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Abstract  
Although terrorism continues to retain its localised nature in some respects, the threat 
has taken on an international character for some time now. Consequently, national 
efforts to curb terrorism are not sufficient in dealing with the threat, underscoring the 
importance of multilateral counterterrorism cooperation. The United Nations (UN) is 
perhaps the most visible and predominant international organisation for security 
issues and has thus built the prime case study for this research endeavour. The aim of 
this thesis has been to examine how the UN’s response to terrorism has changed since 
the 1970s. In doing so, the project has provided an empirical overview of 50 years of 
UN counterterrorism efforts and has analysed the empirical data to identify patterns, 
continuities, and disruptions in the UN’s response. The findings suggest that the 
United Nations has seen both change and continuity in its efforts to quell terrorist 
violence and it has been demonstrated that, while multilateral counterterrorism 
cooperation is possible at the UN, it is cumbersome and progress is best done away 
from the political limelight. The obstacles that have prevented swift action when the 
UN General Assembly first took up the issue in 1972 have remained remarkably 
consistent and are unlikely to be solved quickly. The step-by-step criminalisation of 
certain offences through treaty-making has however allowed the Assembly to make 
some progress. Following the Cold War, the Security Council has — although not 
spared from definitional short-comings — responded to terrorism in a more assertive 
(e.g. sanctions) and at times forceful manner. Finally, it has been highlighted that the 
politised nature of terrorism can greatly limit counterterrorism responses. Therefore, 
it has been suggested that future academic inquiry must explore the extent to which 
less politised organisations, those that are technical and regional in nature, might be 
better suited to address terrorism within their framework.  
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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION 
 
After almost twenty years since the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the 
Pentagon, terrorism remains a significant threat to the international community and 
its citizens. The events of September 11th, 2001 set off a new era in counterterrorism 
(CT) (Hoffman: 2002); governments and commercial enterprises alike considerably 
increased counterterrorism-expenditures, and through international and regional 
forums countries entertained verbal and political – and at times even legal – 
counterterrorism commitments at the highest diplomatic level. If any doubt remained 
as to the danger posed by both international and domestic terrorism after 9/11, such 
doubts surely subsided in light of the attacks in Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005, 
respectively. The occurrences in Paris in 2015 and Brussels in the early months of 2016 
attest to the persistent yet changing nature of the global threat posed by terrorism, 
partially due to the lone wolf nature of the attacks. Recent terrorist incidents across 
the globe have exposed the enduring vulnerability of all countries to terrorist attacks 
and they have reaffirmed the notion that interstate cooperation is indispensable.  
Evolving over time, terrorism has taken on many forms and shapes, from anarchist 
terrorism in the 1880s to non-state terrorism (e.g. Red Army Fraction) and state 
terrorism1 (e.g. in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union) as well as the state-sponsored 
terrorism of the 1940s and 1980s. Terrorism has also been used as a tactic by 
decolonisation and self-determination movements and continues to be drawn on by 
the decentralised and network-like movements of present-day terrorist groups, 
namely al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). While this list is 
neither exhaustive nor suggestive of a chronological or linear development of the 
phenomenon, it is meant to serve as evidence to help refute any claims in favour of the 
novelty of terrorism, and to demonstrate the changing nature of both the perpetrators 
and the victims of terrorism. In spite of periods with relatively little terrorist activity, 
terrorism has remained a reoccurring theme throughout history, one that has made it 
onto the agenda of the United Nations and other international organisations in the 
1970s and has remained there since.  
Some of the earliest terrorists were the Zealots-Sicarri and the Assassins, dating back 
to the time of the Roman Empire. Born out of a desire for true religious independence 
and mounting discontent regarding the Roman occupation, the Sicarris used terrorism 
as a systematic weapon of disruption. Attacking its victims in broad daylight and 
preferably in crowded areas in Jerusalem, the group used Sica’s (short knifes) to 
murder Romans and those whom they perceived to be Roman collaborators. While 
their struggle did not bear much fruit – on the contrary, leading to the destruction of 
 
1 While state terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism continues to be a real threat, this thesis will exclude it 
from further analysis. It is important to however acknowledge, that such terrorism, whether direct or indirect, 
has the most victims and should garner attention in future research. Brief examples include, the Libyan 
government involvement in the Lockerbie Airplane bombing in 1988, the Serbian governments support for the 
Black Hand that significantly contributed to the outbreak of the First World War and Iraq’s support for the 
Palestinian resistance group Abu Nidal. Other examples include the US support for the Contras in Nicaragua 
in the 1980s and the Iraqi support of terrorist groups leading up to and during the Iran-Iraq war.  
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the Second Jewish Temple by the Romans under Titus’ leadership in 70 CE – the group 
is often recognised as the first terrorist organisation one thousand years on (Chalian 
& Blin: 2007, 55-58).2 As an offshoot of the Ismailis, the Assassins are another prime 
example of early terrorism. Based in Persia, and later expanding into Syria, the 
Assassins targeted prefects and local governors, and assassinated prominent crusaders, 
like King Conrad of Montferrat. Hassan Sibai, the first leader of the organisation, 
understood that given the rather limited size of his organisation, an open-field, war-
like battle would do little in helping the group achieve its objectives. Rather, he 
recognised that the group could only be successful if it engaged in a drawn-out and 
enduring campaign of terror (Laqueur: 2012, 8).  
From the anarchist movements of the late 1880s3 to the violent resistance movements 
that arose out of the struggles of the First and Second World War, terrorism has indeed 
been a faithful companion of mankind.4 The end of the First World War saw the rise 
of right-wing and fascist organisations like the Croatian Ustacha, the German 
Freikorps and the Romanian Iron Guard – groups whose appeal lasted well into the 
1930s. As decolonisation gathered traction after the Second World War, terrorism 
became a useful weapon for a number of groups seeking independence. While the 
French faced an uphill battle against the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) in Algeria 
from 1954 to 1960, the British were (re)confronted with the Irgun Jewish Resistance 
Movement in Mandate Palestine. From Algeria to Kenya, (colonial) governments 
across the globe were challenged by the growing number of calls for independence, 
many of which drew on terrorism as one weapon in their struggle. The post-war period 
also saw the rise of the Mau Mau in Kenya in 1952 and the Basque Euskadi Ta 
Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain seven years later, where the former fostered anti-colonial 
ambitions and the latter separatist objectives.  
Since 1968, the world has witnessed the rise of violent Palestinian self-determination 
movements and left-wing terrorism across Europe; it has experienced Shiite Islamism 
ensuing the Iranian revolution of 1979; and it has felt the ruthless resolve of Jihadists5 
in Afghanistan throughout the Soviet-Afghan war. The period from 1980 up until the 
end of the 20th century bore witness to the campaigns of the Shi’a Hezbollah, the brutal 
terrorist campaigns in Chechnya and Kashmir, and the First World Trade Centre 
bombings in 1993. Other parts of Europe have witnessed the re-emergence of neo-Nazi 
groups, including inter alia the Danish Green Jacket movement of the 1980s and the 
more recent German National Socialist Underground (NSU) organisation that 
emerged in the early years of the 2000s (Law: 2005). 
 
2 For further reading on the Sicarris and other earlier forms of terrorism see Laquer’s “A History of Terrorism.”  
3 The 1890s were marked by the rise of Armenian and Macedonian terrorism. While seeking independence, 
Armenian nationalists directed their violence against the Turkish government. Their struggle continued well 
into the 1970s, with the assassination of the Turkish Ambassadors to Vienna and Paris in 1975 as prime 
examples. The Macedonian International Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO) is a further 
example in point. See “A History of Terrorism” by Laqueur.  
4 The French Revolution (1789-1799) witnessed the rise of what can be coined as state-terrorism. However, this 
thesis has chosen to focus on non-state actors and will therefore omit state-terrorism from this study.  
5 A term used to describe a militant Islamist.  
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The end of the 20th century was likewise no stranger to political violence; al-Qaeda 
bombed the diplomatic missions of the United States in both Kenya and Tanzania in 
1998, and over a year later the group attempted to sink the US Navy Vessel USS Cole 
while it was refuelling in Yemen. The events in 2001, the re-emergence of ISIL in Iraq 
and Syria in 2013, and recent events in Europe remain sobering reminders of the 
eternal and devastating imprint of terrorism, as well as its transboundary nature.  
The aims and origins of certain terrorist groups echo localised grievances. There is, 
however, little disagreement over the internationalised nature of contemporary and 
past terrorist movements (Schweitzer & Ferber: 2005, Hoffman: 2006, Bapat: 2007, 
Jensen: 2013 and Brown: 2017). While globalisation has shrunk the prominence of 
national borders, helped bridge cultural differences, revolutionised both travel and 
global communication, and facilitated the accumulation of unprecedented economic 
wealth, terrorists have equally taken advantage of emerging opportunities. They have 
re-calibrated their organisational structure, amended their aims, and attuned their 
message so as to reflect the transnational and interlocked nature of today’s globalised 
order. More importantly, terrorists have weaponised the vehicles of globalisation, in 
particular making use of TV broadcasting and the opportunities presented by the 
internet. It nevertheless remains important to acknowledge that the 
internationalisation of terrorism is not a phenomenon limited to the current epoch.  
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), an umbrella organisation of 
the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), remains one of the most practical 
examples in demonstrating the internationalised nature of terrorism in the late ‘60s 
and early ‘70s. The El Al aircraft hijacking of flight 426 in 1968 and the Olympic Munich 
massacre in 1972 are two cases in point. Flight 426 was en route from London 
Heathrow Airport to Lod Airport in Israel via Rome, when members of the PFLP took 
control of the aircraft and forced the plane to divert to Algiers. The hostages were 
released five weeks later in exchange for Arab prisoners. What is interesting about this 
case is not the fact that the plane was hijacked on its way from Europe to Israel, 
although this does reaffirm the international dimension of terrorism at the time. 
Rather, the point of interest is the global media echo that followed. As one spectator 
observed, the event “…aroused the consciousness of the world and awakened the 
media and world opinion much more - and more effectively - than 20 years of pleading 
at the United Nations” (Quoted in Hoffmann: 2006, 64). The Munich Olympic 
massacre in 1972 was likewise able to capture the world’s attention in an 
unprecedented manner. The Olympics in Munich presented West Germany with an 
opportunity to “reflect the new age in their [West German] rehabilitated land that had 
made a commitment to the ideal of peace and brotherhood among nations” (Melcer: 
2018, 1). In the early hours of September 5th, 1972, members of a Palestinian terrorist 
organisation known as the Black September evaded security and stormed the Olympic 
village to take nine Israeli athletes hostage and immediately kill two. During a 
disastrous rescue operation, all nine athletes perished and the three surviving 
terrorists were taken into custody. In spite of world-wide condemnation of the attack, 
the terrorists were able to propel their grievances onto the international stage, most 
tellingly conveyed by Yasser Arafat being invited to speak at the United Nations 
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eighteen months later (Hofmann: 1974, 1). The Palestinian conflict is deeply rooted in 
nationalist sentiment and its struggle against the state of Israel; however, since the 
1970s Palestinian terrorism truly entered the international arena.  
Hatched from the global student protests at the end of the 1960s, the West German 
Red Army Fraction (RAF) founded by Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof, amongst 
others, posed a considerable challenge for the West German government, while other 
countries certainly faced their own struggles with revolutionary terrorism. In spite of 
the RAF’s West German origins, the group turned to movements of the PLO for both 
training and funding. As early as 1969, the PLO welcomed West German members of 
the group to their training camps in Jordan, and in the years that followed, RAF 
members are said to have been involved, for example, in the hijacking of the Air France 
Flight to Entebbe in Uganda.6 Certainly, the 1970s will be remembered as “the decade 
of the terrorists” (Jensen: 1980, 1) and it ought also to be remembered as the start of a 
new era of truly international terrorist activity. In this respect, Jensen rightly observed 
that “[t]he ten years [1970-1980] brought us the Lod Airport massacre, the murder of 
Olympic athletes at Munich, the takeover of the OPEC headquarters in Vienna, the 
daring rescues of hostages in Entebbe and Mogadishu…and, almost at the end of the 
decade, the frustrating and continuing crisis that began with the seizure of our 
embassy in Tehran” (Jensen: 1980, 1).  
Despite the continued threat posed by non-state terrorist actors, the 1980s and '90s 
were also shaped by state-sponsored terrorism, examples of which include Libya’s 
involvement in the West Berlin Discotheque bombing of 1986 and the Pan Am Flight 
103 bombing over Lockerbie Scotland in 1988 (BBC: 2018). A further example includes 
Sudan’s overt support for terrorism up until the expulsion of Bin Laden in 1996 
(Bhattacharji: 2008). Organisations such as Hamas, al-Qaeda, and the Egyptian Islamic 
Jihad (EIJ) had found a home in Sudan after the end of the Afghan-Soviet war in 1989, 
leading to the imposition of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions against the 
country in 1996.  
ISIL and al-Qaeda and its affiliates have also internationalised; technological advances 
and the understanding that radicalisation is no longer limited to the confines of 
remote caves in Afghanistan or the closed quarters of radical madrassas7 has changed 
the international character of contemporary terrorist movements. With the franchise-
like nature of al-Qaeda, for example, the organisation was able to promote a “global 
ideology that linked local causes together via an image of world politics that presented 
Muslims worldwide as victims of Western oppression. These components enabled 
them to function and replicate on a global scale” (Brown: 2017, 153). Despite being 
predominantly entrenched in Afghanistan (up until the US-led invasion in 2001), al-
Qaeda has evolved into an international movement that remains global in action, 
thought, and impact. The al-Qaeda attacks, from the US embassy bombings in Kenya 
and Tanzania in 1998 to September 11th, echoed far and initiated lengthy military 
 
6 See Blumenau’s “The United Nations and Terrorism: Germany, Multilateralism, and Antiterrorism efforts in 
the 1970s” for further reading on the hijackings and their consequences.  
7 A name at times given to Islamic religious schools.  
 
 
- 13 - 
counter-operations across the globe. At the same time, ISIL has taken the fight to 
Europe. The ISIL-inspired and executed attacks in Paris in 2015, the Nice truck 
bombing in 2016, and the Berlin Christmas market attack in the same year, serve as 
sad examples for the transnational targeting practises of the group.8 
More recently, the global community has become faced with a rapidly and constantly 
changing threat. It is becoming increasingly difficult to track self-radicalised 
individuals and to curtail their activities. This challenge is further compounded by the 
growing number of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) returning home from conflicts in 
Syria and Iraq with military training and ideological indoctrination. Indeed, the 
organisational structure of terrorism has changed – taking on an unprecedented 
network-like form – and so too have the weapons used by terrorists. The London 
Bridge attacks in 2017 have demonstrated that a single knife has the potential of 
inflicting bodily harm and can terrorise an entire community. Today, terrorism 
remains unpredictable, individualised, and international. And as terrorism remains a 
global and interconnected phenomenon, responses to it cannot successfully be 
designed on the national level either. As terrorism became more international in the 
early 1970s, the response to it had to be international, too.  
 
  
  
 
8 Although ISIL has claimed responsibility for most attacks in Europe in recent years, it is well-advised to 
acknowledge the differences between those acts committed in the name of the group, and to which the group 
served as an inspiration; and those acts that were directly sanctioned by the group, and that were executed by 
a formal member of the organisation. The line between these two differences may be ambiguous, and the 
outcome of the attacks render derivation moot, however, I wish to draw a distinction to demonstrate the non-
hierarchical and network-like structure of terrorism today.  
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CHAPTER TWO - PRELIMINARIES 
 
Research purpose and question  
 
The aim of this thesis is to examine how the United Nations counterterrorism response 
has evolved from the 1970s until 2019 and to thus provide an empirical overview of 50 
years of UN counterterrorism efforts. This project will also analyse the empirical data 
to identify patterns, continuities, and disruptions in how the United Nations has dealt 
with terrorism. To put it as a question: How has the United Nations’ response to 
terrorism changed since the 1970s? An implicit aim of this research endeavour is to 
furthermore explore, to the extent the subject allows, what factors have influenced the 
organisation’s response to terrorism. Over the past 50 years, the UN has evolved into 
one of the most visible counterterrorism actors, with its activities taking an 
exponential hike after 9/11. The crux of the matter, however, remains that a full 
assessment of the organisation’s efforts in this issue area are better understood with a 
historical context in mind. A historical approach can provide the necessary depth in 
identifying long-term patterns and trends and can place specific developments in their 
appropriate contexts, thereby isolating lessons for the present and the future. 
Additionally, the focused natured of this research project intends to produce rich 
empirical data for comparison, as well as provide a basis for future research. This 
project is moreover an attempt to provide a succinct synopsis on the literature on the 
topic. The literature on the matter is fragmented and in many instances limited to 
certain time periods as well as disciplinary fields (e.g. law). Following the attacks on 
9/11, the interest of academics in UN-counterterrorism accelerated, yet many works 
neglect to consider pre-9/11 initiatives in detail. Doing so fails to provide a complete 
picture – a gap this thesis intends to bridge. It is also briefly worth noting that, while 
individual countries certainly influence policies within the United Nations, this is not a 
country-specific study. It is the UN as a whole that remains the main focus.  
 
Case selection  
The decision to put the focus on the United Nations was driven by a number of factors. 
Given the pertinence of the comparison element of this thesis, the author only 
considered cases that had a long enough history to provide sufficient material for 
analysis. And thus, the United Nations is a worthy case study. Indeed, it is the only 
truly global organisation, both in terms of scope and reach, and its impact reaches 
from Albania to Zimbabwe. With the growing proliferation of international terrorism, 
global, regional, and sectoral organisations have all been compelled to take action 
against terrorism but the United Nations has remained the predominant international 
organisation for security issues. For instance, the Organisation for the Prevention of 
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) have both taken up counterterrorism-related work. 
Whereas the former addressed the threat posed by the proliferation of chemical 
weapons and terrorism, the latter speaks to the role of culture in preventing 
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radicalisation. Yet, their counterterrorism mandate remains rather peripheral and 
would not have provided the amount of historical (lasting mandate) and output data 
required for in-depth case study scrutiny.  
The case study selection process does, however, have a number of shortcomings. 
Amongst others, the process has neglected to consider non-western organisations like 
the African Union (AU), the Arab League (AL), or the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), a decision that was not taken lightly. However, the researcher’s 
prior knowledge and understanding of the United Nations contributes to the 
robustness and depth of the study. Additionally, the potential language barriers 
associated with researching such organisations, both in terms of conducting 
interviews and document analysis, would have proven difficult and could have 
jeopardised the integrity of this study. More so, case study nomination was also 
dictated by the availability of sufficient material for examination. For example, the 
ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism only entered into force in 2011 and 
therefore the lack of historical material to explore would have made a long-term 
analysis difficult. These organisations, as well as regional and sectoral counterparts, 
play a growing role in counterterrorism and future research ought to endeavour to 
understand their responses in more detail.  
It is also worth mentioning that this research project has intentionally neglected to 
consider not only the European Union (EU) but also less permanent and ad hoc 
entities, like the Group of 8 (currently G7). The EU is a special case as one of its bodies, 
the European Commission, has unparalleled exclusive rights to initiate legislation and 
has far-reaching implementation powers (e.g. infringement proceedings). The EU’s 
counterterrorism efforts can be the subject of its own PhD project and would thus also 
reach beyond the scope of this thesis.9 The G7 has been excluded as it does not have a 
proper bureaucratic structure and deals with issues on a more ad hoc basis. Therefore, 
the United Nations is an ideal case study as it is arguably the most important 
organisation the world over and has dedicated much of its time to security issues. The 
UN is also a symbol of the international community and has dealt with terrorism long 
enough to allow the identification of long-term trends.  
 
Methodological approach and data collection  
 
The thesis combines exploratory, descriptive, historical, analytical, and comparative 
elements under a qualitative research agenda. A qualitative research process provides 
the most promising answers to the research question, namely, how has the United 
Nations’ response to terrorism changed since the 1970s? A further aim of this research 
project is to stimulate further discussion on multilateral organisations and 
counterterrorism, an objective that requires thick and in-depth detail that can only be 
 
9 See Hlavac’s “Less than a State, More than an International Organisation: The Sui Generis Nature of the 
European Union” and Phelan’s essay “What is Sui Generis About the European Union? Costly International 
Cooperation in a Self-Contained 
Regime” for further discussion on the matter.  
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generated by a qualitative approach. A quantitative approach would not produce the 
rich and thick detail and context necessary for a comprehensive assessment.10 
This research is exploratory as the response taken by the United Nations’ in more 
recent years is still underexplored. The research is also descriptive as the thesis intends 
to portray and illustrate the response taken by the organisation, a task that requires 
in-depth narrating and recounting of major initiatives within the respective periods. 
This is necessary because other attempts at delivering an analysis on international 
organisations and counterterrorism have been legal and practitioner-oriented, with 
only a few exceptions considering a historical dimension (e.g. Luck: 2006a and 
Blumenau: 2014b). Consequently, a complete, long-term empirical study of the UN’s 
counterterrorism efforts since the 1970s does not yet exist and this PhD intends to 
contribute to this task. The empirical basis provided in this study is also essential to 
accomplish the second goal of this thesis: To provide a comparative and analytical 
exploration of patterns, continuities, and disruptions in the organisation’s attempts to 
tackle terrorism.  
Building on the above, the research will make use of content analysis, whereby 
documents are analysed in a replicable and structured manner. This analysis is based 
on a detailed study of primary documents produced by the UN over the past 50 years, 
such as resolutions, press releases, meeting records, and multilateral treaties. 
Academic scholarship will also contribute to the basis upon which this project is built. 
Over the course of the research process, the author has undertaken numerous visits to 
the United Nations Headquarters in New York and has had the opportunity to discuss 
the research matter with individuals engaged in counterterrorism work. These 
background discussions have further directed this research endeavour.  
This thesis will focus on the time between the early 1970s until 2019. This time period 
was chosen as the United Nations formally placed terrorism on the agenda of the 
organisation in 1972, making the early 1970s a rational starting point. The end date of 
2019 was chosen as it was important to not only consider the immediate response of 
the organisation to ISIL in 2015 but to moreover track the response over a number of 
years. Also, the timeframe available for this project does not extend beyond 2019, and 
therefore the end date could not exceed beyond 2019.  
 
Limitations  
 
Despite having made every effort to design and execute a research project as rigorous 
as possible, certain limitations persist. At the heart of the limitations lies the problem 
of generalisation. Although the findings of the study generate fruitful thoughts for 
multilateral counterterrorism efforts by international organisations, the conclusions 
drawn are essentially limited to the United Nations and cannot be extrapolated to the 
work of other organisations. This thesis is also limited by a word count. Consequently, 
 
10 See for example Tallberg & Sommerer et al.’s “The performance of international organisations: a policy 
output approach” for a quantitative approach. 
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this project will not account for every measure taken by the United Nations but will 
rather focus on the major efforts as identified in the literature, by the author, and 
discussions with individuals familiar with the subject. This nevertheless remains a 
severely subjective endeavour. A further limitation of this thesis relates to the 
allocated timeframe. The research for this project was conducted from January 2017 to 
November 2019, and could not take into account new developments and scholarship 
after this date. Finally, the researcher has not undertaken research in national archives 
or UN archives. Exploring the internal workings of national delegations to the United 
Nations and how country positions have taken shape, or the position taken by UN-
diplomats, would yield great insights, however many archives have an embargo that 
would limit the research timeframe to the 1970s. More so, archival research is country-
specific and conducting such time-consuming research would only marginally help in 
answering the research question at hand, that is, the general process and outcomes of 
UN counterterrorism efforts. Notwithstanding the limitations, the historical and 
comparative approach taken here will nevertheless fill a research void.  
 
Definitions and conceptualisations  
 
What is terrorism? Academics, practitioners, and policy-makers have yet to reach a 
consensus on what terrorism is and its intended scope. Disagreements arise over the 
aim and purpose of terrorism, as well as the culprits and victims. As Brown observes, 
the label given to terrorism and those branded as terrorists “…gives states considerable 
power to act and use violence against a group and it significantly guides how a state 
should act” (Brown: 2017, 152). For any academic inquiry, a clear definition is hence 
essential. In the context of terrorist violence, there also remains a lack of consensus 
over the suitability of equating the violence perpetrated by the state with that of non-
state actors. In other words, many scholars disagree with the notion of including state 
terrorism within the general study of terrorism. Walter Laqueur, for instance, holds 
that the “…motives, functions and effect between oppression by the states and political 
terrorism” are fundamentally different, and considering these as a single phenomenon 
would cause considerable irritation amongst scholars (Blakeley: 2012, 2). It may also 
be argued that differentiating between state and non-state terrorism may legitimise 
the use of violence that is in itself illegitimate. Jörg Föh puts forward an interesting 
differentiation when he argues in favour of distinguishing between terrorist acts that 
are perpetrated by the state and those committed by non-state actors, but he does so 
by using distinct terminology; ‘terror’ versus ‘terrorism’. Inspired by the French 
Revolution beginning in 1789, Föh maintains that the term ‘terror’ should be associated 
with political violence committed by the state (from above), whereas the term 
‘terrorism’ should be used to describe violence perpetrated by non-state entities (from 
below) (Föh: 2010, 43). Considering the different dynamics involved in state terrorism 
(e.g. state apparatus behind the violence) this thesis will argue that a differentiation is 
in order. Violence committed by the state – that which is not endorsed by the 
legitimate monopoly of power doctrine – deserves to be considered as a separate 
phenomenon not only due to the high number of victims that result but also the 
problems it creates at the United Nations.  
 
 
- 18 - 
 
While acknowledging the complexities of defining terrorism and to provide 
conceptual clarity, this dissertation will use the definition put forward by Richard 
English.11 For English, terrorism 
 
” …involves heterogeneous violence used or threatened with a political aim; it 
can involve a variety of acts, targets, and actors; it possesses an important 
psychological dimension, producing terror or fear among a directly threatened 
group and also a wider implied audience in the hope of maximizing political 
communication and achievement; it embodies the exerting and implementing 
of power, and the attempted redressing of power relations; it represents a 
subspecies of warfare, and as such it can form part of a wider campaign of 
violent and non-violent attempts at political leverage” (English: 2009, 24).  
English’s definition, while surely not flawless, is a good starting point. His explicit 
emphasis on the political nature of terrorism and the element of instilling fear in an 
audience beyond that of the immediate victims, as well as the inclusion of a 
psychological dimension, aids in distinguishing the phenomenon from other forms of 
violence, such as violence committed by organised crime syndicates. His definition 
moreover covers common elements that are mirrored in other definitions put forward 
by a wide variety of scholars (e.g. Schmid: 2004 and Hoffman: 2006).  
A student of Terrorism Studies can also not help but notice the ambiguous relationship 
that both governments and individuals have adopted with the issue of terrorism. As 
the ensuing chapters will highlight in more detail, the use of political violence is not 
always considered a threat in all and any circumstances. On the contrary, many former 
anti-colonial movements that have made use of violence as part of their liberation 
process – acts that could certainly be classified as terrorism – enjoyed wide support. 
For instance, while one can surely muster support for Nelson Mandela’s struggle in 
freeing South Africa from the horrors of an apartheid regime, the African National 
Congress’ use of violence could in certain cases also be characterised as terrorism 
(Little: 2018). A further dilemma as relates to the issue of definition is that the terms 
‘international terrorism’, ‘terrorism’ and ‘political violence/crime’ are at times used 
synonymously. In the case of the United Nations, for example, the General Assembly 
has refered to ‘terrorism’ and ‘international terrorism’ in what seems to be an 
interchangeable manner. For example, General Assembly resolution 62/71 under 
agenda item ‘measures to eliminate international terrorism’ condemns “the heinous 
acts of terrorism” and soon after reiterates the importance of international cooperation 
in “effectively [suppressing] international terrorism” (UNGA Res. 62/71: 2008, para. 10 
& 15). In contrast, the Security Council has been more consistent in only using the term 
‘terrorism’, especially after 9/11, yet it is not clear where the Council draws the 
distinction between terrorism and international terrorism. 12  What is more, while 
 
11 See Hoffman’s “Inside Terrorism,” English’s “How to Respond,” Schmid and Jongman’s “Political Terrorism” 
and Bjorgo’s “Root Causes of Terrorism” for further reading on the definition of terrorism, its complexities as 
well as its changing nature. 
12 See for example UNSC resolutions 1624, 2396 and 2462.  
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terrorism is a type of political crime not all political crimes can be identified as 
terrorism. In this respect, Helfgott differentiates between two types of political crimes: 
oppositional crime and state crime. While the former focuses on violent offenses such 
as terrorism, the latter is focused on state crimes (e.g. human rights violations by 
governments) (Helfgott: 2008, 331). 
The debate is endless and would reach far beyond the allocated scope of this thesis; 
however, suffice it to say that as long as governments and individuals continue to 
perceive politically motivated violence as a necessary evil to reach their objectives, a 
definition of terrorism and auxiliary terms will be difficult to reach. In addition, while 
there are merits in differentiating between ‘terrorism’, ‘international terrorism’ and 
‘political crimes’ this thesis will use these terms interchangeably so as draw on the 
terminology used by UN member states and to avoid repetition. This is however only 
for the purpose of this thesis and in no way should indicate that these terms are 
completely identical.  
Counterterrorism is another complex term to define and there is yet to be a consensus 
on what it encompasses. Counterterrorism, for the purpose of this thesis, will thus be 
defined as “…devising methods and policies to cause nonstate groups that employ this 
[terrorism] technique to stop using violence to achieve their political objectives” (Art 
& Richardson: 2007, 1). Although this definition is neglectful of state actors as terrorist 
entities and does not sufficiently consider the misuse of the counterterrorism label, it 
provides sufficient parameters to proceed for the purpose of this study. 
 
The Lie of the Land- the literature  
Over the past decades, international organisations have been the subject of extensive 
scholarly debate. Academics have approached the question of why and under what 
circumstances IOs are formed (Abbott & Snidal: 2005 and Anand: 2010); in what 
circumstances states are likely to draw on tools of multilateral cooperation (Mitchell: 
2006 and Cai: 2011); how organisations have evolved in the 19th, 20th, and 21st centuries 
(Mazower: 2012); and, the reasons behind the respective changes (Reinalda: 2009, Gest 
& Armstrong et al.: 2013 and Klabbers: 2015). Much of the literature has attempted to 
address the role and function of international organisations in the international 
system (Heinescz et al.: 2005, Archer: 2011, Oestereich et al.: 2012, Martin & Simmons: 
2013 and Abbott et al.: 2015). Using both theoretical and empirical insights, researchers 
have pondered over the significance of international organisations in world politics, 
and depending on their theoretical preferences, have come to rather different 
conclusions. A more recent strand of the literature (Bianchi: 2007, Lawrence: 2007, 
Gabriele: 2013) has also embarked on the difficult task of quantifying IO contributions 
by using categories such as efficiency, effectiveness, and performance (Helm & Sprinz: 
2000, Young: 2011, Ohanyan (2015), Talberg et al: 2016 and Lall: 2017). Despite the 
valuable insights created, there remains a need to better understand – empirically – 
how the responses of organisations, like the United Nations, have changed over time. 
This is important as a historical analysis allows one to better understand what the 
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main points of contention have been and what responses have received most support 
over time. In essence: What has worked and what has not? This project contributes to 
a number of different research areas. In particular, it touches upon the discussion on 
the role and function of the United Nations, and international organisations more 
generally, as well as the general literature on terrorism and the United Nations.  
Numerous works (Angell: 1965, Feld: 1972, Sheets & Maarer: 2000, Archer: 2001, 
Joachim et al.: 2008, Martin & Simmons: 2012, Oesterich: 2012, Helm & Sprinz: 2000, 
Cooper: 2002, Lawrence: 2007, Gabriela: 2013 and Lall: 2017) have established that 
international organisations have a role and consequently a function to play in the 
international system. Yet, in spite of such studies, a number of mainstream approaches 
to international relations theory dismiss IOs as actors in their own right, continuing 
to assume that states use IOs as a means to pursue foreign policy instruments.13 As 
Barkin observes, “[h]aving no ability to tax, they [international organisations] depend 
on states to fund them. Having no territory, they [international organisations] depend 
on states to host them … As such, it makes more sense to understand IOs as tools in 
the power struggles of states, than as independent actors or independent effects” 
(Barkin: 2006, 8). In the wider literature on the role of international organisations one 
can indeed find a number of impressive works. Archer’s “International Organisations”, 
Abbott’s “International Organisations and Orchestrators”, Martin and Simmons’ 
chapter on international organisation and institutions, as well as Oestereich et al.’s 
“International Organisations as Self-Directed Actors” are only a few of many studies 
that provide compelling scholarship on the role of international organisations in a 
wide variety of policy fields. That being acknowledged, there is a scarcity of 
comparative research and, equally important, there is also a noticeable dearth of 
studies which address counterterrorism in particular. 
More important to the purpose of this thesis is the scholarship on the United Nations 
and counterterrorism. Indeed, there has been a remarkable amount of literature on 
the UN and terrorism, especially in the post-9/11 era (Romaniuk: 2010, 2). That being 
said, there are however a number of gaps that make a research project of this nature 
necessary. The United Nations is the most well-known and certainly one of the most 
influential organisations on the world stage. It is hence evident that the UN has been 
the subject of important analysis in most academic fields, ranging from law to social 
sciences. While there has been a wealth of literature addressing, for example, the legal 
issues surrounding the UN and terrorism (Scharf: 2016, Terry: 2016 and Elgebeily: 2016), 
there have only been a few studies that have drawn on other disciplines. This is 
important as many concepts, such as the use of force in response to terrorism in the 
context of the UN, have primarily been examined from a legal perspective (Byers: 2002 
 
13 Theories of International Relations have different stipulations about the role that IOs have in international 
relations and their actorness (or agency). See for example Simmons & Martin’s chapter “International 
Organisations and Institutions” in the “Handbook of International Relations” or Bayeh’s “Theories on the role 
of international organisations in maintaining peace and security” for a more detailed treatment of this 
discussion 
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or Cirkovic: 2017), although they have implications for the broader field of political 
science and international relations.  
Over the past decades, academics have turned to examining the counterterrorism 
contributions of specialized agencies (Mackenzie: 2010), the early efforts in the 
General Assembly to curtail terrorist activities (Hoveyda: 1977, McWhinney: 1984, 
Halberstam: 2003, Peterson: 2004, Boulden: 2014 and Blumenau: 2014a, 2014b) and 
such efforts have also included inquiries into the work of the Security Council in 
responding to terrorism from the 1980s onwards. While these publications have 
certainly contributed to a better understanding of what the UN has done in response 
to terrorism, these works have in many instances remained time-specific (Blumenau: 
2014a), general in nature (Boulden & Weiss: 2004), and only a few of the long-term and 
more general ones have taken a historical approach (Peterson: 2004 Luck: 2006a, 
2006b and Kramer & Yetic: 2007). While there was a spike in academic interest and 
systematic scrutiny in the post-9/11 era (Rosand: 2003, Luck: 2006a, Nesi: 2006, Stiles: 
2006, Boulden: 2008, Rosenow: 2011), this interest seems to have stagnated as early as 
2010, with a few exceptions (e.g. Romaniuk: 2016). This is indeed a considerable short-
coming considering that the emergence of ISIL compelled the international 
community to take action in 2015. In essence, it remains to be determined if the 
findings of previous studies remain accurate given the amount of time passed and to 
explore the extent to which the organisation has adapted its response vis-à-vis 
previous years. It is also worth noting that given the legally-binding and assertive 
character of the Security Council’s response to terrorism post-9/11, academics have 
neglected to place appropriate focus on the General Assembly (with a few exceptions: 
Boulden: 2014). Although there is a general understanding that the output (besides 
treaties) produced by the UNGA are recommendations only, this is a significant gap. 
As it gathers almost all states on this planet, the General Assembly carries high moral 
weight that makes its resolutions an important contribution to international efforts to 
quell terrorist violence and an indicator of global opinion and directions. Also, while 
the discussions in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly are a valuable 
indication of the progress made on advancing a coherent approach to terrorism, it is a 
forum that has only received marginal attention by academia (with few exceptions: e.g. 
Hafner: 2003). 
 
In examining the development of the UN’s response to terrorism from 1972 (and earlier) 
onwards, this thesis attempts to fill some of the research gaps briefly alluded to above. 
First, the findings of this thesis will inform the debate on the place of international 
organisations in international affairs and the broader roles and functions of IOs. 
Second, this research project will draw on works from a wide-array of academic fields 
(e.g. law and political science), and will thirdly refocus attention on the General 
Assembly. Fourth, by exploring the historical dimension of the United Nations’ 
response to terrorism as early as the late 1960s, leaning on primary sources from the 
Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, this work will take an unprecedented 
historical and detailed approach to the study of terrorism and the United Nations. It 
would however be ill-advised to dismiss and disparage the work that has been done 
thus far on the UN and terrorism. Indeed, academics have gone to great lengths to 
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provide a valuable basis for the future study of the UN in this issue area. To a large 
extent, a project of this kind is only possible because others have provided the 
foundation on which one can build and expand. As has been said elsewhere: We all 
stand on the shoulders of giants.  
 
Research structure  
Chapter one has placed this thesis into its appropriate context. Doing so, the chapter 
has emphasised the historical background and international scope of terrorism. 
Chapter two has discussed the research purpose, methodology, case selection, and this 
study’s limitations. Specifically, the chapter has explained the case selection process, 
highlighting its limitations, and has further alluded to the explorative, historical, and 
comparative aspects of this thesis. The chapter has moreover defined some of the key 
terms and has provided a brief overview of the available literature on the subject, as 
well as emphasized the gap this project intends to fill. While not going into great detail, 
this current chapter will close by emphasising that multilateral counterterrorism 
efforts predate the United Nations, briefly alluding to the Conference of Rome and the 
early attempts to deal with terrorism within the League of Nations (LoN).  
Chapter three will address the initial steps taken by the United Nations to respond to 
terrorism, from the early 1970s, including the adoption of the organisation’s first 
terrorism-related conventions starting in 1973. The chapter will yield considerable 
analytical benefits, allowing conclusions to be drawn as to why the UN responded in 
the manner that it did and how this has changed through the respective time period, 
closing just before the start of the end of the Cold War. Particular emphasis will be put 
on the main points of contention between states and why governments had great 
difficulty in finding common ground.  
Chapter four will set out to trace the organisation’s response to terrorism from the 
mid-1980s up until 2001. Particular focus will rest on identifying the most prevalent 
changes and the driving factors behind the respective changes. Most importantly, the 
chapter will seek to outline how the end of the Cold War helped materialise 
counterterrorism cooperation in the Security Council and will highlight how this 
differed from action taken in the General Assembly. Chapter five is the final 
substantive portion of this thesis and will examine how the organisation tackled the 
issue of terrorism following the attacks on September 11th. With a sharp rise in 
counterterrorism initiatives at the United Nations following 2001, this chapter will 
restrict its focus on major trends, namely the far-reaching and binding obligations 
placed on member states by the Security Council as well as changes to the use of force 
against non-state terrorist actors.  
Finally, this thesis will conclude by reiterating some of the main conclusions drawn in 
the respective chapters and will subsequently embark on providing an answer to the 
research question at hand, that is, how has the United Nations’ response to terrorism 
changed since the 1970s? The final portion of this project intends to identify the major 
changes and when they have occurred and to highlight the relevance of the findings 
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to broader international efforts to counter terrorism. Concluding remarks will 
moreover identify further lines of inquiries and the importance of further research into 
the subject area, including a particular focus on regional and sectoral responses to 
terrorism and how these might be different.  
 
Background: Early international counterterrorism 
The multilateral counterterrorism efforts that have emerged at the United Nations 
since the early 1970s – although unprecedented in scope – are not the first of their kind. 
In fact, international struggles to combat terrorism predate the United Nations; 
countries had struggled to curtail terrorist activity in the 19th century, and the League 
of Nations (LoN) undertook early efforts in the 1930s. Throughout the 19th century 
terrorism perpetrated by anarchists was a great burden to many countries. Indeed, 
‘propaganda by the deed’, as anarchist terror was frequently referred to, was a 
worldwide threat that was able to spread across the globe, not least due to expanding 
shipping and communication networks (Shpayer-Makov: 1988, 513). In response to a 
number of politically sensitive assassinations, like that of Austrian Empress Elisabeth 
in 1898, the international community convened the first international conference to 
address the threat posed by anarchists in Rome in the same year. The murder of the 
empress triggered widespread condemnation, and the fact that the Austrian empress 
was murdered by an Italian anarchist, who intended to kill a French duke on Swiss soil, 
provided tangible proof that anarchist terror was far- and wide-reaching and that it 
had taken on a truly international character. It was within the scope of the Conference 
of Rome that countries agreed on regular exchanges of information, the application of 
the ‘Belgian [or attentat] clause14 and a common identification method, namely the 
portrait parlé (Criminocorpus: 2014, 1). The assassinations of King Umberto of Italy in 
1900 and the American President, McKinley, in 1901 once more demonstrated the 
continued threat posed by international terrorism. As a result, a select group of 
countries convened to adopt the St. Petersburg Anti-Anarchist Protocol in 1904, 
specifying expulsion procedures, establishing anti-anarchist offices in each country, 
and further regularising police communication and cooperation (Jensen: 2013, 23). The 
United States did not become party to the protocol, a fact owed to the continued 
absence of a centralised police (Jensen: 1981, 337) and its reluctance to get involved in 
what they perceived to be European affairs (Rapoport: 2002, 12). Equally so, Italy 
refused to sign the protocol amidst concern that the expulsion provisions were in fact 
disguised extraditions. From an Italian perspective, the return of anarchists to their 
home country could potentially lead to considerable domestic troubles (Ibid: 2002, 12). 
With countries disagreeing politically (e.g. conflicts in the Balkans) and ideologically 
(e.g. German expansionism) cooperation became increasingly suspicious in the lead 
up to the First World War. However, the attempt to create a formal anti-anarchist 
alliance not only failed due to the outbreak of the war. Certainly, it was also the 
 
14 The Belgian attentat clause was a common exemption to an obligation of extradition. If a state received an 
extradition request, it could deny such a request on the grounds that the offence for which the alleged offender 
is sought is political in character.  
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absence of some great powers (e.g. America and Italy) in the alliance, which rendered 
it incomplete and left a tremendous gap. Measures directed against the transboundary 
threat of international terrorism would remain incomplete as long as countries vital 
to the process refused to join the efforts, allowing terrorists to find safe havens.  
The First World War that raged across Europe until 1918 left the continent in ruins and 
at the same time marked the end of the international system created by the Congress 
of Vienna15 some hundred years earlier. The League of Nations was created in 1920 
based on the principle of collective security to re-establish peace and maintain 
international order. Despite initial attempts to quell anarchist violence, efforts 
remained ad hoc and the only slowly developing centralised law enforcement system 
in many countries (e.g. the United States of America) prevented any consequential 
advances. Even though the First World War left the European continent in ruins, 
terrorism resurfaced as a threat. It was after all terrorism – the terrorist attack that 
killed the Austrian heir – which was largely responsible for the outbreak of the war. 
When Croatian nationalists assassinated King Alexander I of Yugoslavia and French 
Minister Louis Barthou in Marseille in 1934, the League of Nations was promoted to 
engage in efforts to address terrorism. The assassination in Marseille demonstrated 
that terrorism continued to pose a significant threat to international peace and 
security. Indeed, the proven complicity of either Italy or Hungary, or both, in the 
terrorist attack could have had the potential to lead to war between Italy, Hungary, 
and Yugoslavia (Dubin: 1993, 4). There was thus real danger that the assassination 
could lead to a broader war between nations again and jeopardise peace on the 
European continent. As a result, members of the League set out to negotiate the 1937 
Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. The convention 
defined terrorism as “criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated 
to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or 
the general public” (Draft Terrorist Convention: 1937, Art. 1(2)). To that end, the 
convention obliged state parties to criminalise specific acts, including, inter alia, (1) 
[a]ny wilful act causing death or grievous bodily harm or loss of liberty to: (a) Heads 
of States, persons exercising the prerogatives of the head of State, their hereditary or 
designated successors; (b) [t]he wives or husbands of the above-mentioned persons; 
(c) [p]ersons charged with public functions or holding public positions when the act 
is directed against them in their public capacity” (Article 2). To a considerable degree, 
the 1937 draft convention provided the foundation for later conventions (see chapters 
four and five). Indeed, the instrument asserted, that the crimes laid out in Article 2 are 
made extradition crimes, although Article 8 further stipulates that “[t]he obligation to 
grant extradition under the present article shall be subject to any conditions and 
limitations recognised by the law or the practise of the country which application is 
made” (Ibid: 1937, Art. 8(4)). Similar to other conventions discussed in further detail 
below, the 1937 draft convention however asserted that “[w]hen the principle of the 
extradition of nationals is not recognised … nationals who have returned to the 
territory of their own country after the commission abroad of an offence mentioned 
 
15 The Congress of Vienna system aimed at providing lasting peace in Europe and to establish borders so as to 
ensure a balance of power and stability.  
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in Articles 2 or 3 shall be prosecuted and punished in the same manner as if the offence 
had been committed on that territory” (Ibid: 1937, Art. 9(1)). Article 10 of the 
Convention moreover stipulates that if an individual has committed a crime in a 
country party to the treaty, the country in which the offender is found should 
prosecute and punish the individual as if the crime was committed in its own country. 
Although the convention-text has a number of loopholes, it was the beginning of 
efforts to prevent terrorists from escaping punishment. The agreement understood 
terrorism, although it is political in nature, to be an extraditable offence, yet it did not 
force extradition and left countries with wide discretion in implementation. 
States accepted the seriousness of the dangers posed by international terrorism as 
early as the 19th century. Multilateral counterterrorism – whether in the context of the 
Conference of Rome, the St. Petersburg Protocol, or the permanently established 
League of Nations – was very much subject to geopolitical considerations. More 
specifically, the assassinations of 1934 were not merely a matter of bringing to justice 
the perpetrators, but given the alleged and perceived involvement of states, the events 
had far-reaching ramifications for the maintenance of international peace and for the 
relations between states. By the time the Terrorism Convention was open for signature 
in 1937, the LoN was in disarray. Spain was engaged in civil war, Japanese aggression 
against China increased, and Europe was challenged by German revanchism and the 
rise of Adolf Hitler. Amidst such developments, the urgency attached to multilateral 
counterterrorism subsided and would not reappear as a serious multilateral agenda 
item at the UN until the Secretary-General placed it onto the agenda of the United 
Nations in 1972. The forthcoming chapters will explore how the international 
community has responded to terrorism after WWII. In tracing this trajectory, it will 
become possible to determine if countries were able to overcome the obstacles that 
have prevented meaningful progress in the 19th and 20th centuries.  
 
The United Nations: The General Assembly and the Security Council  
 
The main organs of the United Nations include the General Assembly, the Security 
Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International 
Court of Justice, and the Secretariat. The two bodies that will be the focus of this study, 
however, are the General Assembly and the Security Council and therefore, before 
proceeding, it is important to have a better understanding of the bodies’ institutional 
capacities and how they work, or at least to the extent the word count allows.  
 
The General Assembly 
The General Assembly is the most inclusive body of the United Nations considering 
that all of the 193 member states are represented. Over the past decades the General 
Assembly has come to fulfil the function of organising what has been termed 
“collective legitimisation or collective delegitimisation” (Claude in Voeten: 1995, 527). 
Despite the General Assembly’s rather restricted institutional authority to command 
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member states to take or abstain from particular actions, the workings of the UN body 
have certainly influenced how member states perceive a particular set of issues and 
carry political weight. While the body does not have the ability to sanction – beyond 
political condemnation and “naming and shaming” – the Assembly has come to “guide 
the activity of governments in some general-issue areas, and it influences the 
statements, policies, or behaviour of individual governments and other actors in 
particular situations” (Peterson: 2004, 173). The power of the General Assembly also 
derives itself from the very public stage that it provides and its ability to attract global 
spotlight (e.g. see annual GA session and media coverage). It is perhaps also fair to 
conclude that General Assembly resolutions remain recommendations in nature, and 
although the convention-regimes adopted are binding for those party to it (as opposed 
to Security Council resolutions under Ch. VII which bind all) they require ratification 
and implementation. For this reason, countries are prone to seek unanimity – although 
majority voting is possible16 – and attempt to incorporate the views of as many nations 
as possible. In light of the absence of broad implementation powers or the ability to 
impose sanctions, member states draw on consensus to overcome this short-coming. 
In many instances, the outcomes may also be watered down and may include broad 
provisions that governments can interpret in many different ways. It is important to 
keep the institutional authority of the Assembly in mind, particularly when comparing 
it to the Security Council. As a matter of fact, the institutional capabilities of the 
General Assembly help understand the complexities faced by member states when 
responding to terrorism and provide insight into why the body has responded in the 
manner that it has. In simpler terms, the structural deficiencies, although intended by 
the founding drafters, go a long way in helping understand the absence of action and 
the content of decisions. 
 
The Security Council  
The Security Council has the primary responsibility to maintain international peace 
and security and is comprised of fifteen member states, five of which are the so-called 
permanent members, which includes the United States, the United Kingdom, France, 
Russia, and China, reflecting the great powers of the post-WWII era. The ten 
remaining are the so called non-permanent members and are elected by the General 
Assembly for a period of two years using a formula that considers the major geographic 
regions of the world (Sarooshi: 2019). Therefore, the permanent members retain the 
greatest influence in the Council. This influence is not only due to the veto power of 
the permanent members but also due to their size and capabilities (e.g. militarily) 
(Greenstock: 2008, 251). In practise, action taken by the Security Council is directed by 
the strongest members (e.g. the United States) or through country coalitions (e.g. 
Non-Aligned Movement). Although the United Nations has increasingly developed a 
practise and authority of its own, the organisation remains significantly dependent on 
 
16  The majoritarian voting that is possible in the General Assembly worked well to the advantage of the 
Western countries until the 1970s. The rapid decolonisation and the growing influence of the non-aligned 
countries and the Soviet Bloc however soon changed this development (see Chapter 5). 
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the military capabilities of its members and on the resources allocated to the 
organisation by member states. When examining the role of the United Nations and 
the Security Council in particular, one must hence be wary of the political dynamics 
and the might of the powerful nations involved.  
As the Security Council is the primary organ tasked with the maintenance of 
international peace and security, it has been granted broad powers to respond to 
threats to peace and security. Pursuant to Chapter VII Article 41 (measures not 
involving the use of armed force), members of the Security Council have at their 
disposal a range of sanctions, including both general sanctions (e.g. economic or trade) 
and targeted sanctions (e.g. arms embargoes, travel bans and diplomatic restrictions). 
If the Council determines that non-military measures are coming up short, Chapter 
VII Article 42 enables the body to use force to respond to aggression and to restore 
peace. In the absence of a UN army, the Security Council draws on Article 42 to 
authorize the use of multilateral force through peacekeeping missions or other forms 
of collective force. Chapter I – purposes and principles – of the UN Charter calls on 
member states to settle disputes through peaceful means. Article 2 (4) is perhaps the 
most well-known provision of the Charter, reminding member states of their 
obligation to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity of political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” (UN Charter: 1945, 
Chapter I, Art. 2(4)). Article 51 of Chapter VII however provides an exception to this 
obligation inasmuch by reaffirming the right of individual or collective self-defence in 
the event of an armed attack. This right is only afforded until the Security Council 
takes action, in which case the state party is to discontinue its efforts (UNC, Article 51). 
In consequence, the Security Council is well-equipped to take action against 
international terrorism, both through the use of force and by non-forceful coercive 
measures.  
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CHAPTER THREE – THE UN AND TERRORISM: THE 
BEGINNING 
 
 
The League of Nations (LoN) was formally dissolved by its 23 remaining members on 
April 20th 1946 and the remaining mandates were transferred onto the newly formed 
United Nations. In the aftermath of the Second World War, there was a consensus 
that there ought to be some sort of post-war global order. The LoN failed to prevent 
war, but the Allies understood the importance of an institution that would uphold 
global order. Specifically, the 1941 Atlantic Charter already intended for a “permanent 
system of general security” and Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph 
Stalin planned for some sort of “general organisation, based on the principle of 
sovereign equality of all peace-loving states” (Sayward: 2017, 19). The future 
organisation’s main task would be to safeguard future generations from the scourge of 
war. Delegates at the founding conference of 1945 did not envisage that terrorism 
would become a serious threat to international peace and security (Comras: 2010, 8). 
However, diplomats at the conference made sure that the United Nations was given 
the flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances, a courtesy that the League was not 
afforded. As Luck observes, “[r]ather than listing the kinds of security issues that the 
new organisation should tackle, the founders wisely gave its principle organs 
unprecedented powers and flexibility and authority to respond to emerging threats to 
international peace and security as they would arise over the years” (Luck: 2006a, 338). 
Understandably, the main focus of the founding conference was on creating a system 
of cooperation that would prevent war between states, and at that stage, the menace 
that was international terrorism was largely neglected. This was certainly due to the 
absence of significant terrorist activities during the founding moments of the 
organisation.  
 
However, since 1945 terrorism has not only come to threaten civilians and 
governments domestically, but on many occasions has drawn a wedge between 
countries (e.g. Entebbe 1976), thus truly deserving the label ‘threat to international 
peace.’ Perhaps the murder of the Austrian Archduke by terrorists, leading to the First 
World War, is a telling example of the devastating impact terrorism can have on 
international peace. The Charter of the United Nations (UNC) does not explicitly 
mention terrorism and in consequence it depends on the political will of the 
institution and its member states to tackle the issue. As a matter of record, in the past 
74 years there has been a rise of numerous terrorist organisations that have engaged 
in transboundary operational practises, in respect to both targeting and sanctuary. 
Prominent examples include the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Basque Fatherland 
and Liberty (ETA) and various factions of Palestinian terrorist organisations, like the 
PLO. Yet, the United Nations has not always been chosen as a venue to deal with these 
groups. It is plausible that this is also due to national interests and the unpredictability 
of outcomes of UN consultations. Even after the end of the Cold War, certain conflicts 
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have not, or have only marginally, been addressed within the United Nations 
framework.  
 
The early years of the United Nations were marked by the difficulty of the 
decolonisation process and by what Sayward coined “[e]arly Cold War wrangling” 
(Sayward: 2017, 29). A set of developing crises in Iran, Germany, and Korea increasingly 
played out in front of a global audience at the United Nations. It was in the halls of the 
UN where Indian South Africans brought their complaint against an apartheid regime; 
where independent movements garnered support; 17  where decolonisation took its 
course; and where the Third World changed the dynamics of world order. By the end 
of the Second World War, three-quarters of the world were under colonial rule in one 
form or another, but the global colonial system was rapidly crumbling. The emergence 
of a bipolar international system (United States on the one side and the Soviet Union 
on the other) and the establishment of two military blocks in the form of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact “brought about a new 
international context that led to the necessity of multilateral coordination between 
the countries of the South” (Ministry of External Affairs Government of India: 2012, 3). 
By the late 1950s, former colonial countries became independent members of the UN 
and started to pivot the balance of power in favour of Arab, Asian and African states, 
who would soon gain a majority in the General Assembly. At the Fifteenth Ordinary 
Session of the General Assembly from 1960-1961, seventeen new African and Asian 
states joined the ranks of UN member states, boosting the Global South’s influence at 
the organisation significantly. But even before the Fifteenth Session, countries of the 
so-called Third World – who later organised into the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)18 
– asserted growing influence. This development is best demonstrated by way of 
illustration: When the United Nations General Assembly opened the debate on the 
Algerian Problem (and its independence from France) in the late 1950s, the French 
were irritated by UN involvement in a matter that De Gaulle’s government understood 
to be a matière intern, particularly considering that Algeria was de facto part of French 
territory. As the Algerian struggle for independence continued and no end to the 
bloodshed was in sight, twenty-two Afro-Asian countries, many of which were former 
colonies themselves, requested for the Algerian question to be placed on the General 
Assembly’s agenda (Dossier 37/01/10: 1959, 2). Growing anti-French sentiment was 
only strengthened when former colonies Cambodia, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Morocco, 
Tunisia, and Sudan joined the organisation in 1955 and 1956. In particular, the heads 
of state of Morocco and Tunisia underscored their support for Algerian independence 
and offered their “good offices to open bilateral peace talks on the basis of the 
recognition of Algerian sovereignty [emphasis added]” (Ibid, 1959, 2-3). Despite the 
 
17 See Matthew Connelly’s “A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the 
Post-Cold War Era” for further reading of how independence movements made use of the United Nations early 
on.  
18 Without wanting to go into too much detail at this time, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was created by 
and for former colonial nations from Africa, Asia, Latin America and other regions to coordinate policies and 
to fight what seemed to be an endless battle to ensure that oppressed people could exercise their right to self-
determination and independence. See Morphet ad Vieira’s “The South in World Politics” for further reading 
on emergence and role of the NAM.  
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French government’s continued reiteration of the internal nature of the problem, the 
General Assembly adopted a resolution in which it echoed the longing for negotiations. 
By September 1958 the Algerian Liberation Front (FLN) declared its independence and 
established itself as the Gouvernement Provisoire de la Republique Algerienne (GPRA). 
In 1960 Nikita Khrushchev, then-leader of the Soviet Union, “extended de facto 
recognition to the GPRA, and the Americans started pressuring the French to 
announce a nationwide referendum on Algerian self-determination by January 1961” 
(Sayward: 2017, 41).19 This serves as an example of how a growing body of countries, 
predominantly made up of former colonies in the Southern hemisphere, exercised 
growing political global influence. The use of majoritarianism and the consensus-
based procedure in the General Assembly worked well to the advantage of countries 
of the global north in the 1940s and 1950s. By the 1960s and the 1970s this advantage 
subsided and shifted in favour of the Soviet bloc and countries belonging to the Non-
Aligned Movement who were increasingly able to dictate the agenda (Stiles: 2006, 39). 
 
In the meantime, the wartime alliance of the Great Powers was also rapidly crumbling 
and conflicts along a number of cleavages emerged (e.g. Korean war in 1950 and Berlin 
Crisis in 1961).20 The aversion between the United States and the Soviet Union had 
ramifications for the extent to which terrorism could be addressed at the UN. With 
both powers holding veto prerogatives in the Security Council a stalemate emerged 
and no meaningful action could be taken in that forum.21 As a result, it was the General 
Assembly that emerged as the key actor for counterterrorism-related action. Even so, 
the General Assembly, as will be reflected below, was not entirely free from the 
burdens of Cold War politics and the anti-colonial movement either.  
 
 
Counterterrorism at the United Nations: An early history  
Terrorism did not find its way onto the agenda of the United Nations permanently 
until 1972. It is, however, worth reflecting on how the organisation responded to 
terrorism before that. In September 1948, the United Nations Security Council made 
its first reference to terrorism in resolution 57. Deeply shocked by the murder of Count 
Folke Bernadotte22 (the UN Mediator in Palestine), the Security Council unanimously 
condemned the act “which appears to have been committed by a criminal group of 
terrorists in Jerusalem while the United Nations representative was fulfilling his peace-
seeking mission in the Holy Land” (UNSC res. 57: 1948, para. 1). Besides instructing the 
Secretary-General to take ceremonial preparations (e.g. flying the UN flag at half-
mast), the Council took no further action. In the 1950s, the report “Draft Code on 
Offences against Peace and Security of Mankind” drafted by the International Law 
 
19 A further project that demonstrates the Third World Bloc’s growing influence was the adoption of Resolution 
on 1515 on the Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the establishment 
of Committee 24 to advance the furtherance of people’s right to self-determination.  
20 See Sayward’s “United Nation in International History” for an insightful reading on the organisations early 
years and political divergences that came to light.  
21 This conclusion will be further discussed in subsequent sections of the thesis.  
22 Count Bernadotte was the UN chargé d'affaires tasked with brokering peace between Palestine and Israel. 
He was assassinated by members of the Jewish Zionist group Lehi.  
 
 
- 31 - 
Commission (ILC) made a few passing references to terrorism. In its third session in 
1951, the ILC made note of terrorism in Article 2 (6), stipulating that an act of 
aggression includes, inter alia, “[t]he undertaking or encouragement by the authorities 
of a State of terrorist activities in another State, or the toleration by the authorities of 
a State of organised activities calculated to carry out terrorist acts in another State” 
(ILC: 1951, Article 2 (6)). Eventually the issue of terrorism was again raised in the 1960s 
in “the context of the Declaration on the Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States” (Romaniuk: 2010, 33). The 
declaration settling the friendly relations between states compels governments to 
refrain from engaging in terrorist acts or participating in related activities in another 
state, as well as encouragement of such activities (UNGA resolution 2626: 1970, Annex, 
para. 9 & 21). General Assembly resolution 2625 that followed in 1970 made no mention 
of the term terrorism but merely asserted: “[e]very State has the duty to refrain from 
organising, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts 
in another State or acquiescing in organised activities within its territory directed 
towards the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present 
paragraph involve a threat or use of force” (UNGA res. 2626: 1970, para. 10).  
 
With the proliferation of airplane hijackings in the 1960s, UN involvement in 
counterterrorism gained new momentum, although action was filtered through UN 
specialized organisations (Luck: 2006, Carlton: 2005 and Hegemann: 2014). In fact, the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) became the centrepiece to the UN’s 
counterterrorism efforts in the 1960s. By then, the hijacking of aircraft was a global 
concern. Skyjackings started as a means to escape communist controlled territory in 
Eastern Europe and Cuba (Comras: 2010, 10). By the end of the 1960s, terrorists – a 
significant number of whom declared themselves part of the Palestinian movement – 
however increasingly hijacked planes and pressed their political demands onto 
Western governments (e.g. Dawson’s Field 1970). Terrorists would now threaten the 
hostages and would use the passengers (e.g. threatening to kill them) if their demands 
were not met. Indeed, passengers were usually just a by-product of individuals trying 
to escape from one country to another, yet this changed by the end of the 1960s (Ibid: 
2010, 11). Consequently, states adopted the 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain 
Other Acts Committed aboard Aircraft (the Tokyo Convention), and seven years later 
approved the 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (the 
Hague Convention). The Tokyo Convention was the first UN instrument to establish 
jurisdiction, not only in the state of registration, but furthermore obliged parties to 
“take measures necessary to establish jurisdiction over the offences as the state of 
registration” (Joyner: 2003, 509).  
 
Although the 1963 Tokyo Convention does have application in cases related to terrorist 
offences it is not a counterterrorism instrument. The main objective of the convention 
was to ensure that offenders could not escape justice on the basis of a jurisdiction, or 
the ability to establish jurisdiction. In essence, jurisdiction can be established both by 
the state of registration as well as by the state in whose territory the offence occurred 
(Articles 3 & 4). On that score, it is also worth highlighting that the Tokyo Convention 
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does not define the crime of ‘air piracy’ and it does not explicitly criminalise the offence 
of ‘aircraft hijacking.’ In practise, perpetrators would not necessarily face punishment 
and countries could justify a lack of action with the principle of nulla poena sine lege – 
no penalty without a law. The convention also specifically notes, “nothing in this 
Convention shall be deemed to create an obligation to grant extradition” (Tokyo 
Convention: 1963, Art. 16). As Robert Boyle, the American negotiator in Tokyo, bluntly 
remarks: “it is obvious that the Tokyo convention left major gaps in the international 
legal system in attempting to cope with the scope of aircraft hijacking. There were no 
undertakings by anyone to make aircraft hijacking a crime under international law, no 
undertakings to see to it that the crime was one punishable by severe penalties and 
most importantly, no undertaking to either submit the case for prosecution or to 
extradite the offender to a State which would wish to prosecute” (Boyle in MacKenzie: 
2010, 254). This conclusion is not surprising considering that “[i]t was clear to all…that 
in this particular matter [adoption of the Tokyo Convention] the Bloc delegations were 
merely going through the motion of opposition without any real intention of 
disrupting the work of the Conference” (Ibid: 2010, 252). As such, the conclusion can 
be drawn that political rivalries were not a main obstacle, perhaps owed to the fact 
that the convention did not really impose any obligations on parties.  
 
The Hague Convention enacted in 1970 built on its predecessor and represents a 
noteworthy development insofar that it defines the act of ‘unlawful seizure’ and 
contains a relatively detailed provision on the extradition of alleged offenders. In 
particular, Article 1 outlines the scope of the crime, whereas Article 2 places an 
obligation on countries to “make the offence punishable by severe penalties” (Hague 
Convention: 1970, Art. 2).23 The critical elements of the convention were however 
articles 7 and 8. Whereas the former obliges a state, if it does not extradite the alleged 
offender, to submit the case to its authorities for the purpose of prosecution, the latter 
provides both an obligation and a legal basis for extradition (e.g. the offence is made 
an extraditable offence). The provisions contained in both articles 7 and 8 were indeed 
novel. In respect to the offence of aircraft hijacking, terrorists could no longer evade 
punishment because of the political character of the crime, which was an obstacle to 
extradition in many extradition treaties at the time. However, the Hague Convention 
does not place an obligation on states to prosecute, but merely to present the case to 
the authorities who will then decide if the factual evidence warrants further criminal 
proceedings. Yet, the convention laid the ground for the UN’s aut dedere aut judicare 
– extradite or prosecute – principle, which was to become a constant in future 
conventions.  
 
While aircraft hijacking was a central concern to the international community, the 
destruction of airliners was also increasingly becoming a problem. “Between 1967 and 
1979, terrorists destroyed several airplanes be placings bombs on board” (Joyner: 2003, 
513), an observation that is sufficiently illustrated by the Dawson’s Field Hijacking in 
 
23 Proceeding Article 4 also establishes jurisdiction, Article 6 obliges states to take into custody an alleged 
offender or at a minimum to ensure the presence of the individual for and other articles settle arbitration 
(Article 12).  
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September of 1970 when terrorists blew up airlines in anticipation of a raid (BBC: 1970, 
1). To address this concern, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of 
Violence Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal Convention) was adopted in 
1971. Similar to The Hague and Tokyo conventions, the Montreal Convention contains 
obligations regarding jurisdiction, prosecution, and extradition. The convention 
moreover criminalises certain acts. In the definition of the convention, a person 
commits a crime “if he unlawfully and intentionally (a) performs an act of violence 
against a person on board an aircraft in flight if that act is likely to endanger the safety 
of the aircrafts; or (b) destroys an aircraft in service or causes damage to such an 
aircraft, which renders it incapably of flight or which is likely to endanger its safety in 
flight” (Montreal Convention: 1971, Art. 1). Article 3 of the convention places an 
obligation on states to make such offences punishable by severe penalties and requires 
states to establish jurisdiction over the offence (Article 5). Articles 7 and 8 mirror those 
in the Hague Convention and require a state to submit the case, in the absence of 
extradition, to competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Concurrently, 
the Montreal Convention establishes these crimes as extraditable offences and 
provides legal basis for extradition (Article 8). Once again, however, the convention 
only goes so far in ensuring that terrorists are brought to justice. Despite obligations 
to submit the case to authorities it does not oblige states to initiate judgement.24  
 
 
  
 
24 In subsequent years, the ICAO approved a number of amendments and annexes, as well as institutional 
mechanisms to strengthen the convention-regime24. Such efforts included the establishment of the Committee 
on Unlawful Interferences in 1969 and the approval of the Security Manual for the Safeguarding of Civil 
Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Interferences. In the Annex to the Chicago Convention, ICAO member states 
also adopted an amendment that set out standard practises on unlawful interferences (Romaniuk: 2010, 36).  
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The General Assembly takes action: A divided UN  
Between 1972 and the mid-1980s the United Nations addressed terrorism along two 
distinct tracks. While the first is best characterised as a holistic response, the latter 
was problem-centric. On the one hand, the holistic approach “concentrated on 
elaborating a single, comprehensive standard as a basis for agreeing on a legal 
mechanism to suppress terrorism” (Levitt: 1989, 542) and intended to outlaw terrorism 
in all its manifestations. On the other, the sectoral response focused on the 
criminalisation of an activity that terrorists made use of (e.g. hostage-taking) and 
could as such avoid any definition of the phenomenon. This chapter will deliver an 
overview of the two tracks and will provide a short legislative history as relevant for 
the purpose of this thesis. The initiative of a comprehensive convention on terrorism 
was in deadlock by 1979 and continues to evade member states to this day. The 
adoption of the Diplomats (1973) and Hostages (1979) conventions yielded greater 
success, yet provide illustrative evidence for the politicised and contested nature of 
the issue at the United Nations. Importantly, the ensuing chapter will furthermore 
highlight the geopolitical considerations and the changes in the manifestation of 
international terrorism as key developments in affecting how the organisation 
responded to terrorism.  
 
From the outset it became evident that member states fostered significantly different 
understandings of what terrorism is and what would be the best course of action to 
counter it. Nevertheless, amidst the growing manifestations of international terrorism, 
UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim formally recommended placing terrorism on 
the agenda of the General Assembly in 1972. Waldheim was well-aware of the 
controversies of the agenda item, yet he insisted, also as a matter of credibility, that 
the United Nations could no longer shy away from addressing the difficult political 
problems of the time (Press Release SG/SM/1753: 1972, 1-2). Consequently, on the 8th 
of September 1972 Waldheim requested that the General Assembly include in its 
agenda for the forthcoming twenty-seventh session the item “[m]easures to prevent 
terrorism and other forms of violence which endanger or take innocent human lives 
or jeopardise fundamental freedoms” (Ruperez: 2006, 3). Although the murder of the 
Israeli athletes in the course of the Munich attacks in 1972 certainly provided an 
immediate impetus for action, the Secretary-General emphasised that the initiative 
was in response to the increasing acts of violence perpetrated in recent years, not the 
result of any specific act of terrorism. Specifically, Waldheim cautiously noted, “[i]t 
[the agenda item] does not refer to a specific act of violence. It refers to, and should 
cover, all acts of violence and terrorism against innocent people” (Press Release 
SG/SM/1747: 1972, 3). A few days later, Waldheim observed, “[o]bviously it is not good 
to consider this very complex phenomenon without at the same time considering the 
underlying situations which give rise to terrorism and violence in many parts of the 
world” (Press Release SG/SM/1970: 1972, 3). The roots of terrorism, and their causes 
which make the problem so difficult to tackle, in the words of the Secretary-General, 
“lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair so deep that men are prepared to 
sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes” 
(Ibid.: 1972, 3).  
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On September 20th 1972 the General Committee of the General Assembly took up 
Waldheim’s request. At the opening of the first meeting of the committee, Waldheim 
once again echoed the complexity of the issue at hand and this time also reaffirmed 
the importance of considering the underlying circumstances that give rise to terrorism 
(Waldheim SG/SM/1953: 1973, 2). From Waldheim’s shift in emphasis it becomes clear 
that Third World countries approached him in the interim, expressing their discontent 
with the focus of the agenda item as it stood. When Waldheim met with “key Arab 
representatives, including Amb. Jamil Baroody of Saudi Arabia, they told him bluntly 
they would not accept” (Comras: 2010, 19) the agenda item as originally proposed. 
Fereydoun Hoveyda, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Iran, confirmed as 
much when he maintained “[t]he altered tone of his [Waldheim’s] remarks suggests 
that there had been some exchanges with those who thought their interests might 
adversely be affected” (Hoveyda: 1977, 72).  
 
When the General Committee took up Waldheim’s initiative, the diverging outlooks 
on terrorism promptly came to light. The 25-member committee struggled with the 
decision of whether to recommend the inclusion of the item on the Assembly’s 
agenda.25 In no uncertain terms, then-American representative to the United Nations, 
George H.W. Bush senior, made it clear that it was time for the UN to address 
terrorism. This was well-reflected in the remarks he made to the committee:  
 
“The proper and indeed the only forum for dealing with global problems of this 
magnitude is the United Nations. And to oppose discussion of this problem is 
to strike at the very raison d'etre of the United Nations itself. And if the nations 
of the world here assembled in general session cannot debate the pressing 
global problems of the day and seek their solution, what in heavens name can 
we do? What purpose do we serve here?” (Bush in Perspective Seventy-two 
(no.39): 1972, 5).  
 
Other Western countries agreed. Both the United Kingdom and France asserted that 
it is indeed time for the organisation to approach the subject of international terrorism. 
However, in the same vein they acknowledged the ‘dual responsibility’ of not only 
devising measures to prevent and punish, but also to find solutions to the roots of the 
problem and the underlying causes that give rise to such violence (Perspective 
Seventy-two (no.39): 1972, 7). Notably, they did not intend to use the root causes 
argument in an attempt to stall concrete counter measures. There were nevertheless a 
number of countries that argued against the inclusion of the item. Chen Chu, China’s 
Deputy Permanent representative emphasised that “[i]mperialism, colonialism, neo-
colonialism, racism and Israeli Zionism are the chief culprits of terrorism and 
reactionary violence in the present world. It is perfectly just for aggressed and 
oppressed nations and the people to take up arms under compulsion to resist counter-
revolutionary violence with revolutionary violence [emphasis added]” (Chu in 
 
25 See United Nations Office of Public Information Radio and Visual Services document No.39 for a full list of 
statements by countries in the Steering Committee.  
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Perspective Seventy-two (no.39): 1972, 5). A further opponent was the Soviet Union. 
Yakov Malik, the Soviet Ambassador to the UN, put forth the idea that “[i]t is quite 
clear that no one is entitled to deprive the people of their right to struggle, to fight for 
their freedom and independence, for their legitimate rights and interests against 
colonial domination”, further contending that member states should refrain from 
taking any measures that endanger the legitimate fight of the “peoples of the occupied 
territories against foreign annexationists” (Malik in Perspective Seventy-two (no.39): 
1972, 6). Arguing less on an ideological basis, Jamil Baroody, the Saudi Arabian 
ambassador, suggested that Waldheim was jumping the gun and that the item ought 
to be adjourned until the twenty-eighth session (Hoveyda: 1977, 73). Baroody further 
advised the committee to establish a separate commission that would prepare a 
“dispassionate and objective study of the question” (Ibid.: 1977, 73). The discussions in 
the General Committee were indicative of the elements of contention that would face 
the member states in the coming years. And although much disagreement still 
persisted, the General Committee moved to include the item with 15 votes in favour, 7 
against and with abstentions from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. The 
abstention from the Soviet Union indicated the state’s willingness to engage in 
counterterrorism deliberations at the United Nations. Yet, the remarks by the Soviet 
ambassador also reflect the political tensions between the West and the East.  
 
Upon approval by the General Committee the discussions moved to the General 
Assembly’s Sixth (legal) Committee. It was here that the then-132 members of the 
United Nations continued their discussions on the agenda item. There was a general 
minimal consensus that terrorism is indeed a complex phenomenon. As anticipated 
however, there was significant push back from a number of countries. The 
representative from Senegal characterised the initiatives as “a pretext for allowing 
racist and colonialists opportunists to take severe measures and sanctions against 
those seeking radical changes to the current order of things” (Senegal quoted in 
Comras: 2010, 22). Drawing on the explanation made by Waldheim in his speech to 
the General Committee, the Saudi representative suggested that the title of the item 
should include additional phrasing. The wording that Saudi Arabia suggested would 
redirect focus to the root causes of terrorism. The additional amendment would alter 
the title as to include “…and study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism 
and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which 
cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect 
radical changes” (Quoted in Romaniuk: 2010, 38). Saudi Arabia’s motion was adopted 
with 42 votes in favour, 35 against, and 44 abstentions, with many Western countries 
troubled with this amendment. The very title of the item exposed the philosophical 
and ideological divides. In suggesting the amendment, Saudi Arabia, with plenty 
support from other Arab, African, and Asian countries, aimed to preserve the 
legitimacy of national liberation movements. Indeed, it can be argued that the 
objective of the addendum was to divert attention away from the actual acts of 
violence and redirect focus towards the grievances that give rise and provide impetus 
for such violence. The new title as carried could be understood as suggesting that the 
injustices and grievances must first be eased before the any counter measures can be 
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taken. The title has to also be understood in a broader context. As Rosen and Frank 
remark,  
 
“[o]n the one side of the question in the United Nations General Assembly are 
the American and Federal German representatives, to whom it is obvious that 
the international community cannot tolerate the slaughter of innocent athletes 
at an international sporting competition or condone ‘senseless’ acts of violence 
against airline passengers….On the other side of the question there is the 
Kenyan delegate, who remembers the profound contributions of Mau Mau 
violence to the liberation of his country from the British, or the Algerian 
delegate, who may have participated in unconventional and spectacular acts of 
terror in the resistance to France…” (Rosen & Frank in Carlton: 2005, 43).  
 
With a number of national liberation movements still struggling for independence and 
self-determination in the 1970s, the Third World was reluctant to admit to the agenda 
an item that would, in their view, undermine such struggles and place limits on the 
use of violence in the course of national liberation. Despite Western opposition, the 
agenda item as amended was carried with 66 votes in support, 27 against, and 33 
abstentions and was assigned to the Sixth (legal) Committee of the General Assembly.  
 
The quest for a resolution: Challenges in principle and procedure  
Entrusted with the agenda item, ‘measures to prevent international terrorism which 
endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardises fundamental freedoms, and 
study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which 
lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some people to 
sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes’ 
(UNGA: 1972, res. 27/3034), the Sixth Committee set out to find a common ground to 
dealing with terrorism. Early on in the consultations, the Secretariat was mandated 
with the preparation of a comprehensive study on terrorism, including consideration 
of its origins. Over the course of the deliberations it became apparent that 
disagreement between states remained insuperable. One of the most pressing 
questions was whether the United Nations should condemn the use terrorism in all 
circumstances and to what extent (Hoveyda: 1977, 76). The debate in the Sixth 
Committee is particularly informative as it “reveal[s] the extent to which the 
legitimacy of wars of national liberation has been accepted by states” (Dugard: 1974, 
73). As a matter of fact, some delegates, mainly from developing nations, found 
difficulty in condemning international terrorism without sufficiently having 
considered the principles of self-determination and the legitimacy of national 
liberation movements in their struggles against colonial and repressive regimes. In this 
context, the committee pondered over the question of whether terrorism can be 
justified in pursuit of independence and what role the United Nations should play in 
this regard. In other words, can “activities undertaken in the context of the right of 
peoples to self-determination not be regarded as international terrorism?” (Hoveyda: 
1977, 76). A further dilemma faced by the committee from the beginning was a propos 
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the modalities of how the UN should approach the subject. A number of states 
supported a proposal that would lead to the establishment of an intersessional 
committee with the task of investigating the causes of terrorism, subsequently 
developing preventative measures. The dissenting opinion – a view predominantly 
held by Western countries – however, contended that a thorough investigation of the 
origins is a long-term endeavour that ought to be entrusted to a separate committee. 
The fear expressed by the West was that a sequence as proposed by the developing 
countries would only stand in the way of immediate action (UN Doc. A/9028: 1973, 6).  
 
There was general agreement that all states should be encouraged to become parties 
to already existing counterterrorism-related conventions (e.g. Tokyo, Hague, and 
Montreal) and to introduce measures into national legislation to counter international 
terrorism. A number of findings published in the course of the study prepared by the 
Secretariat caused some countries a great deal of trouble. The Secretariat concluded, 
“even when the use of force is legally and morally justified, there are some means, as 
in every form of human conflict, which must not be used; the legitimacy of a cause does 
not in itself legitimise the use of certain forms of violence, especially against the innocent” 
[emphasis added] (UN Doc. A/C.6/418: 1972, 7). The study further observed, “terrorism 
threatens, endangers or destroys the lives and fundamental freedom of the innocent, 
and it would not be just to leave them to wait for protection until the causes have been 
remedied and the purpose and the principles of the Charter have been given full effect. 
There is present need for measures of international co-operation to protect their 
interests as far as possible” (Ibid: 1972, 41). This observation did not resonate well with 
Third World countries, which continued to insist on the legitimacy of violence against 
colonial and repressive regimes. The aforementioned conclusion by the Secretariat 
filtered into the debate on the modalities of how the organisation should approach 
international terrorism. Particularly, there was a debate about whether the UN should 
first set out to remedy the root causes and then address the elimination of terrorist 
acts, or should the organisation take immediate preventative action in the absence of 
a comprehensive understanding of the origins that give rise to terrorist violence? As 
neither of the contending groups was willing to compromise, the legal committee had 
before it three distinct draft resolutions and a draft convention submitted by the 
United States (Romaniuk: 2010, 39). 26  The proposals ranged from expressions of 
condemnation to statements of mere concern, and from paying little attention to root 
causes to linking preventative measures to the study of underlying causes.  
 
In its draft resolution, the United States aimed to adopt a Convention for the 
Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism.27 The draft 
convention was dismissed right from the beginning as infringing on the right to self-
determination, with Arab and African countries favouring an Ad Hoc Committee that 
would carefully consider propositions for a convention in the future (Dugard: 1974, 73). 
The opposition by the Arab and African countries must be understood in the context 
 
26 See the Department of State’s Bulletin 431 from October 16 1972 (pages 431-433) for further reading on the 
draft Convention introduced by the United States in the Sixth Committee consultations. 
27 Ibid.  
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of neo-colonialism. For many countries, their independence was a hard-won struggle 
that, at the time, only recently manifested itself. Article 13 of the draft convention 
explicitly suggests that “[n]othing in this Convention shall make an offence of any act 
which is permissible under the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War or any other international law applicable in armed 
conflicts” (American draft Convention: 1972, Article 13). It must therefore inevitably 
have been American endeavours in Vietnam in the 1970s and its continued support for 
Israel in the perceived suppression of the Palestinian people that fostered anti-
American sentiment and the rejection of the draft convention (Dugard: 1974, 81). Many 
countries in the Third World were stage grounds for proxy wars (e.g. Libya) and 
countries which recently gained their independence certainly seemed sceptical of 
Western counterterrorism initiatives.  
 
The draft resolution put forth by the United States urged states to become parties to 
existing counterterrorism-related conventions, and called on the ICAO to prepare an 
agreement obliging states to enforce and implement the obligations contained in the 
ICAO convention-regime. Further, states were urged to address the “political 
problems which may, in some instances, provide a pretext for acts of international 
terrorism” (Hoveyda: 1977, 79). Afro-Asian countries, however, sought more attention 
on the root causes (e.g. colonialism) and conversely rejected the American proposal as 
a mere “prescription to talk” (Ibid: 1977, 79).  
 
A second proposal (compromise draft) was introduced by Italy and had the support of 
Iran, the only non-western country to accede (Romaniuk: 2010, 39). The draft 
reaffirmed the right to self-determination, urged the search for solutions to the origins 
of terrorism, and more notably condemned international terrorism. The compromise 
proposal would petition states for the developing of a draft convention on measures 
to prevent international terrorism in the context of a diplomatic conference and 
advocated for the ICAO to take further action in mitigating the continued threat to 
civil aviation. Contrary to the draft resolution put forth by the United States, the 
compromise draft requested the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee for the study 
of origins and root causes of international terrorism.  
 
The final draft proposal was introduced by Arab and Asian states, and was supported 
by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had “suffered hijackings of domestic flights, 
[and] the Soviets had taken a relatively strong position in ICAO debates. But they also 
perceived that support for Palestinian groups in the Middle East could advance Soviet 
interests against the West” (Romaniuk: 2010, 39). The Soviet support for the proposal 
was thus a strategic one, and ought to be understood in the wider context of the Cold 
War. The Soviets’ support was certainly an attempt to garner support in the Middle 
East and to keep American influence at the United Nations at bay. Despite the fact 
that the General Assembly was able to adopt a resolution on international terrorism, 
a consensus was far from reached. The draft resolution proposed by developing 
countries was adopted with 76 votes in favour, 35 against, and with 17 abstentions. And 
so, although resolution 3034 was the first general resolution on international terrorism 
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adopted by the General Assembly, it did not reflect a general agreement but rather the 
growing political influence of the Third World in the organisation.  
Resolution 3034: A weak beginning  
In its preambulatory paragraphs, the General Assembly underscored that it was 
“[d]eeply perturbed over acts of international terrorism” (UNGA res. 3034: 1972, 
preambular), whereas the second preambular paragraph once again reiterates the 
significance of finding solutions to the underlying causes. In the first operative 
paragraph the United Nations “[e]xpresses deep concern over the increasing acts of 
violence which endanger or take innocent human lives or jeopardise fundamental 
freedoms” (UNGA res. 3034: 1972, para. 1). Notably, instead of condemning terrorist 
acts, states merely agreed on expressions of concern. It was however operative 
paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 6 that troubled Western countries the most. Paragraph 2 urged 
“states to devote immediate attention to finding just and peaceful solutions to the 
underlying causes which give rise to such acts of violence” (UNGA res. 27/3034, para. 
2). Paragraph 3 “[r]eaffirms the inalienable right to self-determination and 
independence of all people under colonial and racist regimes … and upholds the 
legitimacy of their struggle, in particular the struggle of national liberation 
movements…” (Ibid., para. 3). In part, the General Assembly did turn to the 
elimination of international terrorism, but it did so by explicitly “bearing in mind the 
provisions of paragraph 3 above” (UNGA res. 3034: 1972, para. 6). Thus, Romanov 
accurately observes that the reference to the elimination of international terrorism 
(paragraph 6) was made with reservations in favour of the inalienable right to self-
determination (Romanov: 1990, 295). The resolution further decided to set up an Ad 
Hoc Committee on International Terrorism and tasked the committee to deal with 
terrorism in a comprehensive manner (operative para. 9).  
 
With their growing presence and power, the countries of the Third World successfully 
moved the debate away from concrete measures and managed to put terrorism’s 
origins centre stage. Condemnation was not explicitly voiced in respect to non-state 
terrorist actors but towards “repressive and terrorist acts by colonial, racist and alien 
regimes in denying peoples their legitimate right to self-determination and 
independence…” (UNGA res. 3034: 1972, para. 4). Resolution 3034 was unsettling for 
the West, with most Western states voting against it. Both the American draft and the 
compromise alternative failed to garner sufficient support, compelling the United 
States to concede that its counterterrorism endeavours at the UN were unlikely to 
yield any success in the foreseeable future (Blumenau: 2014b, 74). Western countries 
initiated a process which they now, given the shifting majorities in the General 
Assembly, no longer controlled. They were increasingly faced with a response they did 
not want and the elimination of terrorism discourse was replaced with the continued 
condemnation of “racism, colonialism, and Zionism” (Comras: 2010, 24). Western 
governments, such as West Germany, were increasingly worried that the United 
Nations was gradually becoming an instrument abused for the legitimisation of 
politically motivated violence (Blumenau: 2014a, 98).  
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The Ad Hoc Committee established by resolution 3034 consisted of 35 members28 and 
met from July to August 1973. The developments in the committee were very much a 
déjà vu and on many levels a continuation of preceding discussions. 29  When the 
members met for the last time in August of ’73, the committee found itself unable to 
come to an agreement on how to eliminate terrorism. After a general debate, member 
states established three sub-committees30  to further examine (1) the definition of 
international terrorism, (2) the underlying causes and (3) the elaboration of concrete 
measures for the prevention of international terrorism.  
 
In respect to the sub-committee on the definition, a number of delegates maintained 
that an abstract definition of the phenomenon was not entirely necessary and would 
prove to be a time-consuming and unproductive task (UN Doc. A/9028: 1973, 6). An 
attempt to define terrorism seemed rather unrealistic and would only deepen the 
divide. Disagreement also arose with respect to the type of definition. Should the 
committee adopt an abstract conceptualisation, an enumerative approach, or a mix of 
both? For instance, the draft proposal introduced by the non-aligned group took on 
an enumerative approach and argued that international terrorism is best defined as 
acts of violence “by colonial, racist and alien regimes against peoples struggling for 
their liberation, for their legitimate right to self-determination, independence…” and 
that have been “committed by individuals or groups of individuals which endanger or 
take innocent human lives or jeopardise fundamental freedoms” (Ibid: 1973, 21). 
Contrarily, France put forth a draft proposal that remained rather general. France 
defined terrorism as a “heinous act of barbarism committed in the territory of a third 
state by a foreigner against a person possessing a nationality other than that of the 
offender for the purpose of exerting pressure in a conflict not strictly internal in nature” 
(Ibid.: 1973, 21). Then there was also the question of scope. Is the definition of terrorism 
limited to individuals and non-state actors, or should a definition extend to acts 
committed by the state? In observations made in respect to resolution 3034, Syria’s 
conceptualisation of international terrorism is usefully telling and indicative of the 
views of many Third World nations at the time. The Arab Republic contended that any 
consideration of the phenomenon ought to begin with reflection of state terrorism. 
Accordingly, the “civilized international community shall not forget the terrorism 
practised by the United States’ imperialism….against the people of Viet-Nam aspiring 
to freedom and unity. The international community is indeed called upon…to put an 
end to the Zionist terrorism practised by Israel against the people of Palestine and 
 
28  The 35 members of the Ad Hoc Committee included: Algeria, Austria, Barbados, Canada, Congo, 
Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, France, Greece, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, 
Mauritania, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Panama, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet 
Socialist Republic) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, and 
Zambia.  
29 See “Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism” for a detailed reading on a detailed 
summary of the developments in the Ad Hoc Committee leading up to the 28th Session of the General 
Assembly.  
30  See Report Ad Hoc Committee (1973) for a detailed reading on the observations made and proposals 
submitted in regards to the respective sub-committees. Only a general account can be given at this time.  
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against the Arab States, portions of whose territories are occupied by Israel” (Syria in 
A/AC.160/1: 1973, 36). Syria further argued that crimes committed by states, in 
particular Israel, are the severest forms of terrorism of its time. State terrorism as 
defined by Syria would include such incidences as the “Israeli diversion of a Lebanese 
aircraft from Beirut 31 … and the Israeli killing of an Arab in Norway” (Franck & 
Lockwood: 1974, 73), whereas such incidents fall under the rubric for ‘counterterrorism 
operations’ in Israel. The Syrian definition would also extend to American involvement 
in Vietnam and would moreover be applicable to the actions of apartheid regimes and 
colonial powers. In this regard, other delegates pointedly remarked that acts 
committed “by the citizens of States which were in a state of war and who were 
resisting the aggressor in the occupied territory or who were fighting for their national 
liberation could not be considered as acts of international terrorism” (UN Doc. A/9028: 
1973, 12). Yet, actions taken to counteract the efforts of those resisting the aggressors 
(e.g. by Israel against Palestinians) would be considered terrorist acts.  
Although states (mostly from the West) agreed with the heinous nature of state 
terrorism, they maintained that international law already settled the use of force and 
issues relating to aggression and terrorist violence involving the state (UN Doc. 
A/9028: 1973, 8). For instance, the UNC Chapter 1, Article 2(4) settles the use of force 
by states when it calls on states to refrain from using (or threatening) force against 
“the territorial integrity or political independence of any state” (UNC: 1945, Art. 2(4)). 
More concretely, with the adoption of UNGA resolution 2625 in 1970, the Assembly 
lent its support for the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States. This instrument upholds that 
“[e]very State has the duty to refrain from organising, instigating, assisting or 
participating in the acts of civil war or terrorist acts in any other State” (Declaration 
Annex: 1970, para. 9). It is however important to note that, while Western reluctance 
to address state terrorism in connection with non-state terrorism is certainly the result 
of not wanting to duplicate efforts, it ought nevertheless also to be understood in the 
context of political alliances. Indeed, Western governments were unyielding in 
supporting any efforts that would open their allies, namely Israel and South Africa, to 
international condemnation legitimised by the United Nations.  
In the second sub-committee, on the underlying causes of terrorism, the disagreeable 
character of negotiations emerged as well. There were once again two contending 
camps. The first, which included numerous countries from the then-developing world, 
was convinced that “the study of underlying causes was a pre-condition of the study 
on measures” (UN Doc. A/9028: 1973, 13). Delegates were convinced that the only way 
to eliminate the evil that is terrorism was to place focus on its causes and find ways to 
solve the circumstances that give rise to terrorist violence (Becker: 2006, 91). 
Suggestions submitted by Algeria, with the support of other Arab-Afro countries, are 
indicative of this view. For Algeria, state terrorism was one of the root problems. The 
use of terrorism by a state manifested itself through “mass imprisonments, the use of 
torture, the massacre of whole groups, widespread reprisals, the bombing of civilian 
 
31 In an attempt to arrest four leaders of the PLO and put them on trial, Israel forced the plane to land in Israel.  
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population…” and emerges in the course of “[f]oreign occupation of a territory whose 
population is forced to leave it; [and in the] [a]pplication of a policy of racial 
discrimination and apartheid” (Algeria in UN Doc. A/9028: 1973, 24). Terrorists thus 
resort to acts of violence “[w]hen they are victims of political, social, or economic 
injustices; when all legal remedies for obtaining justice are of no avail” (Ibid.: 1973, 25).  
 
Western governments, on the contrary, reiterated that the study of underlying causes 
is a long-term endeavour and that it is at a minimum “unrealistic to expect that, upon 
completion of that study, the underlying causes could be so eradicated as to lead to 
the prompt elimination of acts of international terrorism” (Ibid.: 1973, 14). The position 
taken by West Germany is usefully illuminating. In an official letter from the Federal 
Republic of Germany (FGR) to the Secretary-General, the Germans acknowledged that 
the work of the committee should not place restrictions on the right of any people to 
determine its own fate. The letter went on to note that a study of the underlying causes 
should however not “obstruct the speedy implementation of urgent concrete measures 
to check the alarming spread of international violence” (FGR in Blumenau: 2014a, 97). 
In this context, member states debated whether it was desirable to continue the 
committee’s work on the basis of a general knowledge of the problem, including its 
root causes, or whether it would be best to proceed with the drafting of an 
international legal instrument for specific acts of terrorism (a sectoral approach). The 
committee particularly considered attacks against airplanes, the taking of hostages, 
and attacks against diplomatic agents, the latter of which was already being negotiated 
at the United Nations in 1973 (UN Doc. A/9028: 1973, 14).  
 
The deliberations in the third sub-committee on devising preventative measures 
against terrorism faced similar obstacles. Disagreement arose in respect to the 
relationship between definition and origins and the extent to which one could adopt 
countermeasures without having adequately studied the roots of the problem. 
Additionally, the committee deliberated whether it should recommend the adoption 
of measures to combat state terrorism as, allegedly, “it was this form of terrorism 
which led to the others” (UN Doc. A/9028: 1973, 18). Indeed, the draft proposal 
introduced by the non-aligned group stipulated that measures against terrorism could 
include “[t]he definitive elimination of situations of colonial domination; 
Intensification of the campaign against racial discrimination and apartheid” as well as 
provisions that prohibit the support to any state which engages a policy of territorial 
occupation and discrimination (NAG UN Doc. A/9028: 1973, 25). Notably, the group 
moreover suggested the use of Chapter VII32 against colonial and racist regimes and 
urged the committee to recommend the objection to any measures that would 
undermine violence aimed at resisting suppression. Contrarily, the United Kingdom 
urged members to condemn acts of terrorism and recalled the responsibility to refrain 
from engaging in terrorist action in another country, an obligation enshrined in the 
 
32 Chapter VII of the UN Charter sets out the UN’s powers to maintain and restore peace and security. The 
Chapter not only allows the Security Council to establish that there is a threat to international peace (Art.39) 
but moreover grants the body powers to take non-forceful (Art. 41) and forceful (Art. 42) action to restore 
peace and security.  
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Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States. The proposal furthermore called on states to strengthen 
national counterterrorism measures and for states to work in co-operation and “to 
intensify their efforts towards a solution of that problem” (United Kingdom in UN Doc. 
A/9028: 1973, 28). Besides urging states to become parties to already existing 
conventions with counterterrorism relevance (e.g. ICAO convention-regime), Britain 
advocated for the adoption of a convention “for the suppression of certain acts of 
international terrorism, based, inter alia, on the principle that a State should either 
extradite the offender or submit his case for prosecution…” (Ibid.: 1973, 28). Notably 
absent from the United Kingdom’s proposal was any reference to the roots of terrorism, 
or to the notion that one ought first to remedy the causes before preventative action 
could be taken.  
 
Finally, the sentiment that future work should be based on the drafting and adoption 
of conventions dealing with a specific type of terrorism (e.g. letter bombs or hostage-
taking) gained traction. Over the course of the discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee , 
if not before that, it became quite clear that diverging outlooks on how to deal with 
terrorism would not be settled quickly. A sectoral approach gradually seemed more 
and more appealing. The work of the Ad Hoc Committee was suspended and did not 
resume until the thirty-first session of the General Assembly in 1976. In the meantime, 
terrorists attacked the meeting of OPEC leaders in December of 1975, killing three, and 
in the summer of 1976 the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) carried out a counterterrorist 
operation at Entebbe Airport in Uganda in response to an Air France plane hijacking.33 
When the committee thus reconvened in 1976 terrorism continued to remain a threat 
to members of the international community but also posed a threat to the friendly 
relations between countries (see aftermath of Entebbe raid). In the 1970s, “[t]here was 
growing evidence … that terrorists groups were much better organised and more adept 
at securing funding and supplies. There was also a marked increase in the financial 
and material contributions, and direction, terrorist groups were receiving from certain 
UN member countries … Pakistan was increasing fomenting terrorist attacks in India’s 
Kashmir province and elsewhere in the South Asia subcontinent” (Comras: 2010, 26).  
 
After four years of inaction, the General Assembly reactivated the committee, albeit 
with little practical outcome. Following the consideration of the Committee Report in 
1977,34 the General Assembly adopted resolution 32/147. The resolution was very much 
a repetition of resolution 3034, although operative paragraph 7 passingly invited states 
to first study the underlying causes of terrorism and then recommended “practical 
measures to combat terrorism” (UNGA res. 32/147: 1977, para. 7). Also, the General 
Assembly no longer invited states to become parties to existing conventions but rather 
“[a]ppeals to States which have not yet done so to examine the possibility of becoming 
parties…,” (UNGA res. 3034, para. 8 and 32/147, para. 5). When the committee met 
 
33 See chapter 2 “Case studies in International Terrorism: Hostages Crisis and Hijackings” in Blumenau’s “The 
United Nations & Terrorism”, specifically pages 52-74.  
34 See Ad Hoc Committee Report (UN Doc. A/9028: 1973) on International Terrorism for the UN General 
Assembly with summary records for further reading.  
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again two years later in 1979 it was able to forge agreement around a set of 
recommendations. 35  These recommendations were incorporated into General 
Assembly resolution 34/145, with 118 countries voting in favour and 22 abstaining. 
Abstentions were, amongst others, made by the United States and Western European 
countries. Western countries abstained because although the resolution only made 
little progress it contained a general condemnation of terrorism, thus not warranting 
a negative vote. Indeed, the 1979 resolution reaffirmed the right of self-determination 
and independence, yet for the first time condemned “all acts of international terrorism 
which endanger or take human lives…” (UNGA res. 34/145: 1979, para. 3). The inclusion 
of “all acts of international terrorism” is a significant development. The addition of 
such a provision indicated the gradual willingness of governments to condemn 
terrorism in principle, although the right to self-determination continued to remain 
an integral principle to the discussion on terrorism.  
 
When trying to understand why member states were willing to gradually condemn 
terrorism in principle one ought to also consider the changes in the manifestation of 
international terrorism. In the 1960s and in the early 1970s terrorists avoided attacks 
against countries of the Third World Bloc in an effort to avoid losing the backing of 
supportive governments and diaspora. This trend started to change in 1973 when Arab 
diplomats were taken hostage, although they were not the focus of the attack and 
evaded any harm (Blumenau: 2014b, 50). However, by 1975 Arab countries increasingly 
became targets of terrorist attacks starting with OPEC ministers held at gunpoint 
(Farnsworth: 1975, 1). In 1978 terrorists murdered an editor of a prominent newspaper 
in Egypt and hijacked a plane with a dozen of Arab delegates attending a conference 
in Cyprus (Kane: 2017). Similar to previous resolutions, the 1979 version reaffirmed the 
condemnation of repressive acts by colonial regimes (paragraph 5) and accentuated 
the importance of root causes (operative para. 5 & 6). Resolutions 36/109 and 38/130 
adopted in 1981 and 1983, respectively, reflect somewhat of a novelty. Despite the usual 
tribute to the reaffirmation of the inalienable right to self-determination, the 
resolutions no longer contained provisions condemning acts by colonial or racist 
regimes. Importantly however resolution 36/109 only contained a general expression 
of concern regarding the “continuing acts of international terrorism which take a toll 
on innocent human lives” (UNGA res. 36/109, para. 1), whereas the 1983 resolution 
‘deeply deplored’ the loss of life and highlighted the potential impacts of terrorism on 
relationships amongst states (UNGA res. 28/109, operative para. 1). One ought to also 
not forget that both resolutions make reference to the recommendations adopted by 
the Ad Hoc Committee in 1979, which, inter alia, urged the Security Council and the 
General Assembly to pay attention to situations (e.g. colonialism and racism) that give 
rise to terrorist violence (Recommendations Ad Hoc Committee : 1979, para. 11). 
Consequently, it becomes difficult to determine the extent to which the absence of any 
condemnation in the 1981 and 1983 resolutions represent a true break with past 
practises or if these are merely half-hearted gestures.  
 
35 See Yoder’s “United Nations resolutions against international terrorism” for a more detailed reading on the 
proceeds that led to the adoption of the recommendations by the Ad Hoc Committee , particularly pages 506-
508.  
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While there was a general consensus that terrorism was not acceptable, the absence 
of any agreed upon conceptualisation made this practise of condemnation fruitless. It 
is fair to conclude that the committee entrusted with finding a common approach to 
dealing with terrorism was not successful. In little under a decade, members had failed 
to find common ground and consultations were leading nowhere. Too big remained 
the ideological and regional differences between countries of the West and the Third 
World Bloc. Although there were a number of recommendations that emerged from 
the committee in 1979, member states remained chained to their positions and the 
elaboration of a comprehensive approach (or convention) against terrorism remained 
a diplomatic nightmare. The ongoing struggle to put an end to colonialism and 
repressive regimes made any real progress challenging. On that score, it is also 
submitted that the General Assembly has taken a rather ambiguous approach to the 
subject of terrorism. Tellingly, in its later resolutions, particularly those enacted in 1981 
and 1983, the Assembly appears to have no longer included references to the 
condemnation of acts committed by colonial and repressive regimes; yet it continued 
to endorse the recommendations which expressed such condemnation. Equally 
important, the previous discussion also allows for the conclusion that although 
members certainly agreed to some extent on the wrongfulness of terrorism, they were 
only willing to express so explicitly in resolution 34/145, only showing themselves 
concerned over acts of terrorism in its later resolutions.  
 
With the committee in gridlock two observations can be made. The committee held 
the potential to become dangerous to Western interests; the Third World used the 
committee as an instrument to justify violence under certain circumstances; and the 
Soviet Union abused the committee to pay lip service to its support for the Third 
World, fostering relationships at the expense of the United States and its standing in 
the global order. That said, despite the understanding that the committee had lost all 
practical relevance, “it still had a certain general use as a stage for radical Third World 
countries to make noise to impress their domestic audience without causing too much 
damage” (Blumenau: 2014b, 100). The West German UN mission observed that such a 
stage would make it “easier for them [the Third World] to make silent concessions on 
certain aspects such as the fight against hostage-taking” (Blumenau: 2014b, 100). 
Perhaps it is helpful to conclude that although countries were engaging in 
counterterrorism consultations at the UN, any meaningful step towards 
counterterrorism cooperation remained absent and for the West these consultations 
were taking a dangerous direction as the UN had the potential of becoming a forum 
through which countries could legitimise terrorism. Fortunately, the resolutions 
drafted in the Ad Hoc Committee and adopted by the General Assembly did not 
remain the only response to terrorism. Amidst increasing political violence directed at 
diplomatic agents and the continued threat posed by hostage-takings, the focus 
shifted towards a problem-specific response. Focus gradually shifted towards 
achieving agreement on the criminalisation of specific terrorism-related offences. The 
main advantage of this form of response was that the organisation could circumvent 
any abstract philosophical debate on what terrorism is and agree on the outlawing of 
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a specific crime. It is for this reason that the two resulting conventions were a 
significant success.  
 
The United Nations’ problem-specific response 
The focus of the remaining chapter will be on the process 36  which led to the 
elaboration of both the Diplomats and the Hostages conventions. Although neither 
the Diplomats Convention nor the convention on the Taking of Hostages were 
adopted without contention, these two agreements can nevertheless be regarded as 
successful outcomes. The ensuing sections will address the main areas of disagreement 
and will comment on the central provisions of the respective conventions to the extent 
that they are relevant to the research objective at hand.  
 
Aviation terrorism and hostage-taking certainly remained a prominent threat to the 
international community in the early 1970s. There was nevertheless another 
manifestation of terrorist violence that troubled countries of the West (and later of 
the Arab world) and that provided an impetus for the United Nations to take action. 
In fact, the United States was concerned that the kidnapping of diplomats, especially 
in Latin America, could become as “…epidemic a problem as air plane hijackings” (Onis: 
1970, 1). Terrorist organisations, from Marxist extremists in Latin America to 
Palestinian terrorists in Khartoum, quickly understood that the kidnapping of 
diplomats as a political weapon was an effective means to get attention. In 1968, 
United States Ambassador John Gordon Mein “…was machinegunned in the back 
when he tried to run from his official automobile during a kidnap attempt” (Onis: 1970, 
2), and in September 1969 the US Ambassador to Brazil, Burke Elbrick, was kidnapped 
and released only after fifteen prisoners were discharged (Stechel: 1972, 203). The Mein 
and Elbrick kidnappings were only the first of what became a dangerous time for 
diplomats abroad. “Within little more than a year after the ransoming of Elbrick, three 
other diplomats representing Switzerland, Japan and the United States, were 
kidnapped by Brazilian terrorists. The diplomats were only freed after 130 left-wing 
guerrillas held by Brazilian authorities were released” (Stechel: 1972, 203). The case 
that arguably received most attention from a Western perspective was the kidnapping 
of the West German ambassador to Guatemala in March 1970, leading to considerable 
diplomatic tensions between West Germany and the Guatemalan governments. 37 
More so, in December of 1970 the West German consul to Spain was kidnapped by 
ETA terrorists and in October of the same year members of a Canadian revolutionary 
cell kidnapped the British Trade Commissioner. And in May of 1971 members of the 
Turkish People’s Liberation Army kidnapped the Israeli Consul-General, who was later 
executed due to the Turkish government’s refusal to release imprisoned members of 
the group (NYT: 1971, 1).  
 
36 See Green’s “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Diplomatic Agents and Other 
Internationally Protected Persons: An Analysis” for further reading on the adoption procedure. Footnotes 10-
15 on pages 706-708 are especially informative in this regard. 
37 See pages 41-44 in Blumenau’s “The United Nations & Terrorism Germany, Multilateralism & Antiterrorism 
Efforts in the 1970s” for a more detailed treatment of the case and its diplomatic consequences.  
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The Diplomats Convention  
The adoption of the Diplomats Convention was rather unique inasmuch that the 
deliberations were swift and relatively uncontentious. Granted, the rapid adoption of 
the Diplomats Convention was largely owed to the sharp rise in attacks against 
diplomats the world over.38 “[T]he fact that this Convention [Diplomats Convention] 
would principally benefit the very people who were negotiating it [also] contributed 
to its speedy and successful adoption” (Blumenau: 2014b, 77). Although the adoption 
of the convention was not without its setbacks, the acknowledgment that countries of 
the West, the East, and the developing world alike were afflicted united the 
negotiation efforts in the drafting committee. Attacks against diplomats proved 
problematic for a number of reasons. For one, attempts on the life of a diplomat or an 
attack against a diplomatic facility yielded great symbolic value to the terrorists, and 
for another, such acts often resulted in embarrassment to the government in which 
the attack occurred (Levitt: 1989, 542). The hostage-taking and assassination of 
diplomats also had broader implications for the peaceful relations among states. The 
kidnapping of the German Ambassador Karl von Spreti in Guatemala in 1970 serves as 
a telling example. The West German government was frustrated at how the 
Guatemalan authorities handled the case and in consequence expelled the 
Guatemalan ambassador from Bonn, deteriorating relations between the two 
countries (Blumenau: 2014b, 43). It was against this backdrop that the international 
community set out to adopt a legal instrument that, on paper at least, would ensure 
the safety of diplomats in the future.  
 
Over the course of two years, the ILC, the Sixth Committee, and a drafting group set 
out to elaborate the provisions that would later be adopted in the General Assembly 
by consensus. The efforts taken by the ILC in respect to the protection of diplomats 
were considered in the broader context of international counterterrorism cooperation. 
The International Law Commission recognised “…that the question of crimes 
committed against such persons, is but one of the aspects of a wider question, the 
commission of acts of terrorism. The elaboration of a legal instrument with the limited 
coverage of the present draft [Draft Diplomats Convention] is an essential step in the 
process of formulation of legal rules to effectuate international co-operation in the 
prevention, suppression and punishment of terrorism” (ILC Report A/C.4/L.191: 1972, 
para. 65). The ILC thus understood that the Diplomats Convention was only a stepping 
stone in the organisation’s larger efforts to respond to terrorism. In their submission 
to the ILC there were several countries that considered existing instruments, such as 
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, ample in dealing with the threat to 
 
38 Some examples of which included: The US Ambassador John Gordon Mein in Guatemala, US Ambassador 
Burke Elbrick in Brazil, West German Ambassador Karl von Spreti in Guatemala, Swiss Ambassador Giovanni 
Bucher in Brazil, the First Secretary at the US Embassy in Amman, the West German Consul Eugen Beihl in 
Spain and the kidnapping of four US airmen in Ankara. It was truly a global concern. See Baumann’s “The 
Diplomatic Kidnappings: A Revolutionary Tactic of Urban Terrorism” for further reading on attacks against 
diplomats.  
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diplomats.39 France and Australia in particular maintained that existing international 
instruments placed obligations on the host state to protect diplomats and as a 
consequence the problem could be controlled without the adoption of additional 
conventions (Green: 1974, 706 (footnote 10)). It is, however, correct to argue that given 
the continued kidnapping of diplomats existing instruments were insufficient, and 
what is more, existing instruments did not adequately address the matter of safe 
havens and extradition as well as mutual judicial cooperation and international 
cooperation in general. With this in mind, the draft elaborated by the ILC built on the 
principles adopted by the ICAO’s Hague and Montreal conventions, tackling the issue 
of safe havens through the principle of aut dedere aut judicare and accentuated the 
importance of cooperation in counter-terrorist activities. The draft was then 
submitted to the drafting group of the Sixth Legal Committee, where, as discussed in 
further detail below, familiar points of contention arose. In particular, divergences of 
outlook appeared in regard to the right to asylum, extradition obligations, the 
definition of the crime and the extent to which, if at all, the convention should be 
applicable to crimes committed against diplomats in the course of self-determination 
and in response to foreign subjugation.  
 
The success of the convention can be traced back to the common interests of the West, 
East, and the Third World in protecting diplomats and conversely relations between 
states, no matter how strained they might be. The main objective of the convention 
was to provide a legal basis for the punishing of terrorists and bringing them to justice. 
In the aftermath of the Khartoum crisis in 1973, there was mounting evidence that 
suggested that the culprits managed to flee to Egypt and were never seen again 
(Blumenau: 2014b, 51). Likewise, the terrorists responsible for the hostage-taking at 
the OPEC Headquarters in Vienna in 1975 initially escaped with impunity and were 
only arrested years later.40 And so, bringing terrorists to justice as an attempt to deter 
the proliferation of terrorism was certainly a central concern to the negotiators of the 
Diplomats Convention. Article 1 defines the term “international protected persons” to 
mean heads of state, any representative or official of a state, including an agent of an 
intergovernmental organisation. Article 2(2) is a key provision as it not only outlines 
the relevant crimes but moreover obliges parties to “make these crimes punishable by 
appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature” (Diplomats 
Convention: 1973, Art. 2(2)). It was a propos the first portion of Article 2 that states 
decided to remove the phrasing ‘regardless of motive.’ Indeed, the draft articles were 
initially written in such a way that “the intentional commission, regardless of motive 
[emphasis added] [of] [a] violent attack upon the official premises, the private 
accommodation or the means of transport of an international protected persons likely 
to endanger his person or liberty” (Draft Convention considered in Green: 1974, 710). 
As the article was however later adopted, member states could only agree to 
 
39 See Wouters & Duquet’s insightful commentary “The Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular 
Relations” for further reading. See also Maria Tokey’s “Fight against Terrorism in the Light of Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic 
Agents” on further reading on Article 22 and 29 and the obligation to protection foreign diplomats. 
40 Hans-Joachim Klein was not arrested (or better yet turned himself in) until 1998 and Carlos “The Jackal” 
(Orginally Ramirez Sanchez) was ‘extradited’ from the Sudan to France in 1994.  
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criminalise “the international commission of…” (Diplomats Convention: 1973, Art. 2), 
without excluding exceptions based on motives. It is plausible to conclude that the 
ILC intended to remove the intention of the crime from consideration. If the motive 
of the crime becomes irrelevant it would be more difficult for a state to declare a crime 
a political act and the right to asylum would not provide a pretext for offenders to 
escape with impunity. In including the phrase ‘regardless of motives,’ governments 
would limit the extent to which terrorists can evade justice by escaping to a country 
that might be favourable to their cause and by requesting asylum in that country. As 
the text was adopted without the explicit emphasis on ‘regardless of motive’ the 
conclusion can be drawn that member states were unwilling to distance themselves 
from terrorism in all circumstances. In more practical terms, the convention would 
continue to provide governments with the basis for refusing to punish a terrorist by 
emphasising the political motive of the perpetrator.  
 
Article 3 of the convention deals with the matter of jurisdiction and requires countries 
to take “such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the crime 
set forth in article 2” (Ibid: 1973, Art. 3), listing a number cases in which jurisdiction is 
to be established. Jurisdiction is thus recognised irrespective of whether the crime was 
committed on a state’s territory, if the offender or the victim was a national of a 
respective state or if the act was directed against the state itself. In practise, the 
obligation to apply jurisdiction would prevent countries from claiming that the crime 
was not committed on their territory or that it does not concern them. At a minimum, 
it would provide the legal basis for countries to act despite the crime not having been 
committed on their territory or directly against their state.41 The convention further 
established a state’s obligation to ensure the presence of the alleged offender for 
extradition or prosecution (Article 6) and a party’s obligation to submit the case to 
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution (Article 7). The provisions 
contained in Article 6 are indeed vital to efforts aimed at curtailing the use of safe 
havens by terrorists. Only when a country is obliged to ensure that an alleged offender 
that is within its territory is present can extradition or prosecution follow. It is however 
Article 7 that is perhaps the most important provision of the convention as it places 
an obligation on states to either extradite an alleged offender or to submit the case to 
its authorities for the purpose of prosecution. While a state may deny extradition on 
the basis of a number reasons, including national traditions, a terrorist can – in theory 
– no longer evade justice. Yet, one ought to concede that the provision remains limited 
in one essential point: Similar to the short-coming outlined in respect to the Hague 
and Montreal conventions above, the Diplomats Convention only requires that the 
case be submitted to authorities for the purpose of prosecution. There is thus no duty 
to proceed to trial or let alone to a judgment. In practise, a country could thus refuse 
to extradite and pro forma submit the case to its authorities who in turn decide to 
adjourn criminal prosecution based, inter alia, on lack of evidence. Nevertheless, 
Article 2 obliges states to make the crimes outlined punishable, taking into account 
 
41 Article 4 and 5 set out obligations for countries to co-operate in preventing the crimes laid out in Article 2 
from taking place and requires states to share “all the pertinent facts regarding the crime committee and all 
available information regarding the identity of the alleged offender” (Diplomats Convention: 1973, Art. 5(2)).  
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the grave nature of the crime, hence closing any loopholes that would allow the 
offender to escape unpunished.  
 
Equally important, the crimes listed in Article 2 were classified as an extraditable 
offence (Article 8). This provision is useful as it provides the necessary legal basis for 
extraditing an alleged offender. As the previous discussion has indicated, states have 
domestic traditions (e.g. not extraditing nationals) and bilateral arrangements (e.g. 
political offence exception) that may have in the past prevented the extradition of an 
offender. This article attempts to close this gap by determining that the offences laid 
out in the convention do not fall under these exceptions. In respect to the rights of an 
alleged offender, Article 9 stipulates that “[a]ny person regarding whom proceedings 
are being carried out in connection with any of the crimes set forth in article 2 shall be 
guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of the proceedings” (Diplomats Convention: 
1973, Art. 9). Despite not including a further description on what is meant with ‘fair 
treatment,’ the provision is nevertheless noteworthy as it indicates member states’ 
unwillingness to compromise the rule of law in the fight against terrorism. Above all 
else, it is a provision that helps highlight the criminal justice nature of the General 
Assembly’s response to counterterrorism.42  
 
In the course of the discussions on the draft articles on the right to asylum (Article 12) 
and extradition, several members insisted on the crimes in the draft to be considered 
political in nature (Green: 1974, 709).43 Keeping in mind that many extradition treaties 
treated political crimes as non-extraditable offences (Peterson: 1992, 773-778), an 
inclusion of such a provision would render the Diplomats Convention rather 
meaningless. If the right to asylum were to be included, the core principle of extradite 
or prosecute would no longer hold and the system of deterrence that built the 
foundation and the rationale behind the convention would be weakened. Latin 
American countries were in particular troubled by the prospect of any omission to the 
right to asylum. Indeed, it was especially in Latin America that efforts “to suppress and 
punish acts of international terrorism have run into problems arising from the 
complex matrix of asylum, extradition, and the political offence exception. Under the 
Latin American view, a decision to grant asylum to an accused is necessarily 
incompatible with the imposition of criminal penalties for offences committed prior 
to the grant” (Murphy: 1985, 40). There was a long-standing tradition of political 
asylum in these countries and considering the precedent set by a similar convention 
by the regional Organisation of American States (OAS),44 Latin American countries 
 
42 Other provisions settle a party’s obligation to providing all available evidence and afforded one another 
judicial assistance (Art. 10), the right to asylum discussed in further detail above (Art. 12), conflict and 
arbitration (Art. 13) and other provisions of a more administrative nature.  
43 There was also disagreement regarding the question of arbitration. In particular the question arose whether 
the convention should include mandatory dispute settlement mechanisms or if arbitration at the request for 
one party of the dispute is sufficient to trigger a settlement proceeding. See Green’s work in this regard.  
44 Despite the Diplomats Convention having been the first on this matter at the United Nations, the regional 
Organisation of American States (OAS) adopted a similar convention in February of 197144. The convention to 
Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism taking the Form of crimes Against Persons Related to Extortion that 
are of International Significance44 set out to criminalise a set of crimes (e.g. Kidnapping, murder) directed 
against those individuals whom a government has a distinct responsibility to protect (e.g. heads of states or 
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were unsettled by any provision that would infringe on their right to decide when to 
grant political sanctuary and when to reject it. This was indeed a problematic 
predicament. If countries retained sole control over whether the crime was political or 
ordinary in nature, the cohesiveness of the convention was at risk. More so, the 
“extradite or prosecute” provision would lose weight and safe havens for terrorists 
would persist. In practical terms, this would also mean that immunity from 
prosecution would become a likely consequence. Although no clear agreement could 
be reached, a limited provision on the use of asylum was incorporated into the final 
convention. Corresponding Article 12 stipulates that the convention will not infringe 
on existing treaties on asylum that are in force at the date of the adoption of this 
Convention. Notably however, “…a State Party to this Convention may not invoke 
those Treaties with respect to another State Party to this Convention which is not party 
to those Treaties” (Diplomats Convention: 1973, Art. 12), essentially limiting the scope 
of applicability to Latin American countries. 
 
Another particular difficulty that member states faced was in respect to scope. As 
deliberations on this subject unfolded, an old set of patterns emerged. The West 
wanted a convention that was as comprehensive as possible and the Third World Bloc 
again sought the exclusion of acts committed by national liberation movements and 
in the course of self-determination. On the eve of the adoption of the convention, 
countries from the developing world45 proposed a new article that would “make the 
convention inapplicable to acts committed by ‘people struggling against colonialism, 
alien domination, foreign occupation, racial discrimination and apartheid.’” (Levitt: 
1989, 544). There are however two observations to be made. First, as the negotiations 
were unravelling terrorists seized the Saudi Embassy in Sudan in March of 1973, 
notably also holding, amongst others, Saudi and Sudanese diplomats hostage 
(Blumenau: 2014b, 50). Although the attack on the embassy unfolded a few months 
prior to the adoption of the convention in the General Assembly, the events certainly 
impelled countries who have previously been spared from terrorist violence to take 
the threat more seriously while drafting the convention. Equally significant was 
Moscow’s evident interest in protecting its diplomats and ensuring regulated 
international relations. Granted, the Soviet Union frequently positioned itself with 
countries from the developing world, presumably also in an attempt to undermine 
American influence; they would not capitulate to the Third World’s endeavour to 
exclude national liberation movements from the scope of the convention (Blumenau: 
2014b, 77).  
 
The solution to the problem was eventually reached in the form of compromise 
resolution 3166. The General Assembly adopted the Diplomats Convention in the 
annex to resolution 3166, which in operative paragraph 4 decided that the provisions 
 
diplomatic agents). Such crimes were also made extraditable offences under the OAS Convention, the purpose 
of which was to “exclude violent attacks against diplomats from the political offence exception in extradition 
law and practise” (Murphy: 1985, 12)44.  
45 States that supported the last-minute amendment include inter alia: Afghanistan, Algeria, Chad, Congo, 
Yemen, Egypt, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Malia, Mauritania, and Syrian Arab Republic. For a full list see 
UN Document A/9407.  
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of the convention “could not in any way prejudice the exercise of the legitimate right 
to self-determination and independence, in accordance with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, by peoples struggling against 
colonialism, alien domination, foreign occupation, racial discrimination and apartheid” 
(UNGA resolution 3166: 1973, para. 4). Operative paragraph 6 moreover conceded to 
publishing the convention only in conjunction with the resolution. Doing so did not 
place countries under any legal obligation but provided a rather confusing context for 
the interpretation of the Diplomats Convention. It is perhaps due to the fact that the 
reference made in paragraph 4 of the resolution was not part of the actual convention-
text that Western countries were willing to accept resolution 3166 as it was finally 
worded. The manner in which governments understood the relationship between the 
resolution and the convention was by no means a forgone conclusion. Upon adoption 
of the resolution and the convention a number of countries took the floor and 
provided more context on their position. For example, Portugal reiterated that it did 
not recognise the resolution as a pretext for the “practise of acts of violence and 
terrorism condemned by the convention” (Portugal in Green: 1974, 726) based on the 
principle of the exercise of the right to self-determination. Portugal further contended 
that “the Portuguese delegation believes that operative paragraph 4 is poorly 
conceived and misplaced in the resolution approving the text of the convention” (Ibid: 
1974, 726). Upon adoption, the West German government also expressed its 
understanding of the peaceful right to self-determination and further stressed that the 
prohibition on the use of force engraved in the United Nations Charter, and referenced 
in operative paragraph 4 of resolution 3166, also applies to the right of self-
determination (Blumenau: 2014b, 110). 46  Similar to states, national liberation 
movements would thus be bound by the prohibition of the use of force stipulated by 
the UN Charter. By the same token, Algeria, Iraq, and Cuba maintained that the 
provisions of the convention cannot be understood as infringing on the struggles of 
peoples for their liberation, or as the Algerian delegate put it, “the affirmation of their 
national identity or the preservation of their dignity” (Algeria in Green: 1974, 727). It 
is certainly far from evident, that countries had a common understanding of the scope 
of the convention. In this regard one scholar observes, “…the accompanying resolution 
could be seen as a further vehicle for allowing an examination of the motivations of an 
act of terrorism directed against a diplomatic agent. Then, if the State Party 
undertaking such an examination found it to be a political act, motivated by the 
‘exercise of the legitimate right to self-determination…by peoples struggling against 
colonialism, alien domination, foreign occupation, racial discrimination, and 
apartheid’ it could refuse to abide by its obligations under the convention – which 
would usually mean a refusal either to extradite or prosecute the offender” (Green: 
 
46 Other delegations made similar observations. For instance, the representative from the United Kingdom 
asserted that there cannot be any conflict between the obligation on the prohibition on the use of force the 
exercise of independence and self-determination. See UN Document A/P2202 for further reading on the 
respective country statements.  
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1974, 727).47 Although countries were able to forge an agreement that culminated in 
the adoption of the Diplomats Convention in December 1973 there remained very 
different interpretations of its applicability, which was further compounded by the 
adoption of provisions that highlighted the continued insistence on the right to self-
determination (para. 4) in resolution 3166.48 Member states therefore continued to 
remain rather ambiguous in their condemnation of terrorism in any and all 
circumstances.  
 
The successful adoption of the Diplomats Convention would not serve as a model for 
future conventions as the adoption of the convention was made possible by a shared 
interest in upholding proper diplomatic relations between countries. The negotiation 
process has highlighted that many of the problems faced in earlier UN efforts (e.g. 
adoption of a resolution in 1972) recurred. This conclusion is best related by the 
adoption of resolution 3166, which asserted that “the convention could not in any way 
prejudice the exercise of the legitimate right to self-determination and 
independence … by peoples struggling against colonialism, alien domination, foreign 
occupation, racial discrimination and apartheid” (UNGA res. 3166: 1973, operative para. 
4). It was also of no less significance that the Assembly decided that the resolution 
should always be published together with the convention (operative para. 6), 
providing an interpretative framework to the instrument. Although the Diplomats 
Convention was certainly adopted with terrorist-related activities in mind, it does not 
mention the term in any of its provisions. To this end, it has counterterrorism 
application, but it is not an explicit counterterrorism instrument.  
 
The Hostages Convention: A cumbersome success  
The next significant convention that was negotiated was the International Convention 
Against the Taking of Hostages (Hostages Convention) in 1979. The taking of hostages 
 
47 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is a useful point of reference here. In 
addition to the treaty text, “any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty” (VCLT: 1969, 
Art. 31) is to be drawn on for the purpose of interpretation and context. 
48 The disagreement on the extent to which offenders belonging to national liberation movements are subject 
to the provisions of the convention remains relevant to this day. When both Burundi and Iraq, to name two 
examples, were acceding to the convention they made reservations in that regard. Burundi reserved itself the 
right to not abide by the provisions of Article 2 paragraph 2. Article 2 enumerates the offences which paragraph 
2 obliges states to criminalise (e.g. murder or kidnapping). A further reservation made by Burundi was in 
relation to Article 6 paragraph 1, ensuring the presence of the offender for the purpose of prosecution or 
extradition. In effect, Burundi maintained that an offender belonging to a NLM recognised by the country or 
an international organisation to which it is a member should not automatically be subject to extradition or 
prosecution (Tokey: 2005, 61). As of 2018 the reservation made by Burundi still stands (UN Treaty Depository 
Declarations and Reservations: 2018, 3-4)48. Iraq considers Resolution 3166 an integral part of the convention. 
Moreover, Iraq considers Article 1, paragraph 1 sub-paragraph b to cover representatives of national liberation 
movements recognised by Iraq or the Arab League (AL) or the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The 
relevant article stipulates that “Any representative or official of a State or any official or other agent of an 
international organisation….is entitled pursuant to international law to special protection from any attack on 
his person, freedom or dignity, as well as members of his family forming part of his household” (Diplomats 
Convention: 1973, Art. 1, para. 1, sub-para. b). In practise, members of NLM would be entitled to diplomatic 
protection under international law and would unlikely be faced with extradition or prosecution.  
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as a means of coercing governments to concede to political demands became a 
favoured weapon of terrorists by the mid-1970s. With the successful adoption of legal 
mechanisms dealing with terrorism against civil aviation and internationally protected 
persons, there certainly was growing optimism that a sectoral response would yield 
the most success. Terrorism as a tactic presents groups with a number of advantages, 
which in consequence becomes a challenge to governments. Hostage-taking is a rather 
inexpensive endeavour that requires little start-up costs. By taking an individual(s) 
hostage, organisations lacking a wealth of resources are able to force the hand of 
powerful governments into making a concession they would otherwise not do. 
Conversely, it becomes increasingly difficult for governments to give in to the 
demands, as success breeds imitation. In many cases – those which do not involve an 
aircraft or a boat or another form of mobility – hostage-taking is however a static effort, 
making both the terrorists and hostages sitting ducks. If nothing else, the taking of 
hostages is a rather public act that helps terrorists’ work towards their goal of 
intimidating an audience beyond the immediate victims and can thus garner 
awareness and support from those favourable to the cause, providing a terrorist 
organisation with new recruits.  
 
Some prominent examples of hostage-takings include the seizure of the Israeli 
Olympic headquarters in Munich in 1972, the OPEC 1975 incident, the hijacking of an 
Air France flight to Entebbe airport in 1976, and the three-year-long seizure of the 
American embassy and its staff in Tehran starting in 1979. Indeed, in respect to the 
Munich hostage-taking in 1972 a few observations ought to be made. When the 
hostage-takers demanded free passage out of Munich, German police saw an opening 
to try to free the hostages. It came to a fatal shoot out at Fürstenfeldbruck, the nine 
Israeli athletes were killed, and the surviving terrorists were taken into custody. The 
bodies of the dead terrorists were transported to Libya, where they were welcomed as 
heroes and laid to rest with military honours (Sonneborn: 2003, 52). And then there 
was the question of the terrorists taken into custody at the airport. With three 
Palestinian terrorists in German custody, the government feared reprisal, a fear that 
was not unfounded. Little over a month after the Munich Olympic incident, Lufthansa 
flight 615 heading from Beirut to Ankara was hijacked by Palestinian terrorists. The 
hijackers demanded the release of the three terrorists held by West German 
authorities and requested for the plane be flown to Zagreb. Despite calls by the Israeli 
government to not release the prisoners, “the German government was quick to 
transport the three prisoners to a plane of the Lufthansa subsidiary Condor, which was 
waiting in Munich…” (Blumenau: 2014b, 48). Herbert Culmann, the Chief Operating 
Officer (CEO) of Lufthansa ordered the plane to land in Zagreb, where the terrorists 
were handed over. The hijacked plane was flown to Tripoli, Libya, where the hostages 
were released and the terrorists escaped any criminal prosecution (Sibley: 1973, 3). It 
was the hostage crisis in Munich in 1972 that propelled the issue onto the world stage 
and gave the cause a global voice. Indeed, as one commentator recalled, Munich 
“awakened the media and world opinion much more - and more effectively - than 20 
years of pleading at the United Nations” (Quoted in Hoffmann: 2006, 64).  
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There are a number of concerns that made an instrument that deals with hostage-
taking a necessary enterprise. If the act takes place within one state and the 
perpetrator is found in that state, then the question of jurisdiction is settled. Yet, if the 
offence takes place in one state and the alleged offender is found in another because 
he or she was granted passage or managed to flee, it becomes more difficult to establish 
jurisdiction. In cases where an offender is taking into custody in a country where he 
has committed no crime, there is no obligation to submit the case for prosecution, 
meaning that the offender is able to evade justice. In the absence of an extradition 
treaty there is also no obligation to extradite, allowing terrorists to escape with 
impunity. Where an extradition agreement exists, the offender could be extradited to 
face punishment in the country where the act was committed. There are however two 
problems that present themselves. First, a common requirement of extradition treaties 
is that the act is a crime in both countries – that is, in the host country (where the 
offender is located) and in the requesting state (where the act was committed). Second, 
a common reason for denying extradition is the political offence exception included 
in most extradition treaties. If the offence for which a country requests extradition is 
political in nature, extradition treaties historically afford the possibility of denying 
extradition, in effect letting the offender escape unpunished.  
 
The predicament is further compounded in cases where no bilateral extradition treaty 
exists, in which case extradition is left to the individual country to decide upon. In 
such cases, even if the country is willing to extradite, it may have no legal basis to do 
so. Granted, this certainly did not take practical shape and remained more of a 
theoretical reality. In practical terms, it is also difficult to believe that in the mid-1970s 
a country of the Non-Aligned Movement would have granted extradition of an 
offender to Israel, even if a legal basis for extradition existed. While hostage-taking 
was an offence under international humanitarian law, this was limited to hostage-
taking within the context of armed conflict. Compounding the gap further, the already 
existing UN Conventions (ICAO convention-regime and Diplomats Convention) were 
limited in applicability. Simply put, hostage-taking aboard an aircraft or against 
internationally protected persons was a crime, but hostage-taking in the absence of an 
armed conflict and not involving civil aviation remained somewhat of a legal loophole 
internationally. The legal structure was therefore inadequate in dealing with the 
demands of the time. By 1976 it also became apparent that the Ad Hoc Committee on 
International Terrorism, which first took up its work in 1973, would make little 
progress (see above). Conversely, governments took steps to address the scourge of 
hostage-taking and set out to negotiate the Hostages Convention. 
 
Having fallen victim to frequent hostage-taking both internationally and domestically 
(e.g. Stockholm embassy siege in 1975), the West German government proposed the 
inclusion of an agenda item that would deal with the question of adopting a 
convention against the taking of hostages (Saul: 2014, 1). In a letter to the Secretary-
General in September of 1976, the Federal Republic of Germany recalled the adverse 
impacts that hostage-taking has had on the friendly relations between states and urged 
countries to take steps to adopt an appropriate legal instrument to counteract the 
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problem (West Germany in A/31/242: 1976). Germany argued that hostage-taking was 
“intolerable and incompatible with universally accepted standards of human conduct” 
and that both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International 
Covenant on Civil Political Rights were at risk (Ibid: 1976, para. 5). After four years of 
cumbersome negotiations, member states adopted the Hostages Convention in 
December of 1979. Although the convention closely follows the patterns established 
by the ICAO convention-regime and the Diplomats Convention, there are a number 
of innovations that will be examined in due course. More so, a review of the adoption 
process demonstrates that countries continued to favour different responses to curb 
terrorism, the basis of which stem, inter alia, from the perception of the (il)legality of 
violence in the course of national liberation movements. These points of contention 
will likewise receive considerable attention below.  
 
The General Assembly added the item of hostage-taking to its agenda and entrusted 
the Sixth Committee with organising the drafting of the convention.49 Considering 
that the ILC had resolved the technical legal problems when it drafted the Diplomats 
Convention, the Federal Republic of Germany suggested the establishment of an Ad 
Hoc Committee to deal with the drafting and not the ILC (Rosenstock: 1980, 174).50 It 
was indeed not the legal problems that would prove most contentious but rather the 
diverging political positions, a reality that would best be accommodated by a 
committee able to address political concerns such as an ad hoc committee . As the 
countries of the Third World were now holding a two-thirds majority, neither the 
Western bloc nor the socialist countries, on their own, would be successful if it came 
to a vote. As a consequence, the drafters would have to aim for a broad consensus to 
avoid the convention being voted down in the General Assembly.  
 
From the very beginning the familiar disagreements between member states emerged. 
Libya, for instance, introduced the idea of innocent versus guilty hostages. Early on in 
the discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee, Libya – with the support of other Arab 
countries – sought to expand the definition as to include the detention of masses under 
colonial rule (Romero: 1997, footnote 27). Other suggestions favoured a definition of 
hostage-taking that would exclude crimes committed in the course of national 
liberation.51 The addendum was later dropped, yet the philosophical thought behind 
it foreshadowed the difficulty of finding a consensus among states. A victim could 
become guilt simply by association. If such a concept would be included in the text, 
then a highly subjective and interpretative sentiment would have been included in the 
convention – one that would, as Kaye argues, render the convention “utterly useless” 
(Kaye: 1978, 454). In the context of national liberation such a distinction would indeed 
be troubling as an incident of hostage-taking could be justified on the basis that the 
 
49  Given protracted and detailed-focused nature of the legislative process, this thesis can only provide a 
synopsis of the developments. See Kaye’s “The United Nations Effort to Draft a Convention on the Taking of 
Hostages,” Commonwealth Secretariat’s Chapter Seven “International Convention Against the Taking of 
Hostages 1979” and Platz’s “International Konvention gegen Geiselnahme” for more comprehensive reading 
on the legislative history of the Hostages Convention.  
50 See also UN Doc. A/AC.188/L.9.  
51 See Rosenstock’s analysis and UN Doc. A/AC.188/L5 for more detailed discussions on this subject.  
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victim is guilty merely by being a citizen of a country, to name one example. Upon the 
recommendation of the Sixth Committee, the General Assembly adopted resolution 
31/103 and established an ad hoc committee. The committee52 was tasked with drafting 
a convention text and submitting the text to the General Assembly for consideration 
at the earliest possible date. In August 1977, the Ad Hoc Committee held its first 
session in which it considered the fourteen-article draft submitted by West Germany. 
During its first session, the committee was limited to discussions on the importance 
of such a convention, the legitimacy of national liberation movements and Libya’s 
categorization of innocent and guilty hostages became an issue once again and bore 
witness to discussions on mass hostage-taking by the state (Platz: 1980, 279). The 
suggestions of distinguishing between innocent hostages and guilty ones, as well as 
the proposal to include states as potential hostage-takers, did not attract wide support 
and were subsequently dropped (Saul: 2014, 3).  
 
The General Assembly extended the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee at its 32nd 
session and established two sub-working groups, one of which was to deal with the 
more contentious questions whereas the other formalized the draft articles where 
agreement had already been reached53 (United Nations: 2012, 1). On the basis of the 
German draft, the committee was able to forge a consensus on most of the provisions. 
Yet, the politically sensitive provisions would remain fundamental points of 
contention, such as the exact definition of the crime, the place of national liberation 
movements within the scope of the convention, the question of national sovereignty 
in the context of hostage-rescue (e.g. Entebbe 1976), and how the right to asylum can 
be accommodated with the obligation to extradite alleged offenders (Platz: 1980, 
279).54 The Ad Hoc Committee held its final session in Geneva in January and February 
of 1979 where it was able to forge agreement on the applicability of the convention to 
national liberation movements and on the matter of safeguarding territorial integrity 
in the course of hostage-rescue operations (United Nations 2012, 2). In short, the Third 
World bloc and the West agreed on a formulation that would uphold the concept of 
extradition or prosecution without infringing on the right of people in their struggle 
for self-determination. Member states agreed, in Article 12, that the convention “shall 
not apply to an act of hostage-taking committed in the course of armed conflicts as 
defined in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Protocols hereto, including armed 
conflicts…in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien 
occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-
determination” (Hostages Convention: 1979, 210). In practise, the exception for 
national liberation movements that Arab and African states attempted to exclude from 
the Hostages Convention would not go unpunished. The legal basis for prosecuting 
such acts would not necessarily have to be the Hostages Convention but could 
originate from the Geneva Conventions and its 1977 Additional Protocols. In simpler 
 
52 The first session was held from the 1st to the 19th of August in 1977 in New York and the second session was 
held in Geneva from the 6th to the 24th of February of 1978.  
53 See Ad Hoc Committee Reports A/33/39 for a detailed reading on the work of the Committee and the 
recommendations made.  
54 See the reports of the Working Group I (A/33/39 and A/34/39) from 1977 and 1978 for further reading on the 
progress made and where the membership was unable to find agreement.  
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terms, terrorists would face justice either under the provisions of the Hostages 
Convention or under International Humanitarian Law, in effect diminishing loopholes 
and exceptions. In return, the West agreed to include a provision that protects the 
political independence and territorial integrity of every country (Saul: 2014, 4). Article 
14 thus stipulates that this convention shall not be misunderstood as a pretext to 
violate the provisions of the UN Charter, which prohibit the use of force against 
another state. There was, however, no agreement forged on the right to asylum, a 
provision strongly favoured by Latin American countries, and on the exclusion of 
extradition under certain circumstances. In consequence, consultations continued 
into the 34th session of the General Assembly. Consequently, governments established 
a working group that would consider the draft articles for a final time (United Nations: 
2012, 2). Finally, on December 17th 1979 the Sixth Committee adopted a draft resolution 
with the final draft of the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages 
annexed. On the matter of asylum, the members agreed to stick to the text adopted in 
the Diplomats Convention and decided that the “[c]onvention shall not affect the 
application of the Treaties on Asylum, in force at the date of the adoption of this 
Convention, as between States which are parties to those Treaties; but a Party to this 
Convention may not invoke those Treaties with respect to another State Party to this 
Convention which is not a party to those treaties” (Hostages Convention: 1979, Art. 15). 
On the matter of extradition (Article 9), it came to a vote. States were consequently 
permitted to deny extradition in cases where the alleged offender is believed to be 
persecuted due to his race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, or political opinion, or 
in cases when any other prejudice might be determined (discussed further below).  
 
Similar to the Diplomats Convention, the Hostages Convention defines the scope of 
the crime (Article 1) and obliges parties to the convention to “make the offences set 
forth in article 1 punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the grave 
nature of those offences” (Hostages Convention: 1979, Art. 2). The criminalisation of 
the offence was not new considering that The Hague, Montreal, and Diplomats 
conventions contained similar provisions.55 In terms of prevention, Article 4 is similar 
to its predecessors and obliges parties to “take all practicable measures to prevent 
preparations in their respective territories for the commission of those offences within 
or outside their territories…including measures to prohibit in their territories illegal 
activities…” (Hostages Convention: 1979, Art. 4(a)). This preventative clause follows 
almost verbatim what the members agreed in Article 4 of the Diplomats Convention. 
Each state is required to establish jurisdiction when the act occurs within its territory, 
when the offender is a national, when the state is the subject of compulsion, or when 
the hostage is a national of the respective state (Ibid.:1979, Art. 5). The only difference 
between the two conventions is a propos jurisdiction and relates to the expansion of 
the Hostages Convention to include the passive personality principle – that is, a state 
can establish jurisdiction when the victim is a national of that state.  
 
 
55 There was also heated discussion on the role of intent and motivation in the definition of the crime and 
hostage-taking by states. See Kaye’s “The United Nations Effort to Draft a Convention on the Taking of 
Hostages” for further reading on the respective proposals introduced.  
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The Hostages Convention further places an obligation on states to cooperate in the 
prevention of the crimes and furthermore compels parties to take all “practical 
measures to prevent preparations in their respective territories for the commission of 
those offences within or outside their territories, including measures to prohibit in 
their territories illegal activities of persons, groups and organisations encourage, 
instigate….acts of takings of hostages” (Hostages Convention: 1979, Article 4 (a)). 
Besides the familiar obligation of states to ensure the presence of the alleged offender 
for the purpose of criminal proceeding or extradition, the convention furthermore 
details the rights of the alleged offender (Article 6). Accordingly, an offender is 
afforded the right to communicate with the appropriate representative of his state (Art. 
6 para 3). There is, however, a noticeable expansion to the due process obligations 
placed on parties. Article 6, paragraph 5 mandates the right of countries to invite the 
International Committee of the Red Cross to visit the alleged offender. Although 
minor, the rights afforded to an alleged offender are safeguarded and counterterrorism 
is not an excuse to violate due process rights. The corresponding article in the 
Diplomats Convention does not afford this right and only extends visiting rights to 
state entities (Diplomats Convention: 1973, operative para. 6(a)). The Hostages 
Convention thus provides the alleged offender with access to a third-party 
representative in cases where no diplomatic relations between the two involved states 
exist or if the offender is in any way prejudiced by his own state. It is an early attempt 
that endeavours to protect the rights of the offender and one that considers cases 
where an offender might have an unfavourable relationship with his or her own state.  
 
The cornerstone of the Hostages Convention is, however, Article 8. If an alleged 
offender is found in the territory of a party to the convention, he or she is either 
extradited or the case is submitted to the competent authorities for prosecution, 
without exception whatsoever (Ferreira & Carvalho et al.: 2013, 204). While it is 
perhaps fair to conclude that states favour extradition, the aim of the conventions thus 
far has been to close any legal loopholes that would allow an alleged offender to evade 
justice and punishment regardless of whether he is extradited or prosecuted 
domestically (Saul: 2014, 6). Similar to the Diplomats Convention, Article 8 guarantees 
the alleged offender “fair treatment at all stages of the proceedings, including 
enjoyment of all the rights and guarantees provided by the law of the State in the 
territory of which he is present” (Hostages Convention: 1979, art. 8 (2)), again 
representing an intrusion of sorts into a country’s domestic affairs. Together with 
Article 6 paragraph 3 (right to communicate with a state representative or the Red 
Cross) this article illustrates the UN’s early efforts to safeguard the right of the offender, 
adhering to the rule of law and initial efforts at upholding the principle of due process 
in its counterterrorism endeavours. Some governments have tended to “cloak their 
most repressive laws under the title of antiterrorism and it is reasonable to ensure that 
actions of the international community are drafted in such a manner as not to permit 
them to be used, or more accurately, abused, as an instrument of repression rather 
than a tool for protecting such basic rights as life, liberty, and security of person” 
(Rosenstock: 1980, 175). Although this observation was made in respect to the 
preambular portion of the convention, the inclusion of the ‘fair treatment’ clauses can 
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certainly also be understood with Rosenstock’s comment in mind. Article 8, however, 
contains a troubling short-coming. The article does not guarantee that justice will be 
served. The only obligation placed on parties is that the case be submitted to 
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. As previously alluded to, an 
alleged offender may still evade punishment if the authorities determine that there is 
insufficient evidence to proceed to trial, to name one example (Platz: 1980, 293). The 
foregoing discussions, especially those in the Sixth Committee, suggest that there was 
a clear divergence on what member states considered to constitute an act of terrorism. 
Conversely, a state favourable to a certain terrorist cause can still get around bringing 
terrorists to justice as there was no obligation to punish but only one to seek 
punishment. Equally important, the second portion of the article on the topic of 
affording an alleged offender the right to a fair treatment remains vague and leaves 
parties considerable room to determine what ‘fair treatment’ looks like. Any reference 
to existing instruments, like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights56 
adopted in 1976, remain absent.  
 
A significant novelty introduced by the Hostages Convention is Article 9, providing 
parties an opportunity to deny extradition when a state has grounds to believe that 
the request is made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing an individual based 
on his race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, or political opinion. Granted, a first 
reading of the article would give rise to the conclusion that exceptions can be made 
based on the political nature of the crime. Yet, a holistic reading of the convention 
suggests that in cases where extradition is denied, the state remains obliged to submit 
the case for prosecution, ensuring that the principle of aut dedere aut judicare is upheld. 
However, the focus is not on the offence itself but rather on the motives of the 
requesting state (Commonwealth Secretariat: 2002, 145). In any case, extradition 
cannot be refused if the hostage-taker was motivated by his political views but only if 
the extradition request was made for the purpose of prosecuting someone because of 
his/her views (Ibid.: 2002, 145). It is also useful to consider the broader implications of 
the article. Indeed, while the convention continues the practise of trying to bring 
terrorists to justice, Article 9 further demonstrates the United Nations’ attempts to 
protect the rights of alleged offenders and due process. The rights to a fair trial and 
impartiality are also implied by the provisions laid out. Where there is concern that 
the legal system of a requesting state is such that due process and the right to a fair 
trial are not guaranteed, possibly also as a result of the political inclination of the 
alleged offender. Arguably, Article 9 does leave room for abuse. A government can 
refuse to extradite an alleged terrorist by claiming that he or she is persecuted based 
on race, religion or a political opinion while the truth of the matter is that the refusing 
government is supportive of the respective cause. Granted, the case would still have to 
be submitted to the prosecuting authorities, but such efforts could remain to no avail.  
 
 
56 Part 3 of the Covenant outlines the procedural fairness of law, the rights of due process and the principle of 
presumption of innocence. These concepts are enshrined within Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Covenant, yet it 
remains speculation to what extent these are considered in the context of the Hostages Convention.  
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The right to granting asylum proved to be another provision with the potential of 
jeopardising the aut dedere aut judicare principle that many Western countries were 
striving for. At its core, the right to asylum provides a state with the basis to refuse the 
extradition of an offender for a crime that is political in nature. The original proposal 
introduced by Mexico suggested including the phrasing “none of the provisions of this 
Convention shall be interpreted as impairing the right of asylum” (UN Doc. A/34/39: 
1978, 6). This formulation would have put the principle of extradition or prosecution 
at risk as it opened the opportunity to prevent extradition based on the fact that 
asylum was granted. This would indeed have impaired the principle of aut dedere aut 
judicare, as the Mexican proposal did not make it abundantly evident whether, in the 
absence of extradition, the case would have to be submitted to competent authorities 
for prosecution (Platz: 1980, 297). In practise, Article 15 (see above) is limited in scope 
to Latin American countries, and as Wood dully noted in respect to the Diplomats 
Convention, it does not relieve a party from its obligation to submit the case to 
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution (Wood: 2008).  
 
Article 12 was a further provision that provoked a great deal of discussion between 
Third World countries and the West. After numerous negotiation attempts, members 
finally agreed to exclude acts committed in armed conflicts from the scope of the 
convention (Saul: 2014, 3). Article 12 was only made possible by the then-recently 
adopted Additional Protocols in 1977 to the Geneva Convention of 1949. There was 
considerable debate whether hostage-taking committed by national liberation 
movements should be subject to the scope of the convention. Seeing that this 
altercation was already addressed above and will be the subject of discussion in 
subsequent chapters, only a short synopsis remains necessary here. Early on, the 
delegate from the United Republic of Tanzania made it clear that the convention 
“must under no circumstances be capable of being invoked against national liberation 
movements which took their oppressors hostage in the course of a struggle against 
colonial government or a racist foreign regime” (Tanzania in Verwey: 1981, 72). With 
the support of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Nigeria, amongst others, the following 
amendment to the convention was suggested: “[f]or the purpose of this Convention, 
the term ‘taking of hostages’ shall not include any act or acts carried out in the process 
of national liberation against colonial rule, racist and foreign regimes,” by liberation 
movements recognised by the United Nations or regional organisations” (Ibid.; 1981, 
73).57  In their effort to safeguard the position of the NLM, the Third World Bloc 
insisted on the categorization of innocent versus guilty victims, the need to focus on 
the question of motive as a reason to deny extradition (see discussion on Article 9 
above) and more abstractly the concept of just cause (justa causa). Verwey aptly puts 
it by saying “…it is submitted that acceptance of the idea of justa causa would entail 
two risks, escalation and proliferation. On the one hand, once the self-appointed 
defender of a just cause is permitted to commit a specific, otherwise prohibited, act 
like hostage taking, why should he not subsequently claim to be entitled to commit 
 
57 At later sessions of the Ad Hoc Committee other countries made similar demands. See UN Docs. A/32/39 
(1978) and A/33/39 (1979), as well as the earlier records UN Doc. A/AC.188/L.4 for a detailed reading on this 
matter.  
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other prohibited acts, like using poison gas?” (Verwey: 1981, 75). He further maintains 
that “…once one political movement is identified as a defender of a just cause, why 
should others not subsequently claim to be defenders of other just causes, and thus to 
be entitled to the same exception rights?” (Ibid.: 1981, 75). The maxim ‘one man’s 
terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’ thus fittingly summarizes the discussion on 
this article. The Western countries were however adamant in not allowing any 
exclusions to the scope of the convention (Blumenau: 2014a, 172). The idea of just 
causes as a potential exemption would have rendered it completely meaningless. 
Indeed, as one commentator puts it: “…once one political movement is identified as a 
defender of a just cause, why should others not subsequently claim to be defenders of 
other just causes, and thus to be entitled to the same exception rights?” (Verwey: 1981, 
75). However, after lengthy negotiations, a compromise was reached by the final 
session of the Ad Hoc Committee in 1979; Article 12 of the convention would refer to 
international humanitarian law to cover hostage-taking in cases where the Hostages 
Convention fails to apply. More precisely, if a state has an obligation to extradite or 
prosecute an offender under one of the Geneva Conventions and its Protocols, then 
the Hostages Convention would not take effect. If, however, no such obligation exists, 
a state party is obligated to draw on the Hostages Convention as legal basis and take 
action (O’Donnell: 2006, 864). The article achieves the objective of ensuring that the 
principle of aut dedere aut judicare is upheld. A state is required to prosecute or 
extradite either by the provisions of the Hostages Convention or equally so under the 
obligations placed on contracting parties by the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocols of 1977. In practise, a perpetrator could not escape justice or rely 
on safe havens on the grounds that no international instrument finds application.  
 
On July 4th 1976, 248 passengers of an Air France flight were taken hostage by members 
of the PFLP and the German Revolutionary Cells. Over the course of the hostage-
taking the non-Jewish passengers were released and the remaining passengers 
remained in detention in a Ugandan airport building. In response, Israeli commandos 
planned and executed a rescue operation that freed 102 hostages; however, the 
operation also led to the death of over a dozen Ugandan service men (Blumenau: 2014b, 
68). The raid greatly divided member states. In an attempt to show support, Western 
countries congratulated Israel on a successful rescue mission, whereas other countries, 
mainly from the Arab world, condemned the operation as a blatant violation of 
international law.58 As these developments occurred during the negotiation of the 
Hostages Convention, the issue of territorial integrity and political independence 
quickly became an urgent matter to address. It was highlighted that the convention 
cannot become a pretext for the violation of another country’s sovereignty 
(Rosenstock: 1980, 186). Conversely, member states decided that “[n]othing in this 
Convention shall be construed as justifying the violation of the territorial integrity or 
political independence of a State” (Hostages Convention: 1979, Art. 14).59  
 
58 See “Excerpts from the United Nations Security Council Debate on the Entebbe Incident” for an overview 
on the discussions in the Council and the positions taken.  
59 The remaining Articles of the Hostages Convention, as well as the ones not addressed, are less important 
for the purpose of this research endeavour. The articles not addressed outline the requirements of establishing 
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On a final note, it is worth briefly reflecting on the preambulatory portion of the 
convention. The third paragraph reaffirms the principle of both equal rights and self-
determination. The reference to the principle of self-determination reflects the power 
of the Third World at the United Nations and is specific to the Hostages Convention. 
Indeed, although the issue of self-determination and foreign subjugation was a topic 
of discussion in the consultations leading to the adoption of the Diplomats Convention 
in 1973, no such reference was made in the preamble, which is likely the result of a 
common interest in upholding the safety of diplomats among all member states. One 
ought, however, to be cautious to conclude that paragraph 3 on self-determination 
provides justification for the use of violence. To be sure, the taking of hostages has 
been identified as a crime of great concern to the international community (Hostages 
Convention: 1979, para. 4) and one that the members ought to prevent, prosecute, and 
punish (Ibid: 1979, para. 4). By extension, and as already alluded to above, the 
convention places an obligation on a state to extradite an alleged offender or to submit 
the case to prosecution (Article 8). The preamble, although not part of the legally-
binding portion of the text, is nevertheless imperative when it comes to the 
interpretation of a given resolution or, in this case, a convention. Rosenstock usefully 
concludes in this context, that the “reason for including language of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples is the perception that the legitimacy of the use of force 
in the cause of self-determination is strengthened by the inclusion of this language 
and would be weakened by its absence” (Rosenstock: 1980. 175). Therefore, while no 
explicit reference is made to the justification of violence in the course of self-
determination, the inclusion of such a provision within the introductory remarks 
demonstrates the unwillingness of member states to condemn all forms of political 
violence in any and all circumstances. In the absence of a clear consensus, states are 
likely to interpret the provisions of the convention with their own experiences and 
ideological inclination in mind.  
 
Terrorism has been on the agenda of the United Nations permanently since 1972. Kurt 
Waldheim requested the inclusion of the agenda item as a result of a series of terrorist 
attacks, including in Munich in 1972 and at the Israeli airport of Lod in the same year. 
The General Assembly adopted resolution 3034, emphasising the importance of 
analysing the root causes of terrorism, and established an Ad Hoc Committee of the 
Sixth Committee. The Ad Hoc Committee was to deal with terrorism in a general and 
comprehensive manner and to help countries find common ground. It soon, however, 
became clear that countries fostered fundamentally different outlooks on how to deal 
with terrorism; in some cases justification was made for terrorism when committed in 
situations of national liberation or foreign subjugation. By 1979, the committee was 
unable to produce any tangible outcome and “decided to abandon the idea of a 
 
jurisdiction (Article 5), informing interested parties on the outcomes of the proceedings (Article 7) and on the 
effects that the convention would have on existing bilateral extradition treaties (Article 10). The remainder of 
the convention further outlines dispute settlement proceedings (Article 16), how the Treaty will enter into 
force (Article 18), as well as other procedural aspects (articles 17, 19 and 20). See Saul’s “International 
Convention Against The Taking of Hostages” for a more detail analysis on these provisions. 
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comprehensive assessment of terrorism and to focus on different aspects of the 
phenomenon” (Blumenau: 2014b, 103). To be sure, the United Nations has continued 
to address terrorism in a comprehensive manner throughout its trajectory, as will be 
discussed further in subsequent chapters; nevertheless, it is important to understand 
that it was clear early on that such efforts would only have little chance of success.  
 
By 1979, the United Nations had also adopted a series of instruments that criminalise 
offences which can be applied to counterterrorism-related activities. They are however 
not purely counterterrorism instruments and only the Hostages Convention mentions 
terrorism in its preambulatory paragraphs, certainly also as an attempt to avoid 
familiar disagreements that may have arisen if the term was included in the operative 
portion of the text. It is important to note, that the preambular likewise fell short of 
any definition of the term. The conventions discussed above have set out to not only 
criminalise certain behaviour but have moreover placed obligations on contracting 
parties in relation to establishing jurisdiction and extradition or prosecution. It can 
also be observed that the provisions contained in the respective conventions predate 
the United Nations. Indeed, although the 1937 draft convention never entered into 
force, many of the provisions in respect to extradition or prosecution find their basic 
origins in the League of Nations text. Over the course of the 1970s, governments have 
developed international instruments that have highlighted the criminal justice 
response taken by the organisation. At the heart of this approach lies the aut dedere 
aut judicare principle, imposing an obligation on parties to either extradite an 
individual or to submit the case to prosecution. It has also become clear that although 
the political offence exception has been significantly narrowed, extradition can still be 
denied on a number of grounds. At the same time, countries would still have to submit 
the case to their competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, and that is 
where the crux of matter lies. If a government is unwilling or unable to cooperate in 
bringing terrorists to justice, these instruments fail (Joyner: 2003, 540). To a 
considerable extent, states must rely on one another to ensure that offenders are 
brought to justice. Certainly, when governments have the political will to enforce the 
provisions of the conventions as they were intended, a perpetrator will either face 
extradition or will face trial and subsequently punishment. Yet, governments that are 
unwilling, as in some cases they are sympathetic to a specific terrorist movement, 
offenders can evade punishment if domestic authorities decide that there are no 
grounds for criminal proceedings. In the end, it is critical for states to understand that 
these instruments will only bring terrorists to justice if they are implemented properly 
without drawing on the given loopholes.  
 
The proceeding analysis thus allows for the conclusion that countries agreed that 
international terrorism was indeed a challenge that had to be dealt with within the 
confines of the United Nations. In this respect, the Diplomats Convention has 
specifically demonstrated that when states have similar interest (e.g. the protection of 
its diplomats and their relations with other states), the international community 
would be able to find common ground quite quickly. The Hostages Convention, on 
the other hand, has also made evident that compromise is difficult and cumbersome, 
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yet external circumstances (e.g. adoption of the 1977 Geneva Protocols) make 
compromise possible. Above all, it is fair to assert that the issue of terrorism remained 
deeply political and the UN’s response to terrorism can only be fully appreciated when 
taking into account geopolitical realties and the nature of the international system at 
a specific time. When Mikhail Gorbachev became the new leader of the Soviet Union 
in 1985, the relationship between the West and the Soviet Union slowly entered into a 
more peaceful and cooperative era (Marantz: 1989, 19). Hence, with the relationship 
between the East and West slowly taking on a more conducive shape – and the process 
of decolonisation coming to end – western countries were certainly hopeful that this 
would manifest itself at the United Nations. It is therefore with this context in mind 
that the proceeding chapters will embark on exploring the response taken against 
terrorism by the United Nations from the demise of the Cold War (as early as 1986) 
until 2001.  
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CHAPTER FOUR – THE UN AND TERRORISM BETWEEN 
MID-1980S AND 2001.  
 
The end of the East-West conflict created a political environment in which the super- 
powers – namely the United States and the Soviet Union – progressively disengaged 
from confrontation and their method of proxy warfare (Schmid: 2013). Concurrently, 
the post-Cold War era also established an environment more conducive to 
cooperation in terrorism-related matters at the United Nations. It was also of 
significance that the now-independent former colonies started to see terrorism as a 
threat to their own power. In fact, “[t]he newly independent states saw their new role 
as defenders of the status quo and found terrorist organisations particularly 
threatening” (Stilles: 2006, 42). Former supporters of terrorist movements eventually 
found themselves the target, a process that had already started at OPEC in 1975. Indeed, 
although al-Qaeda was born out of the remnants of the Soviet-Afghan war and initially 
depended on Saudi and American support, they increasingly directed their wrath at 
the Americans and later the Saudi governments (as well as other Middle Eastern 
regimes). Al-Qaeda, and the fighters it produced, eventually flocked to conflicts in 
Chechnya and Kashmir (Wright: 2006, 297). What’s more, with the USSR being in 
demise and communism discredited there was a “shift to a pro-Western orientation 
[and an inclination] to accept the West’s interpretation of international law and 
terrorism” (Stilles: 2006, 42). By 1990 thirty new countries made the transition to 
democracies, and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe likewise in 1990, 
“made possible democratisation in Eastern Europe” (Huntington: 1991, 14).  
 
      The General Assembly 
By the time the General Assembly60 approached international terrorism in 1986, the 
UN body had adopted five problem-specific counterterrorism conventions.61 Equally 
so, the Assembly had developed a normative framework through which countries were 
encouraged to take action when responding to terrorism. The previous chapter took a 
detailed look at how the General Assembly structured its debate on the phenomenon 
and over what issues member states were unable to reach consensus. Chapter three 
also concluded that the General Assembly’s response to terrorism was very much 
characterised by its criminal justice orientation, as well as by its marginal focus on 
prevention. More precisely, the conventions of the previous decade evolved around 
the criminalisation of a specific offence, the extradition or prosecution of alleged 
 
60 See the introduction for an overview of the General Assembly’s institutional capacities.  
61 The 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, the 1972 Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, the 1973 convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crime against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents and the 1979 
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages. The General Assembly also adopted the 1979 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (this convention was not addressed in the previous 
chapter).  
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offenders and thus notably on the time after an attack (e.g. prosecuting terrorists). The 
General Assembly hence provided a basic international legal framework for aspects 
relating to terrorism, something that did not exist before. A commendable attempt 
was also made to incorporate rule of law principles and human rights concerns into 
the UN’s counterterrorism endeavours, albeit with a great deal of ambiguity left 
behind. The ensuing section will consider how, if at all, the General Assembly’s 
response to terrorism changed between 1985 and 2001.  
 
United Nations General Assembly resolutions from 1985-2001 
The position of the United Nations on terrorism took a turn with the adoption of 
resolution 40/61 in 1985. Whereas earlier resolutions ‘deeply deplored’ and found 
themselves concerned with the rise in terrorist violence, the resolution adopted in 1985, 
for the first time, “[u]nequivocally condemn[ed], as criminal, all acts, methods and 
practises of terrorism wherever and by whomever committed, including those which 
jeopardise friendly relations among States and their security” (UNGA res. 40/61, op. 
para. 1). Indeed, the increasing frequency of terrorist violence as well as the lethality 
prompted expressions of condemnation and the use of political violence was 
increasingly seen as an illegitimate form of political participation, no matter the 
context. Although terrorism remained localised in ambition, it was perceivably 
becoming more global in nature. It is also noteworthy to mention that attacks were 
increasingly targeted against American facilities and citizen, 62  one of the most 
powerful countries at the time. Hence, resolutions adopted biannually until 1991 
mirrored this sentiment. 63  Despite the reiteration of condemnation in General 
Assembly resolutions after 1985, member states however continued to insist on the 
inclusion of preambular references to the principle of self-determination and 
maintained the notion of the inalienable right of independence from colonial and 
racist rule. Particularly noteworthy in this regard was the insertion of ‘legitimately’ in 
the provisions that reaffirmed such rights. For instance, resolution 46/51 (1991) avowed 
that nothing could prejudice the right of a people to seek self-determination and “the 
right of these peoples to struggle legitimately to this end…” [emphasis added] (Res. 
46/51: 1991, preambular para. 15). This certainly was the result of the fact that previous 
resolutions established this practise and for another, while member states were slowly 
condemning terrorism in all circumstances, they were reluctant to completely remove 
all references to anti-colonial struggles. The insistence on the self-determination 
principle must also be understood by way of considering that some countries were not 
yet independent (e.g. Namibia was not independent until 1990) and Eastern Europe 
was still under Soviet rule, hence even the West arguably fostered an interest in the 
notion of self-determination. Also, considering that struggles for self-determination 
were not too far in the distant past, Third World countries may have wanted to 
 
62 Some notable attacks include: the April 1983 bombing of the US embassy in Lebanon, the October 1983 
bombings of Marine barracks in Beirut and the Hijacking of TWA Flight 847 in June 1985.  
63  Resolutions 42/159 (1987), 44/29 (1989) and 46/51 (1991) all condemned terrorism in all its form and 
irrespective of perpetrator. The resolutions however likewise continued to reaffirm the right to self-
determination.  
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incorporate the principle as a ‘safety-net’ of sorts against neo-colonialism and foreign 
interventions in the future. A further significant change adopted with resolution 46/51 
was the rephrasing of the title. The subject of international terrorism would no longer 
be referred to and placed on the agenda as including explicit reference to the study of 
the underlying causes that give rise to terrorist activities, but was rather shortened to 
‘measures to eliminate international terrorism.’ The alteration to the name suggests 
that there was an agreement that the existence of root causes could not be an excuse 
for political violence, nor was the need to study the root causes an excuse to delaying 
concrete counterterrorism measures (Peterson: 2004, 176). The explicit reference to 
the root causes in the title did indeed have dangerous implications. As one 
commentator suggests, “[i]f emphasis was given to ‘underlying causes,’ if ‘misery’ and 
‘frustration’ were the evils and not the overt acts of terror, then terrorism, instead of 
being discouraged, could be tolerated, justified, and even legitimised” (Schoenberg in 
Comras: 2010, 19). In spite of continued differences in outlook on how the organisation 
ought to respond to international terrorism, these changes certainly pointed to a 
slowly emerging consensus that terrorism cannot be justified under any circumstances, 
no matter how noble the cause (Ruperez: 2006, 4). By the mid-1980s the issue of the 
root causes was no longer placed at the centre of the General Assembly’s 
counterterrorism endeavours and represents a considerable change in General 
Assembly practise. That said, resolutions adopted from 1985 until 1991 continued to 
urge states to “pay special attention to all situations, including colonialism, racism and 
situations involving mass and flagrant violations of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms and those involving alien domination and foreign occupation, that my give 
rise to international terrorism and may endanger international peace and security” 
(UNGA res. 46/51, op. para. 6).  
 
Resolutions adopted until 1991 also remained rather similar to one another and 
repetitive; inter alia, calling on states to adopt existing multilateral agreements, refrain 
from organising and instigating terrorist acts in another state, and to cooperate closely 
with one another concerning the prevention of terrorist activity, and included 
provisions on extradition and prosecution, which were also to be included in bilateral 
and multilateral treaties. The resolutions furthermore accentuated the need for UN 
specialized organisations, such as the International Maritime Organisation64 and the 
ICAO, to take up the issue of international terrorism and present recommendations 
to the United Nations (Romanov: 1990, 299). One can also not help but notice that the 
resolutions adopted by the General Assembly until 1991 remained vague as to the 
preventative element of the organisation’s work. For instance, resolution 44/29 urges 
governments to “prevent the preparation and organisation … of terrorist and 
subversive acts directs against other states and their citizens [and to]co-operate with 
one another in exchanging relevant information concerning the prevention and 
combating of terrorism” (UNGA res. 44/29: 1989, operative para. 4(a) & (d)). Similar 
 
64 The seizure of Achille Lauro, a vessel seized by Palestinian terrorists, in 1985 promoted member governments 
to consider the threat of maritime terrorism. The hostage-taking and the killing of an American wheel chair 
bound American certainly provided sufficient impetus for the General Assembly to entrust the IMO with 
considering instruments against terrorist activities on the water.  
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to the resolutions adopted in the 1970s, it remained uncertain how the General 
Assembly intended member states to prevent terrorism. Its inclusion, one might argue, 
was more of a habit than a substantive practise as the Assembly did not provide 
comprehensive instructions on how to prevent terrorism. In 1993 the General 
Assembly broke with its process of adopting a resolution biannually. During the Sixth 
Committee meeting that year, member states found themselves unable to agree on the 
need to further pursue a comprehensive convention against terrorism. Indeed, 
member countries concluded that “any broad discussion of terrorism would be 
counter-productive, [which was] in sharp contrast to the relative success of the 
piecemeal approach” (Romaniuk: 2010, 56).65 It appeared that a piecemeal approach 
had yielded the most success to date and was considered a good starting point for 
further action.  
The General Assembly’s trend of lending support in its resolutions in the 1970s 
onwards- although not explicitly legitimising- for the use of terrorism in the course of 
self-determination would come to an end in 1994 when member states adopted 
resolution 49/60 and in its annex the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism. The 1994 Declaration gave light to a number of noteworthy 
novelties in how the General Assembly – and in consequence the United Nations – 
responded to terrorism. The declaration was unique in detail and contained stronger 
language of absolute condemnation. More significant, however, was the General 
Assembly’s position that “criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of 
terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political 
purposes are in any circumstances unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a 
political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that 
may be invoked to justify them” (UNGA res. 49/60: 1994, op. para. 3). Although the 
resolution likewise condemned all acts and practises of terrorism wherever and by 
whomever, as resolutions 40/61 (1985) 44/29 (1989) and 46/51 (1991) have previously 
done, exclusion of violent acts as unjustifiable no matter what nature (e.g. political) 
was new. It is also worth highlighting that a careful reading of the declaration 
furthermore allows for the conclusion that language reaffirming the right to self-
determination is absent. Indeed, resolutions 44/29 (1989) and 46/51 (1991) contained 
provisions that reaffirmed the right to self-determination and that this right should 
not be curtailed in any respect. Halberstam, for instance, observes that if any reference 
to the right to self-determination was interpreted as a justification for the use of 
violence, “the omission of any such reference in the later resolutions [1994 onwards] 
and the broad language condemning terrorism ‘wherever and by whomever’ 
committed are a clear rejection of that position” (Halberstam: 2003, 577). While one 
can only speculate, this change in response can, in part, be attributed to the fact that 
most countries were gradually becoming afflicted by terrorism and given the coming 
 
65 In the meantime, the United Nations adopted a series of resolutions on the ‘human rights and terrorism’. 
Consultations to this stream of resolutions took place in the Third Committee and culminated in the adoption 
of resolution 48/122 in 1993 resolutions 49/185 (1994), 50/186 (1995), 52/133 (1998) and 54/164 (2000). While 
these are certainly important to the UN’s response to terrorism, space restrains do not permit a more detail 
discussion.  
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to an end of the decolonisation process (e.g. Namibian independence in 1990), former 
colonies vested no interest in catering to terrorist organisations, many of which could 
turn on their former supporters.  
 
General Assembly resolutions adopted thereafter leading up to 9/11 did not 
significantly deviate from the provisions of resolution 49/60 adopted in 1994, nor from 
the declaration in its annex. Later resolutions reaffirmed the Declaration to Eliminate 
International Terrorism and called upon states to intensify cooperation in matters 
relating to preventing terrorist acts from unfolding. Specifically, governments were 
urged to “refrain from financing, encouraging, providing training for or otherwise 
supporting terrorist activities” (UNGA res. 53/108: 1999, op. para. 5). A people’s 
struggle for self-determination was no longer grounds for the use of violence, and the 
condemnation of terrorist activities by whomever and whenever became an engrained 
credo in the General Assembly’s response. Resolution 51/210 (1996) is however worth 
exploring in further detail. In 1996 member states recommended the “accelerat[ion] 
[of] research and development regarding methods of detection of explosives and other 
harmful substances that can cause death or injury…identify[ing] their origin in post-
blast investigations” (UNGA res. 51/210:1996, op. para. 3(a)). Although the 1994 
declaration already made reference to the importance of preventing terrorist acts from 
taking place, it was the 1996 resolution that urged governments to take concrete steps 
in preventing the financing of terrorist organisations as well as the use of explosives 
for terrorist purposes (Ibid: 1996, op. para. 3(b)). Adding further context, member 
states acknowledged the use of organisations who claim to have charitable, social, or 
cultural objectives for the purpose of terrorist financing (Ibid: 1996, op. para. 3(f)). The 
increasing transnationalisation of terrorist financing by 1996 (Brzoska: 2011, 5) must 
have also played a significant role in the adoption of resolution 51/210. Perhaps one 
can conclude that with the adoption of resolution 51/210 the General Assembly was 
unprecedently descriptive in how it expected governments to respond to terrorism and 
that it contained the most detailed language on the issue of terrorism financing in the 
pre-9/11 era.66 On a final note, resolution 51/210 established an Ad Hoc Committee with 
the objective of developing a convention on terrorists’ use of bombs and to further its 
work on elaborating a comprehensive convention (UNGA res. 51/210: 1996, operative 
para. 9).  
Action taken by the General Assembly against terrorism in the mid-1980s until 2001 
culminated in a series of resolutions that “[u]nequivocally condemn[ed], as criminal, 
all acts, methods and practises of terrorism wherever and by whomever committed 
(UNGA res. 40/61: 1985, op. para. 1). Henceforth, the General Assembly would identify 
all criminal acts as “unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, 
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be 
invoked to justify them” (UNGA 49/60: 1994, operative para. 3), essentially narrowing 
the extent to which terrorists (and governments) can justify violence. With the 
adoption of resolution 51/210 in 1996 the Assembly amended the declaration and 
 
66 The General Assembly however did not repeat the instructive nature of the 1996 resolutions in subsequent 
resolutions. 
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adopted unusually detailed language on the urgency to prevent the financing of 
terrorism, encouraging governments to also review, inter alia, ‘charitable organisations’ 
and their abuse for terrorist purposes. Later resolutions adopted in 1998, 1999,67 2000, 
and early 2001 follow this practise and reaffirm the 1994 declaration. Most importantly 
however, while the General Assembly provided that “criminal acts intended or 
calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or 
particular persons for political purposes” are not justifiable in any circumstances, the 
body has fallen short of a concrete definition of terrorism. The lack of a definition 
continued to remain the result of differences of opinion of what constitutes an act of 
terrorism (see chapter four for the cleavages on definition). As such, member states 
are left with a broad discretion on what constitutes an act of terrorism. Conversely, 
the provisions within the respective resolutions will be interpreted with country-
specific experiences (and interests) in mind. This ambiguity was arguably an attempt 
to try to get as many countries as possible to sign on to the resolutions on terrorism. 
Nevertheless, the period from 1985 until 2001 represents a rather radical shift in the 
General Assembly’s response to terrorism.  
 
The UN’s problem-specific response: Innovation or continuity?  
By the late 1990s the General Assembly had adopted an impressive series of 
multilateral treaties.68 Complementing the work of the General Assembly through its 
resolutions and declarations, these treaties were focused on depriving terrorists of a 
geographic and political sanctuary, bringing terrorists to justice either through 
extradition or prosecution, and committing states to taking preventive action. Each of 
these treaties addressed a specific terrorist activity, continuously leaving a gap as 
terrorists groups developed and changed their methods, becoming more innovative 
over time. With the adoption of resolution 51/210 in 1996, the General Assembly would 
yet again turn its attention to advancing international law through its convention-
regime. By way of illustration, the subsequent section will argue that the General 
Assembly continued to make progress in broadening its response to terrorism. Similar 
to the previous timeframe reviewed, the Assembly advanced its convention-regime 
along two tracks: A sectoral and a comprehensive one. The Comprehensive 
Convention on International Terrorism was (and remains to this day) an attempt by 
the United Nations to criminalise all forms of international terrorism. Following the 
apparent failure by the Sixth Committee to adopt such a convention throughout the 
1970s, the General Assembly renewed its efforts in 1996, certainly also as a result of the 
rise in global terrorism towards the end of the 1990s (Oudraat: 2004, 30). Yet, by 2001 
any real progress remained elusive. It became clear early on that negotiations on a 
 
67 Starting in 1999 with resolution 53/108 the UNGA inserted a preambular reference to the outcome document 
of a conference of the Non-Aligned Movement. The impact of this provision will be discussed in further detail 
in chapter seven.  
68 These include inter alia the Diplomats Convention (1973), the Hostages Convention (1979), the Convention 
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980), the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988), Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the 
Purpose of Detection (1991). 
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comprehensive convention would be difficult. The definition of the term ‘terrorism’ 
and the scope of application were particularly challenging. In contrast, the 
organisation’s efforts to add two further sectoral conventions to its repertoire of 
treaties – the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 
(Bombing Convention) in 1997 and the International Convention for the Suppression 
of Terrorist Financing (Terrorist Financing Convention) in 1999 69  – were more 
successful. On a general level, the Bombings Convention adopted in 1997 is directed 
towards a particular area of terrorist activity, while the Terrorist Financing Convention 
is the first to address the phenomenon in a more general manner. Also, the latter 
convention addresses terrorism at a much earlier stage, preventing terrorists from 
acquiring the funds to get the material to make a bomb, to name one example. The 
provisions in both conventions follow the pattern of previous agreements, yet a 
number of innovative elements can be identified and are worth reflecting upon further. 
It is also noteworthy that both conventions are explicitly addressed as what they are: 
Conventions for the suppression of terrorism. This was indeed a novel development 
considering that terrorism was not mentioned in the Diplomats Convention and only 
in the preambles to the Hostages Convention, demonstrating member states’ earlier 
reluctance to address terrorism as a special offence. Both conventions, adopted in 1997 
and 1999, respectively, hence reflect the organisation’s consistency in proceeding 
along a problem-specific track.  
 
Terrorist Bombing Convention 1997  
It was not until the United States promoted the idea of a convention on terrorist 
bombings in 1996 that member states turned their attention to such terrorist acts. 
Despite the series of bombings in the 1980s, predominantly against American targets 
in Lebanon, it was the bombing of a housing complex hosting American forces in the 
city of Khobar, Saudi Arabia, in 1996 that broke the camel’s back (Boulden: 2014, 561). 
The United States first made its proposal at a G7 (plus Russia) ministerial meeting in 
Paris, where it garnered support from the other major industrialised nations (G7/G8 
Ministerial Conference on Terrorism: 1996, para. 17). In a subsequent letter addressed 
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, France – on behalf of the G7 and Russia 
– highlighted the urgency of strengthening international cooperation in tackling 
terrorism, placing particular focus on bringing terrorists to justice and curtailing 
terrorist fundraising activities (UN Doc. A/51/261: 1996, 3 & 5). The ministers also 
agreed on the promotion of an international instrument on terrorist bombings.70 The 
United States formally submitted its proposal of a convention to the Sixth Committee 
in October 1996 (Diaz-Paniagua: 2008, 226). As the basis for its work, the Ad Hoc 
 
69 Negotiations on an international instrument for the suppression of nuclear terrorism were also underway, 
yet it was not until 2005 that the Nuclear Terrorism Convention was open for signature.  
70 The criminalisation of terrorists’ use of explosives and other lethal devices was indeed an urgent matter by 
1996. In his speech to the General Assembly in September of 1996 President Clinton urged the membership to 
do more to fight terrorism. He believed that the international community had not done enough in denying 
terrorists’ a safe haven (explicitly calling out Libya, Iraq and Iran). He closed his remarks by calling on member 
governments to “punish terrorism and to criminalise the use of explosives in terrorist attacks” (A/51/PV.6: 
1996, 4).  
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Committee used the draft working document submitted by France on behalf of the G7 
and Russia, although later amendments by the bureau were also considered.71 What 
ensued was a number of informal meetings, a drafting and re-drafting process, and 
consultations within the committee and the respective Working Group. Despite 
diverging opinions, the General Assembly adopted the Bombing Convention in 
December 1997.72 It is easy to get trapped in the details of the discussions that forewent 
the adoption process. And while brief remarks on the challenges faced during the 
drafting process are certainly in order, focus will rest on the main provisions of the 
convention and the extent to which these represent novelties.  
 
The convention is structured around the obligation to criminalise terrorist bombings 
(Article 4), the requirement to establish jurisdiction (Article 6) and extradite or 
prosecute alleged offenders (Article 8), as well as a duty to assist in investigating 
(Article 10) criminal acts that fall under the scope of the agreement. Most notably, the 
convention does not try to define ‘terrorism,’ although, unlike the previous treaties, 
the title implies its specific application to a terrorist context. The preambulatory 
paragraphs of international treaties are insightful when trying to grasp the spirit of the 
final outcome. In some cases, they even demonstrate compromise. Unlike the 
Diplomats and Hostages conventions, the Bombing Agreement explicitly condemned 
all acts, methods and practises of terrorism, no matter what the context or 
perpetrators (preambulatory para. 4). As a matter of fact, the convention adopted in 
1973 made no mention of terrorism and the Hostages Convention (1979) only made 
passing reference, noting the connection between the taking of hostages and terrorism 
in preambulatory paragraph 6. The insistence on a reference to terrorism was however 
only “an attempt [by Soviet diplomats] to reopen old wounds and re-enter into the 
negotiations about NLM and terrorism as such” (Blumenau: 2014a, 186). The reference 
in the preambular was thus a compromise. The latter (Hostages Convention) also 
reaffirmed the principle of self-determination in preambulatory paragraph 3. 
Interestingly enough, the previous conventions addressed their subject matters as a 
generic crime. By adopting the Bombing Convention by consensus, “the General 
Assembly appeared to be taking a clear stand against the indiscriminate violence 
against civilians” (Cortright & Lopez: 2007, 53). Yet, as Cortright et al. note in this 
regard, [m]embers of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (IOC) subsequently 
adopted their own terrorism convention that explicitly contradicted provisions of both 
the bombings and financing conventions by distinguishing between acts of terrorism 
and acts committed in the fight for self-determination or against foreign occupation” 
(Ibid: 2007, 53).73  
 
71 The United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law provides a more detailed account on the 
drafting process and the committees and the subcommittees involved.  
72 Diaz-Paniagua’s work “Negotiating Terrorism: The Negotiation Dynamics of Four UN Counter-Terrorism 
Treaties, 1997-2005 is particularly useful in understanding the intricacies, both during the actual negotiations 
and leading up to them.  
73 See Organisation of the Islamic Conference, Convention on Combating International Terrorism, annex to 
Resolution no. 59/26P, completed at the Organisation of the Islamic Conference Convention Terrorism, in July 
of 1999.  
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The OIC Convention text entails a number of contradictory provisions worthy of brief 
attention. For one, the preambular text confirms the “legitimacy of the right of peoples 
to struggle against foreign occupation and colonialist and racist regimes by all means, 
including armed struggle to liberate their territories and attain their rights to self-
determination and independence” (Annex OIC res. 59/26: 1999, preambular para. 9). 
For another, Article 2 of the convention stipulates “[p]eople’s struggle including armed 
struggle against foreign occupation, aggression, colonialism, and hegemony, aimed a 
liberation and self-determination in accordance with the principles of international 
law shall not be considered a terrorist crime” (Ibid: 1999, Article 2(a)).74 Additionally, 
the African Union (AU) likewise adopted a regional counterterrorism convention 1999 
taking on a similar approach. Several countries also expressed their discontent with 
the provisions of the UN Bombing Convention upon signing and ratification. Pakistan 
for example declared that “nothing in this Convention shall be applicable to struggles, 
including armed struggle, for the realization of self-determination launched against 
any alien or foreign occupation or domination…” rendering, as one could argue, the 
convention utterly useless. It is consequently unlikely that all member states, although 
party to the same convention, have an identical, let alone common understanding, of 
the provisions in the Bombing Convention.  
Article 1 of the Bombing Convention defines key terms, including amongst others, 
“State or government facility”, “[i]nfrastructure facility” “explosive or other lethal 
devices” and no lesser important “[m]ilitary forces of a state.” Article 2 sets out to 
define the offence. A person commits an offence within the meaning of the convention 
“if that person unlawfully and intentionally delivers, places, discharges or detonates 
an explosive or other lethal device…(a) [w]ith the intent to cause death or serious 
bodily injury; or (b) With the intent to cause extensive destruction of such a place” 
(Bombing Convention: 1997, Art. 2). The attempt to commit such an offence, or to 
participate in the organisation thereof was also criminalised.75 Indeed, the ancillary 
offences were more comprehensive than before and were intended to “strengthen the 
ability of the international community to investigate, prosecute, and extradite 
conspirators or those who otherwise direct or contribute to the commission of offences 
defined in the convention” (Witten: 1998, 776). Article 5 was rather new insofar that it 
explicitly called on state parties to adopt, “where appropriate, domestic legislation, to 
ensure that criminal acts within the scope of this Convention … are under no 
circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, 
racial … nature” (Bombing Convention: 1997, Art. 5). Unparalleled, this article would 
universally criminalise and condemn terrorism regardless of the offenders’ motives, in 
theory no longer legitimising the use of violence by national liberation movements.  
On numerous occasions, terrorists have bombed states’ overseas facilities. In Lebanon 
(in 1983) and Saudi Arabia (in 1996), the United States became the victim of a number 
 
74 Space restrains do not allow for further elaboration. However, to fully understand why the OIC Convention 
was adopted with such a text one ought to consider that the Second Intifada (Palestinian uprising against 
Israel) was slowly gaining traction and Palestine was yet again becoming a hotspot for political violence.  
75 Article 3 excludes the application of the convention to offences committee within a domestic context, 
whereas Article 4 obliges member governments to establish jurisdiction over such crimes and to levy 
appropriate penalties that reflect the nature of the crime.  
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of terrorist attacks on its military instillations and personnel, and so Article 6 extends 
jurisdiction to when an offence is committed against a facility of a state abroad. The 
United States, for example, could use the convention as a basis for establishing 
jurisdiction over the 1996 bombing in Dharan, as well as the 1998 Embassy Bombings 
in Kenya and Tanzania. Article 7 of the Bombing Convention is comprehensive, 
defining a state’s obligation to investigate crimes that occurred on its territory, to 
ensure the presence of the alleged offender for the purpose of prosecution or 
extradition and to afford the offender a number of basis rights (e.g. communication 
with a representative of the home state). This article is however not entirely new, and 
a similar provision was placed in Article 6 of the Hostages Convention. A rather 
marginal evolution to this commitment was paragraph 3(c) in which the alleged 
offender is to be explicitly informed of his right to communicate and to be visited by 
a representative of his state of origin. In the likely event that an alleged offender is 
unwilling or unable (e.g. due to absence of diplomatic relations between two states) 
to communicate with a state-representative, the International Committee of the Red 
Cross can take on that role (Article 7, paragraph 5). Article 8 contains the usual 
obligation of aut dedere aut judicare, this time however extending the possibility of 
extradition only for the duration of the trial. This is was done so as to accommodate 
states’ reluctance to extradite own nationals permanently. Upon sentencing the 
offender will return to the state of origin to serve his sentence (Article 8, paragraph 
2).76  
Unlike its predecessors, the Bombing Convention explicitly addresses the problem of 
the political offence exception.77 The inclusion of Article 11 is no coincidence, nor is its 
sequence. A request for extradition cannot be refused on the grounds of the political 
nature of the crime. Indeed, Article 9 provides that the offence laid out in Article 2 of 
the convention are deemed extraditable offences. Although the Hostages Convention, 
in Article 9, stipulates that extradition can be refused on the grounds that a request 
was made for the purpose of prosecuting an individual based on his or her political 
opinion, the Bombing Convention evidently attempts to narrow this gap. Granted, the 
Bombing Convention includes a similar provision in Article 12- not placing an 
obligation on countries to extradite under certain circumstances- yet the sequence of 
the articles and the explicit rejection of the use of a political offence exemption is 
evident.78 In fact, Article 11 makes clear that extradition cannot be rejected based on 
the motives of the perpetrator and Article 12 only provides an exception based on the 
 
76  It is not worth dwelling on Article 9 and 10 as these closely mirror articles 10 and 11 of the Hostages 
Convention. Whereas Article 9 deemed the offences of the convention as extraditable and establishes the 
Agreement as the basis of any extradition arrangement, Article 10 requires states to afford one another the 
greatest courtesy in matters of mutual judicial assistance (e.g. extradition proceedings).  
77 This terms refers to a states’ right to refuse extradition on the grounds that the offence for which an alleged 
offender is requested is political in nature. For instance, a government who is favourable to the cause of a 
communist or anarchist, many of which used terrorism to achieve their objectives, could refuse extradition on 
the grounds that the crime was political. As this thesis has however described, the political offence exception 
was increasingly becoming more narrow as UN-conventions were gradually excluding certain crimes from the 
list of exceptions (e.g. Aircraft hijacking with The Hague Convention 1970).  
78 Article 13 is new inasmuch that it outlines the procedure for the extradition of an individual already serving 
a sentence for the purpose of providing testimony. This is a novel development, yet not one entirely relevant 
to our purposes.  
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motives of the requesting state (e.g. prosecuting someone based on ethnicity). Article 
14, while in substance not entirely a novelty, is worth reflecting upon briefly. The 
Hostages Convention, in Article 8(2), guarantees the fair treatment of an alleged 
offender. The Bombing Convention confirms this right and at the same time extends 
it by making explicit mention of the provisions of international human rights law. 
While Article 14 is certainly not a detailed prescription of what a fair treatment of an 
alleged offender would look like, the reference to existing international human rights 
law provides unprecedented criteria.  
Finally, parties were also required to take steps to “prohibit in their territories illegal 
activities of persons, groups and organisations that encourage, instigate, organise, 
knowingly finance…” [emphasis added] activities related to the use of explosives or 
other lethal devices (Bombing Convention: 1997, Art. 15, para. a). Admittingly a 
marginal evolution, yet the specific mentioning of financing was not included in the 
corresponding article of the Hostages Convention (Article 4). Perhaps it is plausible to 
assume that member states were growing concerned with terrorist fundraising 
activities, to which the subsequent adoption of the Terrorist Financing Convention 
surely provides sufficient evidence. The Bombing Convention certainly extended the 
United Nations’ preventive efforts, although focus predominantly remained on 
bringing terrorists to justice by closing jurisdictional gaps and reaffirming the 
principle of aut dedere aut judicare.79 Particular attention also continued to rest on the 
post attack element of a terrorist act. Article 15 sub paragraph (c) is noteworthy in this 
regard. Member states were called upon to consult on the “development of standards 
for marking explosives in order to identify their origin in post-blast investigations 
[emphasis added], exchange information on preventative measures, cooperation and 
transfer of technology” (Bombing Convention: 1997, Art. 15, para. c). Notwithstanding 
member parties’ obligation to prevent preparations and to prohibit activities that 
encourage, instigate, organise or finance terrorist bombings, the convention is 
emblematic for the lack of instructive detail on preventing terrorist acts from 
occurring.  
The remarkable swiftness with which countries were able to forge agreement should 
not mislead. The usual points of contention found their way into the UN’s negotiations 
on the Bombing Convention; Syria submitted a proposal (A/C.6/52/WG.1/CRP.9) in 
which it urged the consideration of the elimination of the underlying causes, again 
paying special attention to circumstances of colonialism, racism and violations of 
human rights. Syria moreover advocated for the insertion of a preambular paragraph 
that would reaffirm the right to self-determination. It likewise attempted to include a 
separate article within the operative portion of the convention that would confirm that 
nothing in the agreement could be interpreted as affecting the rights of “people 
forcibly deprived of that right [self-determination]…particularly peoples under 
 
79 The convention also affirms the inapplicable nature of the Agreement to activities of armed forces during 
armed conflict (Article 19), if they are governed by the law of war. Also, all activities undertaken by military 
forces as part of their official duties is excluded from scope. The rest of the conventions settles dispute 
settlement mechanisms (Article 20), the ratification process (Article 21), when it will enter into force (Article 
22) and how countries can go about removing themselves as parties (Article 23).  
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colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien domination” (Report Working 
Group: 1997, 30). Syria’s attempt to exclude certain elements of the convention must 
certainly be seen as an effort to safeguard the use of violence by Palestinian groups 
against Israel. At the fifty-second sessions of the Sixth Committee in 1997, Pakistan 
proposed similar amendments. In particular, a preambular paragraph reaffirming the 
inalienable right of self-determination and independence movements of people under 
colonial and racist regimes was suggested (UN Doc. A/C.6/52/L.19:1997). In general 
terms, Pakistan “strongly condemns the use of State power to subjugate and brutalize 
people under foreign occupation, depriving them of their most basic rights, including 
the legitimate right to self-determination … [and Pakistan] would not compromise on 
its fundamental belief that the legitimate struggle of people under foreign occupation 
or alien domination did not constitute terrorism” (Summary Record 28th Meeting Sixth 
Committee: 1997, 7).  
With the territorial conflict over Kashmir raging between Pakistan and India since 
1947, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict unresolved, any negotiation of an 
international instrument against terrorism needs to be considered with this historical 
context in mind. And so, while political differences persisted in both the Sixth 
Committee and within the Working Group, the successful conclusion of the 
convention gives rise to the conclusion that countries were coming to terms with the 
criminalisation of terrorists’ use of bombings. The sectoral approach to international 
terrorism has proven successful, evidently setting aside the most controversial item, 
that is, the definition of ‘terrorism’. 
 
The Terrorist Financing Convention 1999: A new way forward?  
Over the course of its then fifty-four-year history, the UNGA adopted a number of 
agreements with counterterrorism relevance. Up until the adoption of the Terrorist 
Financing Convention in 1999 these treaties took on a strong post-attack character and 
have predominantly focused on closing jurisdictional gaps and bringing terrorists to 
justice. As noted, the Financing Convention would become an exception and would 
address the phenomenon in more general terms and in essence focused on preventing 
terrorist from acquiring the funds to execute an attack. For some observers (e.g. Forget: 
2002, Nesi: 2005), the convention even includes a definition of terrorism. Indeed, the 
convention does not concern itself with the criminalisation of specific activities, such 
as the taking of hostages or the planting of a bomb, but rather turns its attention to 
the financing of such acts and intends to prevent terrorism from even occurring. And 
it was this element that presented the negotiators with unfamiliar obstacles (Aust: 2001, 
286). Since the financing of terrorism was not a terrorist act in and of itself, the 
delegates were tasked with defining the exact scope of the offence and how to deal 
with institutional non-state actors, such as banks and remittance services. The 
adoption of the convention was not particularly contentious, and the provisions that 
did give rise to discussion, were mostly of a technical and legal nature.  
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Already in 1998 the French Foreign Minister, Hubert Vedrike, urged the international 
community to criminalise terrorist financing (Diaz-Paniaqua: 2008, 434). As 
innovative as the French proposal may have seemed at the time, the idea was not new. 
In 1996 the Secretary-General “had determined that the collection of funds for terrorist 
purposes was one of the topics not covered by the existing legal framework against 
terrorism, and he had invited the General Assembly to consider the possibility of 
adopting a new treaty” (Ibid.: 2008, 434). Prior to the French Minister’s statement, 
terrorist attacks hit the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August of 1998, 
bringing al-Qaeda to the attention of most capitals and the global public. It was time 
for member states to turn to tackling the seeds (resources) that allowed terrorism to 
flourish. Originally, the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, as established 
by the General Assembly in 1996, was tasked with elaborating a convention on the use 
of terrorist bombings and nuclear terrorism. It, however, was resolution 53/108 
adopted in 1998 that extended the committee’s mandate to include a convention on 
the financing of terrorism (Turney-Harris: 2002, 6). On the basis of a working 
document submitted by France, the third session of the Ad Hoc Committee took up 
its work (UN Audiovisual library: 2019, 1). In subsequent sessions of the committee, 
the Working Group and in informal consultations, member states were able to find 
common ground and in the end adopted the Terrorist Financing Convention in 1999.80 
Although the agreement did not enter into force until 2002, due to slow rates of 
ratification, the short time span in which the convention was negotiated, does however 
also show the importance the international community attributed to an instrument of 
this kind.  
Similar to the Bombing Convention, the Terrorist Financing Agreement made note of 
the 1994 General Assembly Declaration and its 1996 amendment in resolution 51/210. 
Both the declaration and the resolution, besides unequivocally condemning terrorism 
in all its manifestations, also rejected any justification for terrorism on the grounds of 
its political, religious or ideological intent. This was not an easily won achievement; in 
a proposal submitted 81  in the Working Group, Pakistan and Syria, with support 
expressed by Kuwait, advocated for the inclusion of a new fifth preambular paragraph 
in which the General Assembly recalled resolution 40/61 adopted in 1985 (Report 
Working Group: 1999, 44). The reference to the 1985 resolution was a considerable set-
back considering that the resolution urged states to contribute to the progressive 
elimination of the underlying causes of terrorism by paying, amongst others, specific 
attention to colonialism, racism and circumstances involving alien occupation (UNGA 
res. 40/61: 1985, op. para. 9). It is certainly not too far from the mark to see this as a 
renewed attempt to justify acts of violence in the course of self-determination. As a 
matter of record, delegates remained reluctant to extend the scope of the United 
Nation’s counterterrorism endeavours to armed resistance in the face of national 
 
80 For a comprehensive review of the negotiation process see “Diaz-Paniagua’s “Negotiating Terrorism: The 
negotiation dynamics of four UN counter-terrorism treaties, 1997-2005.” See also the United Nations 
Audiovisual Library of International Law for a more comprehensive analysis.  
81 See UN Document A/C.6/54/WG.1/CRP.34 for a detailed reading.  
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liberation (Report Working Group: 1999, 55).82 The matter was however put to rest, 
when a majority of countries highlighted that the preambular portion of the treaty 
already made reference to “all relevant General Assembly resolution on the matter 
[terrorism]” (Ibid.:1999, 57).  
 The convention contains a number of standard provisions that are similar, if not 
identical, to the Bombing Convention;83 state parties laid out the definition of its 
principal terms (e.g. Funds) (Article 1); defined the offence (Article 2); restricted the 
scope of the convention to international criminal activity (Article 3); required states 
to criminalise the offence (and ancillary offences) and impose penalties that reflect the 
severity of the crime (Article 4); outlined the cases in which states should establish 
jurisdiction, as well as the circumstances under which they can establish jurisdiction 
(Article 7). The cornerstone of the UN’s convention-regime remained the obligation 
to extradite or prosecute an alleged offender (Article 10), including a number of 
ancillary requirements to investigate the facts of the incident and to ensure the 
presence of the alleged offender for the purpose of extradition or prosecution (Article 
9). Similar to previous convention texts, states were also obliged to respect the right 
of the alleged offender, enabling the communication, without delay, with a 
representative of the state of origin (Article 9). Like the Bombing Convention, the 
Terrorist Financing Convention explicitly rejected any suggestions that support a 
political offence exception for the offence ’terrorist financing’ (Article 14).84 Both the 
Bombing Convention (Article 12) and the Financing Convention (Article 15) (and the 
Hostages Convention in Article 9) do not impose an obligation to extradite if there is 
grounds to believe that the request has been made for the purpose of prosecuting an 
individual on the account of its race or political opinion, yet the case would still have 
to be submitted to domestic authorities for the purpose of prosecution (Article 10 in 
Terrorist Financing Convention), essentially upholding the aut dedere aut judicare 
principle. Closing provisions also include “certain miscellaneous provisions, such as 
savings, dispute settlement and final clauses, as well as a few other sundry provisions” 
(Lavalle: 2000, 494).  
Perhaps the most novel feature of the 1999 convention is Article 2, which defines that 
a person commits an offence if that individual “directly or indirectly, unlawfully and 
wilfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that they should be used or in 
the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out [a]n act 
which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as defined in one of the treaties 
listed [e.g. Hostages and Diplomats conventions]in the annex” Terrorist Financing 
Convention: 1999, Art. 2(a)). Although, Article 2(2a) continues to confirm a state’s 
right to exclude any convention in the annex that it is not a party to (Forget: 2002, 6), 
 
82 Iraq also regretted the absence of the problem of state terrorism from the scope of the convention and 
furthermore underscored the importance of taking the right of peoples to self-determination into 
consideration (Report Ad Hoc Committee : 1999, 9).  
83 Some of the provisions, like the obligation to extradite or prosecute, are also identical to the Diplomats 
Convention and the convention of the Taking of Hostages of 1973 and 1979, respectively.  
84 Further narrowing the political offence exception was Article 6, which provided that state parties should 
adopt, when necessary, domestic legislation that make sure that no justification (e.g. political nature) can be 
provided for the crimes laid out in the convention.  
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in a way limiting the reach of the convention and its annex. The most noteworthy 
element of Article 2 is, however, that a person also commits an offence if the “act [is 
]intended to cause death or seriously bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person 
not taking active part in the hostilities in a situation or armed conflict, when the 
purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel 
a Government or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act” 
(Terrorist Financing Convention: 1999, Art. 2(b)). As Lavalle reflects, “any attempt at 
kidnapping … in order to create terror in the general public, indiscriminately use 
firearms against a crowd in a public place (other than an airport) of any city or a rural 
area. This act (assuming that no explosive bullets are used) would be covered neither 
by the Bombing Convention, nor by any other of the counterterrorism treaties listed 
in the Annex to the Financing Convention” (Lavalle: 2000, 497). Conversely, sub-
paragraph b was needed to extend the scope of the convention beyond those crimes 
not already covered by previous treaties.  
To get a better understanding of the scope and implications of the offence, attention 
must also specifically be drawn to the word ‘funds’ as outlined in Article 1. Here, funds’ 
is identified as “assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or 
immovable, however acquired, and legal documents or instruments in any form, 
including electronic or digital…including, but not limited to, bank credits, travellers 
cheques, bank cheques, money orders, shares, securities…”(Terrorist Financing 
Convention: 1999, Art.1(1)). The meaning of the term is thus stretched broadly enough 
to include all assets and represents an unprecedented intrusion into the domestic 
arena, although it does not explicitly extend to states as potential offenders of terrorist 
financing. This was indeed necessary as objects of value, like diamonds, were smuggled 
and sold for the purpose of financing terrorism (Ndumbe & Cole: 2008). Further, it is 
not necessary for the funds to actually have been used for a terrorist attack (Art. 2, 
paragraph 3); it is sufficient to participate as an accomplice (Art. 2 paragraph 5) and 
attempt (Art. 2 paragraph 4) to committee such an attack for an act to fall under the 
scope of the convention. Article 5 of the convention is innovative inasmuch that it 
imposes liability, albeit not necessarily criminal, on legal entities. It is therefore worth 
highlighting that the Terrorist Financing Convention not only instructs countries on 
how to deal with individual terrorists but also with organisations and other entities 
that may be involved in the financing of terrorism, a development that previous 
conventions had not addressed. This is certainly a broadening of the UN’s approach to 
dealing with terrorism.  
In Article 8, parties are obligated to take appropriate steps to detect, freeze and/or 
seize any funds allocated for the purpose of committing crimes, and paragraph 4 of 
the article moreover stipulates that countries should “establish a mechanism whereby 
the funds derived from the forfeitures [e.g. seizures]…are utilized to compensate the 
victims” (Terrorist Financing Convention: 1999, Art. 8, para. 4). In particular, previous 
conventions have not been victim focused. And although the agreement 
predominantly remains perpetrator-focused, Article 8 is an initial effort to address the 
plight of the victims of terrorism. The Terrorist Financing Convention not only 
highlights the need to prevent terrorism from occurring by draining groups of their 
 
 
- 82 - 
resources but furthermore also addresses how victims of a terrorist attack can be 
helped after the fact. Articles 12 (mutual assistance) and 18 (cooperation) represent 
further novelties. Surely enough, elements of Article 12 can be found in the Diplomats 
Convention (Article 10), the Hostages Convention (Article 11), and the Bombing 
Convention (Article 10), requiring countries to ‘afford one another the greatest 
measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations’. Nevertheless, the 
Terrorist Financing Convention is new insofar that it prevents countries from drawing 
on banking secrecy as a justification to refuse assistance (Article 12(2)). This was 
indeed significant as typical fiscal offences (e.g. tax evasion) were considered as non-
extraditable offences (Aust: 2001, 304) and the provision reached far into the domestic 
financial laws and practises of state parties. This was an important step as the UN was 
increasingly placing obligations on member states that until then exclusively fell 
within national competencies (besides European Union obligations). In turn the 
global body was increasingly standardising countries’ response to terrorism financing 
globally. 
Article 18 is perhaps the most comprehensive and instructive provision in the 
preventive segment of UN conventions. Governments are obligated, if necessary, to 
adopt national legislation, to prevent the commission of an offence as laid out in 
Article 2. Specifically, if not already in place, governments are obliged to adopt 
measures that in turn place an obligation on “financial institutions and other 
professions involved in financial transactions…to pay special attention to unusual or 
suspicions transactions and report transactions suspected of stemming from criminal 
activity” (Terrorist Financing Convention: 1999, Art. 18 1(b)). To put this rather broad 
provision into practise, “State Parties shall consider: [a]dopting regulations 
prohibiting the opening of accounts the holders or beneficiaries of which are 
unidentified or unidentifiable, and measures to ensure that such institutions verify the 
identity of the real owners of such transactions” (Article 18 1(bi)), or other measures 
that establish the identity of an account holder.85  
The adoption of the Bombing Convention and the Terrorist Financing Convention is 
a continuation of the United Nations’ piecemeal response to terrorism. It is certainly 
fair to say that the conventions follow the patterns of previous documents, yet a 
number of novelties were identified. On a general note, both conventions mention 
‘terrorism’ and were adopted primarily as counterterrorism instruments. More 
specifically, the Terrorist Financing Convention was the first successful attempt by the 
UN to advance international counterterrorism law by addressing terrorism in a more 
general manner. Yet, the piecemeal approach would not criminalise terrorism in all its 
manifestations and therefore a comprehensive convention remained necessary, 
nevertheless.  
 
 
85 The convention also contains a number of provisions laying out a countries obligation to cooperate in the 
detection of physical cross-border transportation of cash (Article 18(2)), articles on non-intervention (Articles 
20 and 22) and dispute settlement clauses (Article 24).  
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The UN’s wavering desire for comprehensiveness  
Resolution 51/210 in 1996 gave precedence to the elaboration of an international 
convention for the suppression of terrorist bombings (and nuclear terrorism), so it was 
not until 1999 that member states, again, decided that the General Assembly “shall 
address means of further developing a comprehensive legal framework of conventions 
dealing with international terrorism, including considering the elaboration of a 
comprehensive convention on international terrorism” (UNGA res: 54/110: 1999, op. 
para. 12).86 Consequently, an Indian draft convention was circulated in 200087 which 
would build the basis for future discussion (Hmoud: 2006, 1032). What ensued was a 
tedious drafting and re-drafting process that continues to this day and that remained 
rather similar to previous attempts. From the onset, the discussions on a 
comprehensive convention remained familiarly controversial. The deliberations in the 
Working Group and the Ad Hoc Committee revealed that the definitional parameters 
– that is, to what extent state-terrorism should be considered – and the scope of the 
convention (should the convention apply to terrorist acts in the course of foreign 
occupation?) remained key points of contention (Einsiedel: 2016, 1). The endless divide 
on “who has the right to use force without being described as a terrorist have surfaced 
in the negotiations of the Comprehensive Convention from the beginning” (Hmoud: 
2006, 1033). A proposal submitted by Malaysia on behalf of the Organisation of Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC) is a telling example. In rephrasing Article 1 (definition), the OIC 
states, on the one hand, advocated for terrorism to be defined as “any act of violence 
or threat thereof notwithstanding its motives or intentions perpetrated to carry out an 
individual or collective criminal plan with the aim of terrorizing people or threatening 
to harm them or imperilling their lives, honour, freedoms, security or rights…” (Report 
Working Group: 2000, 37). On the other hand, Western European states were intent 
on avoiding “broader political issues such as self-determination” (Singh: 2017, 4).  
 
With respect to Article 2, the Malaysian text further promoted the position that 
“[p]eoples’ struggle including armed struggle against foreign occupation, aggression, 
colonialism, and hegemony, aimed at liberation and self-determination in accordance 
with the principles of international law shall not be considered a terrorist crime” (Ibid.: 
2000, 38). The proposal introduced by OIC states can only be seen as inconsistent with 
General Assembly resolutions adopted since 1994, which no longer made explicit 
reference to the legitimacy of self-determination movements. The OIC proposal is 
however not entirely novel and reflects the OIC’s own convention ‘Combating 
International Terrorism’ adopted in 1999. In its second article, the OIC Convention 
excludes people’s “struggle including armed struggle against foreign occupation, 
aggression, colonialism…aimed at liberation and self-determination in accordance 
with the principles of international law” as terrorist crimes (OIC Convention: 1999, Art. 
2). The proposed Malaysian text also stands in stark contradiction to the provisions in 
the conventions adopted in 1990s (see above), both of which categorically reject the 
 
86 Resolution 53/108 (1998) also already underscored the priority of elaborating a comprehensive convention 
on international terrorism and resolution 55/158 reaffirmed this priority in December of 2000.  
87 See UN Document A/C.6/55/1 for further reading on the draft. The working document is also annexed to the 
Report of the Working Group dated 2000.  
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use of force under any circumstances, even by consideration of “political, philosophical, 
ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature” (Bombing Convention: 
1998, Art. 5). In retrospect, the OIC countries were very much discontented with the 
provisions incorporated into the Bombing Convention and the UN’s agreement on 
Terrorist Financing, particularly the limitations placed on the use of violence in the 
course of self-determination (Stilles: 2006, 43). It is consequently plausible to conclude 
that the Comprehensive Convention was considered as a means of retracting past 
concessions and gaining more this time around, and consequently, a comprehensive 
agreement should replace existing unfavourable provisions (Ibid: 2006, 43). More 
pointedly, it was an attempt to undo the progress made since the 1980s. 
Other familiar disagreements also surfaced. To name another example, “[i]n the 1999 
meeting of the Working Group, Syria and Pakistan proposed a paragraph in the draft 
Convention incorporating anti-racism politics” (Ekwo: 2010, 101). Both Pakistan and 
Syria suggested the inclusion of a fifth preambular paragraph which would recall 
Assembly resolution 40/61 (1985) which urged all states “to contribute to the 
progressive elimination of the causes underlying international terrorism and to pay 
special attention to all situations, including colonialism, racism and situations 
involving mass and flagrant violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms and 
those involving alien occupation, that may give rise to international terrorism and may 
endanger international peace and security” (Report Working Group: 1999, 44). To this 
end, one can at a minimum agree that member states continued to hold diverging 
outlooks on where the focus of the convention should lie. Mindful of the sectoral 
conventions, disagreement also arose in respect to the relationship between the 
comprehensive convention and the UN’s problem-oriented agreements (Hafner: 2003, 
156); should it add to existing agreements or become more of an umbrella convention? 
Should there be a hierarchy, and if so, what sequence would apply? One side of the 
debate intended for a comprehensive convention to close any existing gaps, 
considering and preserving existing achievements. Other views expressed however 
maintained “that the comprehensive convention should reinforce, complement and 
complete existing legal framework, and therefore would necessarily overlap with 
existing treaties (Report Working Group: 2000, 43).  
It would be premature to consider the different draft articles of the draft 
Comprehensive Convention, particularly when keeping in mind the various country-
specific amendments. Suffice to say, the working document put forth by India very 
much followed the schemata of the sectoral conventions; establishing the offence; 
obliging member states to criminalise the offence and imposing penalties that reflect 
the severity of the crime; instituting and extending jurisdiction; and encouraging 
cooperation in an attempt to prevent terrorist acts from unfolding (UN Doc. 
A/C.6/55/1: 2000). The draft also reiterated the principle of aut dedere aut judicare 
(extradite or prosecute), highlighted the rights of the alleged offenders (e.g. visitation 
by a representative of the state of nationality) and accentuated the broader importance 
of respecting human rights in counterterrorism activities.88 It is also interesting to 
 
88 See UN document A/C.6/55/L.2.  
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note that the working document categorically condemned all acts of terrorism as 
unjustifiable, committed wherever and by whomever, very much mirroring the 
language adopted in the UNGA resolutions on the subject as early as 1994. By the time 
the United States was attacked by al-Qaeda in 2001 no apparent consensus could be 
found, and political issues continued to dominate discussions. With considerable 
pressure to finalize an agreement that would criminalise terrorism in all its 
manifestations, the Working Group resumed its work in October 2001, one month 
after the attacks. How the UN proceeded on this matter will be discussed in chapter 
six.  
 
The Security Council 
With the end of the Cold War, the United Nations Security Council89 found itself no 
longer restrained by an East-West stalemate. The rivalry and animosity between the 
United States and the Soviet Union considerably restricted the Council’s 
counterterrorism action until approximately 1990 (although relations improved as 
early as 1986). Initially, the body took a rather ambiguous approach to terrorism, 
unable to adopt a resolution in the aftermath of the Munich massacre in 1972. 
Nevertheless, by 1985 the Security Council’s stance on terrorism left little ambiguity 
and its response was gradually becoming more assertive. The previous chapters have 
purposely excluded the work of the Council prior to the 1990s, as meaningful action 
was prevented by Cold War dynamics and greatly limited by interests of the great 
powers in regional conflicts. Thus, before proceeding, a brief review of the Council’s 
response to counterterrorism prior to the end of Cold War is necessary. Both the 
United States and the Soviet Union “cast nearly two hundred vetoes prior to 1990 on 
substantive questions of peace and security. In some years, the number of resolutions 
that were vetoed outnumbered those that were passed” (Stiles: 2006, 39).90 Terrorism 
in Northern Ireland, Vietnam and in Kashmir was not placed on the agenda of the 
Council and Palestinian terrorism was a contentious topic. This was the result of the 
involvement (to varying degrees) of the permanent members to the respective 
conflicts (e.g. USA in Vietnam). In addition, two permanent members – the Soviet 
Union and China – remained committed to supporting the Palestinian cause and the 
United States fought off any attempt to condemn or sanction Israeli counterterrorism 
measures against Palestinian terrorist groups (Ibid: 2006, 41). One observer does 
caution however that it would be an exaggeration to claim that the Council functioned 
“in a permanent state of paralysis in the field of international peace and security…” 
(Mansuama: 2006, 2). It is nevertheless accurate to observe that in the midst of the 
Cold War, terrorism was not a pressing concern for the major powers of the Security 
Council (Boulden: 2008, 609). Yet, the increase in terrorist violence at the beginning 
of the 1980s, progressively increasingly afflicting the permanent members of the 
Council (e.g. United States), elevated terrorism onto the agenda of the body.  
 
89 See introduction for an overview of the composition of the Security Council and its powers in respect to the 
maintenance of international peace and security.  
90 This was the case for resolutions 1945, 1954 and 1955.  
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The first mention of ‘terrorism’ in the Council came in 1948. Following the murder of 
the UN mediator in Palestine, Count Bernadotte, the Council adopted resolution 57 
condemning the attacks. In 1970, the Security Council managed to adopt resolution 
286 in which it expressed concern over the threat posed by international hijacking of 
aircraft, making a generic appeal on all parties to release hostages being held, and 
urging states to take all possible legal steps to prevent hijackings in the future (UNSC 
res. 286: 1970). Following the hostage crisis at the Munich Olympics in 1972, the United 
States introduced a draft resolution condemning the attacks and called on states to 
stop providing a safe haven to terrorist organisations (Romaniuk: 2010, 37). Yet, 
Council members were unable to forge agreement and the American resolution was 
dropped (UN Repertoire 1972-1974, 120-121).91 Significantly, a European compromise 
draft of a resolution in response to Munich was vetoed by both China and the Soviet 
Union. And as a draft resolution introduced by the Non-Aligned Movement failed to 
mention terrorism and made no reference to the Munich attacks, it drew a veto from 
the United States (Luck: 2006, 96). The previous chapters have shown that many 
countries perceived terrorism as a legitimate strategy for national liberation, and that 
the use of terrorism against Israeli targets was not necessarily condemned. This 
sentiment was also seen in the Security Council.  
Two developments in particular are worth exploring in further detail. As Luck 
summarises, “[i]n some cases [referring to terrorist incidents], allies or client states of 
the Soviet Union were suspected of aiding or abetting some of the shadowy groups 
that employed terrorist tactics” and thus the USSR “had little interest in seeing the 
Security Council take up these matters…” (Luck: 2006, 95). As regularly alluded to in 
the previous and current chapter, the newly independent countries from Asia and 
Africa shifted the political orientation of the United Nations from condemning 
violence in all circumstances to making exception when seeking self-determination. 
For many of the newly independent countries, the use of violence in the course of 
fighting for independence was not considered terrorism (Messmer & Yordan: 2010, 175). 
As Stiles notes: “[t]he Soviet Union and China were fully committed to the support of 
Palestine sovereignty, for example, while the USA consistently endorsed Israel 
counterterrorism measures (Stiles: 2006, 41). Also, the competition for influence in the 
Third World prompted the Soviet Union (and the United States as well) to tread lightly 
on matters relating to counterterrorism (Elisabeth: 2013). Given what Luck terms 
‘unfavourable politics’, the Security Council was unable to make use of its Chapter VII 
powers as the threat of a veto from one of the permanent members rendered any 
attempts difficult. The inability to adopt a resolution following the Munich attacks, 
and the focused attention on Israeli and American counterterrorism measures testify 
to this effect. For example, in 1973 the Security Council condemned the Israeli 
interception of a Lebanese aircraft,92 identifying the incident as a violation of the 
 
91 See United Nations Repertoire 1972-1974 for further reading on the draft introduced by the United States 
and the discussions and amendments that followed, as well as the other drafts (e.g. by Somalia) that were 
introduced.  
92 After the vote, the US representative to the United Nations noted that its affirmative vote cannot be seen as 
change in his government’s policy towards Israel and the problem in the Middle East, but should be 
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Charter of the United Nations and in response to Israel successful rescue operation in 
Entebbe in 1976, the Council was divided on whether to condemn the actions taken by 
the terrorists or whether to focus on Israel’s violation of Uganda’s territorial 
sovereignty. Furthermore, the incident in Entebbe is also an interesting example as it 
demonstrates how terrorism can play a role in endangering the peaceful relations 
among states, which very much relates to the original purpose of the Security Council 
to maintain international peace and security. Equally telling, was the condemnation 
of Israel’s raid on the PLO in 1985 in Tunis, which was declared a ‘flagrant violation of 
the Charter’ and member states were called on to prevent Israel from committing any 
further violations of sovereignty in resolution 573 (Tams: 2009, 367). 
A number of high-profile terrorist incidents, including Achille Lauro93 and the attacks 
at the airports in Rome and Vienna in 1985, marked a shift in the Security Council’s 
counterterrorism endeavours by 1985. A presidential statement adopted in the 
aftermath of Achille Lauro condemned terrorism in general terms, and resolution 579 
made reference to the convention against the Taking of Hostages adopted in 1979. 
Further, the resolution “unequivocally [condemned] all acts of hostage-taking and 
abduction,” affirming states’ obligation to take “all appropriate measures to secure 
their [hostages] safe release and to prevent the commission of acts of hostage-taking 
and abduction in the future” (UNSC res. 579: 1985, op. 1 & 3). Additionally, resolution 
579 urged states to develop co-operation mechanisms for the prevention, prosecution 
and punishment of such activities (Ibid: 1985, op. 5). Notably, the resolution restricted 
its focus on the act of hostage-taking while the Council remained silent on other forms 
of terrorism. In response to the airport bombings in Rome and Vienna in 1985 the 
Council condemned the attacks yet fell short of adopting any meaningful action.94 
Whereas the Council was unable to muster sufficient support to react to the Munich 
attacks in 1972, by 1985 it was gradually taking a more consistent position against 
terrorism, albeit predominant focus was placed on hostage-taking and abductions. 
The newfound collaborative spirit in the Security Council, in many ways as a result of 
the gradually disintegration of the Soviet Union and the more cooperative spirit under 
then-leader Mikhail Gorbachev, also allowed for the adoption of more general and 
legally repressive responses to terrorism (Hageboutros: 2016, 10). In 1989 the Council 
adopted resolution 635 and widened its focus beyond hostage-taking and abductions. 
Indeed, while resolution 579 limited its purview to addressing hostage-taking only, 
resolution 635 noted the implication of terrorism for international security 
(preambular para. 1) and “[c]alls upon all States to co-operate in devising and 
implementing measures to prevent all acts of terrorism, including those involving 
explosives” (UNSC res. 635: 1989, op. para. 2). While the Council’s response to 
terrorism in the mid-1980s was certainly not far-reaching, these resolutions “laid the 
groundwork for the Security Council’s future work on terrorism” (Kramer & Yetic: 2007, 
 
understood in the broader context of safeguarding international civil aviation. See New York Times article ‘U.N. 
condemns Israel for forcing Down Arab Plane’ for further background information.  
93 An Italian cruise ship was hijacked off the coast of Egypt en route to Israel, resulting in the murder of one 
wheelchair bound American Jew by terrorists belonging to the PLO.  
94 See UN Document S/17702 (1985) for further information on the Council’s condemnation of the events in 
Rome and Vienna.  
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413).95 The increased attention given to terrorism by the Security Council should also 
be understood in light of the increase in the number of American casualties per attack; 
the frequency with which American facilities and citizens were subject to attacks; as 
well as the growing understanding that terrorists may draw on chemical, biological 
and nuclear material as weapons (Oudraat: 2004, 30).  
The Security Council also took a more assertive response to terrorism by imposing 
sanctions on three separate occasions. These included against Libya in 1992, the Sudan 
in 1996 and the Taliban-regime in Afghanistan in 1999. 96  From the outset it is 
important to understand that, short of war, the use of sanctions is an intrusive and 
repressive tool of countering terrorist activities. Indeed, “it is important to recognise 
that sanctions are extreme measures that can have effects in some cases equal to or 
more severe than those of war. The perception of sanctions as a peaceful, or “soft,” tool 
of persuasion does not reflect the harsh reality of the economic and social devastation 
that can result … The fact is that sanctions represent a forceful measure of coercive 
pressure … they are three-quarters of the way toward the use of force … (Cortright & 
Lopez: 2000, 7). In the context of countering terrorism, the legally-repressive and 
coercive nature of sanctions is intended to dismay a state from engaging in terrorism, 
or in its support. The deterrent effect of sanctions does however not need to be limited 
to the specific state in question. In fact, the imposition of sanctions against one 
country can certainly dissuade another country from harbouring or supporting 
terrorism, thus best characterised a punitive and pre-emptive. Conversely, the 
sanctions-regimes placed on Libya and later against the Taliban-regime, amongst 
other freezing and seizing assets, represent a novelty insofar that they are the first time 
the Council took a more assertive and repressive response to terrorism. 
 
Security Council responds to Libyan terrorism  
In December of 1988, Pan Am Flight 103 was heading from London to New York when 
it exploded in mid-air over Lockerbie, Scotland. 270 people perished, including 243 
passengers, 16 crew members and 11 people on the ground. The ensuing investigations 
led American and Scottish investigators to Adbelbaset Ali Mohmed Al Megrahi, a high-
level Libyan intelligence official, and Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah, a former manager of 
the Libyan Arab Airlines. “Libya’s involvement with a forensic scientist’s discovery of 
a tiny microchip of the bomb’s trigger mechanism” was confirmed (Plachta: 2001, 126). 
 
95 The counterterrorism work of the Security Council also included addressing the marking of plastic or sheet 
explosives for the purpose of detection and a number of declarations reacting to specific events (e.g. attack on 
a Jewish religious centre in Argentina – S/PRST/1994/40). See Dedring’s “The United Nations Security Council 
in the 1990s” (2008).  
96 The sanctions imposed against the Sudan in 1996, although certainly acknowledged, will be excluded from 
the scope of the ensuing analysis. In contrast to the sanctions imposed against Libya, the Sudanese sanction-
regime remained diplomatic in nature96 and the far-reaching sanctions (e.g. travel sanctions) adopted in 
resolution 1070 were never implemented due to humanitarian concerns (Cortright & Lopez: 2000, 121). Suffice 
it to say however, the goal of the sanctions was to extradite terrorists suspected for the attempted assassination 
of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Abba, Ethiopia and to stop the harbouring of terrorists. By May 
of 1996, Osama Bin Laden was expelled from the Sudan and the country made visible gestures dissociating 
itself from terrorism.  
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Also, a private diary entry from Fhimah further implicated the two Libyan nationals. 
The investigations confirmed that the two individuals were acting on behalf of the 
Libyan government (Comras: 2010, 31). Consequently, a grand jury in Washington D.C 
indicted the two suspects in November of 1991, and shortly afterwards an indictment 
by the United Kingdom followed (Ibid: 2010, 31). A considerable challenge however 
remained. There was no bilateral extradition agreement between the two Western 
nations and Libya. If the Libyan government was indeed involved in the explosion they 
would likely refuse to grant any extradition requests. The American and British 
governments were stern in their demand on Libya; the country was called upon to 
surrender the suspects for trial, cooperate in the disclosure of any information Libya 
may possess in relation to the crime (including full access to witnesses and documents), 
accept responsibility for actions of its agents and pay appropriate compensation 
(Plachta: 2001, 126). 97  What followed was a back and forth between the Libyan 
Government and its counterpart in the United Kingdom and the United States. 
Amongst other initiatives, Libya began criminal proceedings of their own and offered 
to admit UK and US observers to the trial (Plachta: 2001, 127). Significantly, Libya 
referred to Article 5(2) of the 1971 Montreal Convention exercising jurisdiction over 
the offence (Ibid: 2001, 127). Libya denied any of the charges and refused to surrender 
the suspects. Articles 5(2) and 7 of the 1971 Montreal Convention obliges states to 
exercise jurisdiction (see chapter 5) and codified the aut dedere aut judicare principle. 
Therefore, in accordance with the Montreal Convention the culprits were arrested and 
a Libyan investigation into the crimes took its course. Persistent in their demands, the 
United Kingdom and the United States insisted on the surrender of the suspects. Two 
observations can be made: First, considering the involvement of the Libya state it is 
plausible to conclude that the two Western countries were sceptical in believing that 
the Libyans would conduct thorough investigations and that the alleged suspects 
would face severe penalties if found guilty. Second, the involvement of the families of 
the victims (e.g. see meeting in Tripoli with Libyan officials) indicate the importance 
attributed to the outcome by the public (NYT: 1990). As a matter of fact, the victims’ 
family members “became a visible and influential interest group, demanding that the 
suspects be brought to justice” (Cortright & Lopez: 2000, 111). Therefore, the 
perseverance by the UK and the US governments to try the suspects in their own courts 
ought also to be seen within a domestic political context.  
 
In September 1989, a French airliner (UTA 772) exploded in mid-air over Niger killing 
170 people. An investigation launched by the French government likewise determined 
that this was the work of the Libyan government (Comras: 2010, 31). Most damning to 
Libyan innocence was the confession obtained “from a Congolese opposition figure [in 
which he indicated] that he helped the Libyan defendants arrange to get the suspicious 
suitcase placed on board the flight” (Ibid: 2010, 31). Contrary to the approach taken by 
the authorities in the Lockerbie bombing, the French court sentenced a number of 
 
97 See Plachta’s “The Lockerbie Case: The Role of the Security Council in Enforcing the Principle Aut dedere 
aut judicare” for a detailed account on the discussions between Libya and the two Western governments. 
 
 
- 90 - 
individuals to lengthy sentences in absentia.98 Nevertheless, the French government 
joined the United Kingdom and the United States in their appeal to bring the matter 
to the Security Council. France submitted a request to the Council in which it 
demanded “Libyan authorities cooperate immediately, effectively and by all means 
with French justice in order to help establish responsibility for this [UTA bombing] 
terrorist attack.” (S/1999/726: 1999, para. 15). Significantly, France did not demand the 
surrender of the suspects but rather expected Libya to uphold the life sentences that 
it handed down (Ibid: 1999, para. 18).  
While the Pan Am Flight 103 and the UTA Flight 772 incidents certainly triggered 
Security Council action, not the least because the three permanent members of the 
Council were the targets of Libyan terrorism, Libyan sponsored terrorism was not new 
by then. In fact, “[i]n 1981, 1982, and 1986 Washington imposed progressively stronger 
unilateral sanctions against Libya” (Cortright & Lopez: 2010, 110). And, in response to 
the West Berlin discotheque bombing in 1986, President Reagan ordered retaliatory 
strikes against Tripoli and Benghazi (Glass: 1986). Libyan involvement in international 
terrorism was not born overnight and by the later 1980s and it was therefore 
increasingly becoming a central concern to the international community (Wardlaw: 
1987).  
The Montreal Convention provides that a country can either extradite an offender or 
submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution (Article 7) 
and it was conversely paramount that France, the USA and the UK convince the 
Security Council that the bombings were indeed the direct result of state-supported 
terrorism (Comras: 2010, 33). Although Libya continued to argue that the alleged 
offences fell within the scope of the Montreal Convention, and should thus be 
prosecuted locally, the Security Council moved to adopt resolution 731 in January 1992, 
albeit without yet taking assertive action. The resolution urged “the Libyan 
Government immediately to provide a full and effective response to those requests 
[made by the three afflicted countries] so as to contribute to the elimination of 
international terrorism” (UNSC res. 731: 1992, op. para. 3).  
When it became evident that Libya would not comply with the request in resolution 
731, the Security Council again addressed the matter in March 1992.99  During the 
debate in the Security Council, the Libyan representative (Mr. Elhouderi) highlighted 
his country’s exemplary dealing of the case, maintaining that the moment his country 
“received the documents of indictment its competent judicial authorities began to act. 
 
98 A French court sentenced, amongst others, Addallah Senoussi (Gaddaffi’s brother in-law) to life in prison. 
See Henley’s “France finds six Libyan guilty of 1989 airliner bombing” for further reading.  
99  At the same time, Libya initiated legal proceedings before the International Court of Justice, seeking 
confirmation that the Montreal Convention would find application and that the case would be tried locally. It 
later turned out that the Court sided with the Western states, determining that parties had an “obligation to 
accept and carry out the decision of the Security Council in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter…” and 
that the obligations placed on states by the Security Council supersede the obligations of international 
agreements, including the Montreal Convention (In Comras: 2010, 33). See also ICJ Judgment of February 27th 
1988 on the Question of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention (Libya vs. United 
States). 
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Two judges were appointed and began work immediately; they undertook an initial 
investigation and an order was issued to hold the two accused in initial custody” (UN 
Doc. S/PV.3063: 1992, 5). China, although condemning terrorism in all its forms, was 
sceptical of potential sanctions against Libya. Mr. Li Daoyu remarked that the 
imposition of sanctions against Libya would “not help settle the question but will 
rather complicate the issue further, aggravate regional tensions and have serious 
economic consequences for the countries concerned in the region” (Ibid: 1992, 61). 
Most significantly, however, China concluded by confirming that it will abstain from 
voting on the draft resolution imposing sanctions on Libya (Ibid: 1992, 61). Russia, 
another permanent member of the Security Council, observed that despite the efforts 
made, “the Security Council had no alternative but to adopt another resolution 
providing for enforcement action to ensure compliance with the resolution it had 
previously adopted [Resolution 731]” (Ibid: 1992, 79-80). It was indeed important that 
China would abstain from the vote and Russia supported the adoption of coercive 
measures, paving the way for the adoption of resolution 748. Soviet influence during 
the Cold War extended across the Middle East (e.g. Freedman: 1987), including in Syria, 
Yemen, Algeria and notably also in Libya (Dakheel: 2014, 16). By providing military and 
economic aid (e.g. Aswan High Dam in Egypt) the Soviet Union undertook efforts to 
weaken Western influence in the Middle East (Freedman: 1987, 177). In the 1980s, the 
Soviet Union “has also sought to solidify its influence through the conclusion of long-
term Friendship and Cooperation treaties”, including with Egypt in 1971, Afghanistan 
in 1978 and Syria in 1980 (Ibid: 1987, 177). Consequently, the sanctions against the 
government of Muhammad Al-Gaddafi are thus to be entertained with this 
acknowledgement in mind. The Soviet Union’s willingness to not draw on the veto to 
undermine sanctions against Libya is indicative of the newfound sense of cooperation 
in the Council on matters relating to terrorism. 
For the first time since its inception, member states of the United Nations found 
themselves able to adopt legally restrictive measures against a state sponsor of 
terrorism. During the Cold War years, this development was certainly a distant 
thought. So, acting pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council 
decided that Libya must comply with the requests made by France, the UK, and the 
US and that the country must cease all forms of terrorist activities and commit itself 
to suspending any support for terrorist organisations. Subsequent operative 
paragraphs laid out a comprehensive sanctions-framework, imposing an arms 
embargo and aviation, travel, and diplomatic sanctions. The Council moreover 
required states to “deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in, or overfly 
their territory if it was destined to land in or had taken off from the territory of 
Libya…prohibit the supply any aircraft or aircraft components to Libya…the provision 
of aircraft engineering or servicing…or airworthiness certification…to Libyan aircraft” 
(Farall: 2008, 299). Paragraph 6(c) placed an obligation on states to take steps to deny 
entry and or expel Libyan nationals “who have been denied entry to or expelled from 
other States because of their involvement in terrorist activities” (UNSC res. 748: 1992, 
op. para. 6(c)). In consequence, the sanctions were not only directed against the 
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Libyan government as such but also against individuals identified as involved in 
terrorist activities.100  
When the Security Council reviewed Libyan progress and determined that the core 
obligations of resolution 748 remained unheeded, the Council tightened the aviation 
ban and restricted the import of oil-related equipment by adopting resolution 883 in 
November 1993. Again acting under UN Chapter VII, the Council decided that 
countries should freeze any funds and other resources of the Libyan government and 
its public authorities (UNSC res. 883, op. para. 3). The sanctions imposed by way of 
resolution 883 further prohibited the export to Libya of goods used in the course of 
the refinement and export of oil (e.g. furnaces) and states were obliged to close all 
Libya Arab Airline offices within their jurisdiction (even prohibiting the endorsement 
of any ticketing by Libyan Arab Airlines) and furthermore prohibited material supply 
intended to administer, inter alia, Libyan airfields (Ibid: 1993, op. para. 6). The United 
States also propagated the imposition of an oil boycott. Despite Europe’s eagerness to 
contribute to deterring Libyan sponsorship of terrorism, the Europeans “resisted 
because they depended heavily on imports of Libyan oil, consuming 90 percent of 
Libya’s oil exports” (Cortright & Lopez: 2000, 112).  
Following the adoption of resolution 883, the conflicting parties descended into 
deadlock until 1998. Despite the general support for the use of sanctions, a number of 
countries voiced concern of the growing economic and humanitarian costs (Cortright 
& Lopez: 2000, 118). As such, the OAU announced that it would side-step the sanction-
regime in June 1998 if an agreement was not reached within a few months (Romaniuk: 
2010, 51). Consequently, it was suggested that Libya would hand over the suspects to 
be prosecuted in the Netherlands under Scottish Law. The details of the deal were laid 
out in resolution 1192, in which sanctions would be lifted once the two suspects 
appeared for trial (UNSC res. 1192, op. para. 8). On April 5th 1999 the suspects were 
delivered to The Hague and two days later sanctions were suspended. Secretary-
General Kofi Annan confirmed that he will be “submitting a report to the president of 
the Security Council, confirming that the two have arrived in the Netherlands … and 
the Council will act to suspend the sanctions immediately” (Press Release SG/SM/6944: 
1999). It was however not until the adoption of resolution 1506 in 2003 that the 
sanctions imposed on Libya were formally lifted (Press Release SC/7868: 2003).  
While it is difficult to assess the extent to which the sanctions had an economic 
impact,101  it does follow that the sanction-regime was successful in leading to the 
extradition of the alleged offenders. As Kofi Annan noted “…apart from living with the 
sanctions for seven years, no country likes to be treated as an outcast and outside the 
society of nations…And I think Libya wanted to get back to the international 
 
100 A number of exceptions were made on the grounds of humanitarian and emergency needs. To ensure the 
implementation of the sanctions, member states established the 748 Sanctions Committee. See the Global 
Policy Forum’s “Libya Sanctions Committee” for more details.  
101 See Cortright & Lopez’s “The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s” pages 113-115 for 
further analysis on the impacts of the sanction-regime on Libya’s economy.  
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community… [and] wanted to be able to deal freely with its neighbours and with the 
rest of the world” (Press Release SG/SM/6944: 1999).  
 
The Taliban and the Security Council  
The sanction-regime that has attracted the most attention in the pre-9/11 era has been 
the one imposed against the Taliban in Afghanistan in October 1999. The 1267-regime, 
adopted unanimously, remains in place at the time of writing (although in amended 
form) and demonstrates the Council’s assertive response to terrorism even before 9/11. 
With the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, Afghanistan fell into a civil war with various 
fractions gunning for power, becoming a futile ground for terrorist organisations. By 
1996 the Taliban rose to power in Afghanistan, 102  increasingly garnering support 
during the civil war (Laub: 2014). The Taliban imposed a strict interpretation of tribal 
codes and sharia law in the territory it controlled until it was overthrown by US and 
allied forces after 9/11. Although Afghanistan was a concern to the United Nations for 
its ill-treatment of women and its harsh rules (see UNSC res. 1076), it was the 
movement’s support for Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda organisation that 
ultimately led to Security Council action against the regime in 1999. Already in 1996 
the Security Council showed itself increasingly worried, highlighting “that the 
continuation of the conflict in Afghanistan provides a fertile ground for terrorism and 
drug trafficking which destabilise the region and beyond” (UNSC res. 1076, op. para. 
5).  
 
The early 1990s were a busy time for al-Qaeda. “During this period more than a 
thousand new al Qaeda foot soldiers were recruited, trained, and pledged to carry out 
al Qaeda’s bidding.” (Comras: 2010, 42).The organisation was rapidly evolving into an 
international jihadist movement, with many local organisations pledging allegiance to 
the group. Bin Laden was able to enlist “groups from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Iraq, Oman, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Somalia, and Eritrea” (The 9/11 
Commission Report: 2004, 58) One of the conflicts that al-Qaeda got involved in was 
the support of Muslim fighters in Chechnya. Russia had been fighting for control of 
the northern Caucasus for centuries and a US State Department review from 1998 
moreover suggested that “that insurgents led by a Chechen guerrilla commander of 
Jordanian origin, who goes by the name Khattab, is receiving equipment and training 
assistance from Islamic guerrillas from throughout the Middle East and South Asia” 
(Katzman: 1999, 2). The 1998 Patterns of Global Terrorism report provides further 
evidence that not only did Khattab have a direct link to bin Laden but also that al-
Qaeda provided the Chechnyan rebels with individuals to support their training efforts 
(Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1998, 28). “To the Islamists, Chechnya offered an 
opportunity to create an Islamic republic in the Caucasus from which they could wage 
a jihad throughout Central Asia” (Wright: 2006, 283). This acknowledgment would 
prove pivotal in garnering Russian support for action against the Taliban and their 
 
102 See Ahmed Rashid’s insightful work “Taliban The Story of the Afghan Warlords” for a detailed reading on 
the origins of the Taliban and their rise to power.  
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endeavours at harbouring bin Laden. During a meeting prior to the adoption of 
resolution 1267 (see below) in 1999 Gennady Gatilov, speaking on behalf of Russia, 
acknowledged the negative consequence of the export of al-Qaeda support across the 
globe. He noted, “… Afghanistan has acquired a firm reputation as an international 
exporters of terrorism and narcotics. The negative consequences of this are already 
being felt far beyond the borders of that country, including in some regions of Russia 
and in the States of Central Asia” (Gatilov in UN Doc. SPV/4039, 9). India likewise 
raised concern over Afghanistan’s status as fertile ground for terrorist organisations 
because “of the training camps in our immediate neighbourhood, in Pakistan-
occupied Kashmir and Afghanistan” (UN Doc. S/PV.3921, 7). Al-Qaeda was thus a 
problem to all countries alike, and in the case of India and Pakistan played into broader 
geopolitical disputes. One also not lest forget that many of the Islamic countries that 
provided support to al-Qaeda in its early stages now became its target (Comras: 2010, 
35).103  
Famously, bin Laden and the Taliban’s Mulla Omar forged a firm alliance. While “Al 
Qaeda enjoyed full freedom of activity and movement, and an open door policy to 
bring in, indoctrinate, and train new jihad volunteers (and its members) could travel 
freely (Comras: 2010, 51) the Taliban in return received access to al-Qaeda contacts and 
funding channels, and at times al-Qaeda operatives fought alongside Taliban fighters. 
The 9/11 Commission Report puts it well when it concludes, “[b]in Laden appeared to 
have in Afghanistan a freedom of movement that he had lacked in Sudan. Al Qaeda 
members could travel freely within the country, enter and exit it without visas or any 
immigration procedures…used the Afghan state-owned Arian Airlines to courier 
money into the country” (9/11 Commission Report: 2004, 66). Al-Qaeda was 
increasingly become a bigger problem and given its involvement (or planned 
involvement) in conflicts that afflicted a broad spectrum of countries, including Saudi 
Arabia and Russia, many countries had a vested interest in curtailing the organisation’s 
ability to execute terrorist offences. Two incidents in particular compelled the Security 
Council to take action. In August 1998, al-Qaeda attacked two US embassies, one in 
Nairobi, Kenya and the other in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Over 200 hundred people 
died, including 12 Americans and many more were injured (Mitchell & Talbot: 2018). 
The attacks in the East African cities were well coordinated and showed the world that 
al-Qaeda had emerged into a dangerous threat that could no longer be ignored. Only 
a few days later, on August 13th 1998, the Security Council unanimously adopted 
resolution 1189. After condemning the attacks in Kenya and Tanzania, the Council 
proceeded to call on “States to adopt, in accordance with international law and as a 
matter of priority, effective and practical measures for security cooperation, for the 
prevention of such acts of terrorism, and for the prosecution and punishment of their 
perpetrators” (UNSC res. 1189, op. para. 5). The resolution addressed state actors but 
did not direct its appeal towards non-state actors like al-Qaeda. On August 28th, two 
 
103 For example, when bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia prior to the Gulf War he proposed to the king that 
he can gather sufficient volunteers to fend off any attack from expansionist Iraq. The king declined and turned 
to the United States which ended up providing troops on the ground. In effect, bin Laden grew increasingly 
critical of the kingdom and included Saudi Arabia on its list of infidels against whom a jihad is to be waged. 
See Lawrence Wright’s “The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda’s road to 9/11” for further reading on this subject.  
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weeks later, the Council convened again and adopted resolution 1193. Member states 
expressed their concern over the recent escalation of violence in Afghanistan, in which 
Afghan forces caused serious human suffering when they took control of Mazar-e-
Sharif mostly inhabited by Shi’a Muslims (UNSC res. 1193, para. 10). The Afghan crisis 
was of great concern to the Council and its members understood that the warring 
parties were lending support to terrorist organisations. As such, the Security Council 
demanded that the Afghan factions “refrain from harbouring and training terrorist and 
their organisation and to halt illegal drug activities” (UNSC res. 1193, op. para. 15). Both 
resolutions remained rather unspectacular and it was not until the adoption of 
resolution 1267 (see below) that any significant action was taken.  
In the meantime, the United States launched cruise missiles at selected targets in 
Afghanistan and at a pharmaceutical factory in the Sudan. The United States, as 
stipulated in the UN Charter, notified the Security Council of its bombings and 
justified the use of force by its right to self-defence pursuant to Article 51 of the UN 
Charter. International reaction to the unilateral strike were mixed and many countries 
condemned the use of unilateral force (Lietzau: 2004, 419). “Most U.S. allies, including 
Britain, Germany … supported the attacks. France and Italy issued tepid statements of 
support. Russian President Boris Yeltsin condemned the attacks, as did Pakistan and 
several Arab countries. China, although equivocal at first, later openly criticized the 
U.S. action” (Lobel: 1999, 538). At the Council meeting on August 28th following the 
attacks, Pakistan, although condemning terrorism and the loss of innocent lives, 
showed itself frustrated by the recent American airstrikes. On behalf of Pakistan, Mr. 
Akbar explained that the strikes in Afghanistan “caused deep indignation, irrespective 
of the motives behind the air strikes…(and that) the violation of the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Afghanistan cannot but be a matter of grave concern” (UN Doc. 
S/PV. 3921: 1998, 5). Iraq went as far as to characterise the strikes as an act of 
“‘American arrogance’ and Iran also condemned the bombings” (Irish Times: 1998, 1).104 
As the record suggests, some member states in the Security Council, both permanent 
and non-permanent members, were not willing to accept the unilateral use of force in 
counterterrorism.105  
It rapidly became evident that the Taliban would not heed the demands made by the 
Security Council in resolutions 1189 and 1193. It also appeared as if the Taliban-regime 
and al-Qaeda found a common enemy in the West around which it could rally its 
fundamentalist doctrine (Comras: 2010, 57). In October of 1999, the United States 
introduced a draft Security Council resolution in which it proposed the adoption of 
sanctions against the Taliban for its unwillingness to cease its support for terrorist 
organisations and for its failure to turn over bin Laden to a country where he has been 
indicted (UNSC res. 1267). Acting under Chapter VII, thus placing a legal obligation 
on all states, the Security Council specifically targeted the Taliban (Dedring: 2008, 97). 
 
104 See Lietzau’s “Old Law, New Wars: Jus ad Bellum in an Age of Terrorism” and Williamson’s “Terrorism, War 
and International Law: The Legality of the Use of Force” for further reading.  
105 Also, one should not forget the rescue missions conducted by Israel in 1976 in response in Entebbe Uganda. 
This too, was not greeted with support in the Security Council by many states. See Chapter five for further 
reading. 
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Yet, they also demanded the extradition of bin Laden as the person responsible for the 
attacks. Specifically, operative paragraph 2 demanded that the “Taliban turn over 
Usama bin Laden without further delay to appropriate authorities in a country where 
he has been indicted … where he will be arrested and effectively brought to justice” 
(Ibid: 1999, op. para. 2). In essence the Council froze all oversea assets of the Taliban 
and banned the use of resources that would benefit the Taliban-regime (Cortright & 
Lopez: 2000, 127). In addition, states were to take steps to cooperate in preventing and 
suppressing terrorist acts, and to bring to justice the perpetrators of the attacks 
(Dedring: 2008, 100) and to report to a newly established sanctions committee. 
Resolution 1267 did not impose broad economic sanctions but rather mandated the 
establishment of a special committee – the 1267 Committee – which would set out to 
identify and designate entities against whom sanctions should be imposed (UNSC res. 
1267: 1999, op. para. 6(e)). The committee was also instructed to submit periodic 
reports on the state of implementation, any violations and the impact (e.g. 
humanitarian) in connection with the sanctions-regime. With the adoption of the 
sanctions against the Taliban, the Council sent a direct message to Osama bin Laden 
underscoring that “You can run, you can hide, but you will be brought to justice” 
(Sodenberg in Comras: 2010, 65). In operative paragraph 4, resolution 1267 decided 
that all states shall freeze funds and other financial resources and ground Afghan-
related air travel (UNSC res. 1267, op. para. 4).  
The sanctions imposed on the Taliban had little consequence and would not hinder 
Taliban support for al-Qaeda. Yet, the Taliban showed itself willing to resolve the issue 
and suggested the convening of a panel of Islamic clerics that would decide on what 
to do with the terrorist leader, but it did not demonstrate any willingness to comply 
with the demands made in resolution 1267. Additionally, “[m]ajor states were unwilling 
to take the extensive measures that would be required to reduce arms trafficking along 
the Afghan-Pakistani border. The military coup in Pakistan in October 1999 made the 
challenge of cutting off Pakistani support for the Taliban even more difficult” 
(Cortright & Lopez: 2000, 129). While the overthrown government was distancing itself 
from Taliban rule in Afghanistan, the new military regime was more favourable to the 
Taliban (Ibid: 2000, 129). Also, the sanctions committee was slow to identify and 
designate entities and individuals to be listed. In fact, the first list of Taliban assets to 
be frozen was not introduced until April of 2000. Additionally, resolution 1267 
included a thirty-day embargo on the sanctions, giving individuals who anticipated to 
be subject to the sanctions sufficient time to transfer assets out of the reach of the 
Sanctions Committee. Conversely, “this process only actually began well after the date 
set for sanctions to enter in force had passed” (Comras: 2010, 66). What is more, the 
Taliban operated outside of the traditional and mainstream economic system. It took 
another dramatic attack, in this case it was the destruction of a US Naval vessel (USS 
Cole) in October 2000 in Yemen by al-Qaeda, for the Security Council to take further 
concrete action.  
In December 2000 the Security Council moved to adopt resolution 1333. The passing 
of it was a major development as it extended the “the scope of the asset freeze to 
include those controlled by Usama bin Laden, Al-Qaida and affiliates of both” 
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(Gutherie: 2005, 494). Member states also extended the sanctions to include an arms 
embargo (Holtom: 2007, 7), extending the flight ban to any aircraft from taking off or 
landing in Taliban controlled areas and also decided that states shall prevent the 
supply or transfer of the chemical acetic anhydride “to any person in the territory of 
Afghanistan under Taliban control” (UNSC res. 1333: 2000, op. para. 10). This was an 
attempt to curtail the regime’s illicit drug trade and thus one of their strongest revenue 
streams. It was however the extension of the sanctions list administered by the 1267-
Committee to include individuals associated with bin Laden and al-Qaeda that was 
most significant (UNSC res. 1333: 2000, op. para. 8(c)).106 It was the first time the UN 
was directly targeting individuals and commercial and non-governmental entities in 
relation to al-Qaeda and the Taliban (Comras: 2010, 70). This was indeed a deviation 
from the practise established by the Council in resolution 1267. Although resolution 
1267 made passing reference to bin Laden and his associates, it was done in the context 
of condemning the Taliban for providing a fertile ground on which they can operate. 
It thus did not include any sanctions against al-Qaeda, a non-state actor. A noticeable 
similarity however was that both 1267 and 1333 were adopted with a geographic context 
(Afghanistan) in mind and did not have a global reach (Luck: 2006, 99).  
The Security Council was able to muster sufficient support for the imposition of 
sanctions as a counterterrorism instrument. Indeed, acting under Chapter VII, the 
Council adopted sanction-regimes against Libya in 1992, the Sudan in 1996 and against 
the Taliban-regime in 1999 (and later against al-Qaeda). While Libyan sanctions were 
largely in response to a specific terrorist incident107 (e.g. Pan Am 103) and applied to 
the whole of Libya, the 1267 Taliban sanction-regime was limited to the territory 
controlled by the Taliban and was not in response to a particular terrorist incident but 
rather as a result of a threat that manifested itself over time. What is more, the latter 
sanctions were also novel as they not only imposed the usual aviation sanctions but 
additionally froze Taliban assets. Resolution 1333 imposed a mandatory arms embargo 
and more importantly, extended the regime to include sanctions against al-Qaeda, a 
non-state actor. On a general level, the response by the Security Council was 
unparalleled in its assertiveness and laid the foundation for SC action post-9/11.  
 
 
106 Resolution 1333 also included a number of institutional amendments. It established a new committee of the 
experts to make recommendations of “how the arms embargo and the closure of terrorist training camps 
demanded in paragraphs 3 and 5 above can be monitored.” The first report issued by the expert group indicated 
that implementation would fall short if bordering countries did not comply (Source). In July 2001 the Security 
Council adopted resolution 1363, in which the Secretary-General was tasked with establishing a monitoring 
mechanism to a. monitor implementation of measured imposed by previous resolutions, b. offer assistance to 
bordering states of Afghanistan to increase capacity c. to report any violations of the measures imposed by 
resolutions 1267 and 1333. The monitoring mechanism included a monitoring group set up in New York and a 
sanctions enforcement support team. See resolution 1363 for a detailed overview on the institutional changes. 
107 Although one has to acknowledge that Libyan support for terrorism greatly occupied the United States. Yet, 
Security Council action remained absent until 1992, after investigations into Pan Am flight 103 and UTA flight 
772 implicated the Libyan government.  
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Chapter conclusion  
A lot had transpired in terms of counterterrorism at the United Nations in the 1990s. 
The General Assembly gradually moved towards unequivocally condemning all acts 
and practises of terrorism (see UNGA res. 40/61). Although the Assembly initially 
continued to pay tribute to the inalienable right of independence from colonial and 
racist rule and no measure was to jeopardise these people’s legitimate struggle (see 
UNGA res. 46/51) this practise came to a halt when member states adopted resolution 
49/60 in 1994. In the annex to the resolution the General Assembly adopted the 
Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism and asserted that 
“criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, 
a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstances 
unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, 
racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them” (Res. 
49/60: 1994, Annex, Art. 3). Resolution 51/210 (1996) built on this framework and 
extended the UN’s focus on the preventative element by highlighting the urgency to 
curtail terrorist financing activities. Certainly, the UNGA gradually established 
terrorism as a crime no matter the circumstances or how noble the cause.  
 
The General Assembly likewise initiated further deliberations on a comprehensive 
framework against terrorism. Yet, with the familiar differences of opinion as regards 
definition and scope, these efforts remained unsuccessful. The draft working 
document proposed by India does nevertheless allow for the conclusion that a similar 
schemata to the sectoral conventions was favoured. Provisions included, inter alia, the 
extradition or prosecution of alleged terrorists and the upholding of their rights. In 
1997 and 1999 member states set out to adopt two further sectoral conventions. The 
1997 Bombing Convention dedicated itself towards the particular terrorist activity 
involving the use of bombs, whereas as the 1999 Terrorist Financing Agreement, for 
the first time, addressed the phenomenon as a whole. Unlike the predecessor 
conventions (Diplomats and Hostages conventions), these two conventions left little 
doubt that they were adopted for the purpose of suppressing terrorism. The adoption 
of the 1997 and 1999 conventions is also indicative of the UN’s increasing tendency to 
treat terrorism as a special crime in the need of a special response.  
It is also worth noting that a military approach to tackling terrorism was neither 
endorsed nor mandated by the United Nations. The contrary seems very true. 
Countries showed themselves sceptical of the US unilateral strikes against Afghanistan 
and the Sudan. In fact, the American strikes in 1998 were condemned by members of 
the Security Council and were perceived as counterproductive to the overall peace 
process in Afghanistan (see statement made by Pakistan above). The Security Council, 
however, imposed three sanctions-regimes, two of which were previously discussed. 
Sanctions are restrictive and repressive counterterrorism instruments. Initially, the 
Council predominantly targeted state-actors but with the adoption of resolution 1333 
following the USS Cole bombing, the body extended its reach to not state-actors, albeit 
within a specific territorial context (Afghanistan).  
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There is no doubt that September 11 marked a radical shift in global affairs. In part, the 
attacks triggered immense public spending on security and readjusted political 
alliances. In his speech to Congress on September 20th, 2001, then President Bush 
called on every nation to make a decision, “[e]ither you are with us, or you are with 
the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbour or support 
terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime” (President Bush in 
his address to Congress: 2001). The world would now follow a new dichotomy in which 
countries are either classified as good or evil on the basis of their contribution to ‘the 
war on terrorism’. The global dimension of al-Qaeda and international terrorism in 
general brought a new kind of challenge to the United Nations. Chapter five will 
therefore explore how the organisation responded to international terrorism after the 
tragic attacks in 2001(and the overall shift in the nature of terrorism) and amidst the 
changing geopolitical realities.  
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CHAPTER FIVE – THE UN AND TERRORISM AFTER 9/11 
The United Nations have struggled to formulate a response to terrorism since it first 
formally placed the item on its agenda in 1972. This conclusion has become visible 
through the assessments in chapters three and four. Since the four coordinated attacks 
on the United States in 2001, terrorism has emerged as a central concern to the 
international community. Concurrently, the General Assembly and the Security 
Council have significantly increased their counterterrorism output, both in terms of 
quantity and complexity. This chapter intends to address how the UN’s response to 
terrorism has changed since 9/11 until 2019. In an attempt to provide consistent 
comparison across timeframes, the focus of this chapter will rest on the General 
Assembly’s resolutions adopted under the ‘measures to eliminate international 
terrorism’ stream, the body’s problem-specific response (e.g. conventions) and on the 
attempts to adopt a comprehensive convention to suppress terrorism. As regards the 
Security Council, chapter five will place specific focus on the emerging regulatory 
regime of UNSC resolutions, the extension of the 1267 sanctions-regime, and the 
evolution of the use of force as a counterterrorism instrument. Although already a 
feature of earlier UN work, specialised agencies have increasingly taken on a 
counterterrorism mandate in the post-9/11 era. Due to space restraints, these will not 
be dealt with here.108  
 
The General Assembly after September 11th  
There is little doubt that the attacks on September 11th were a watershed event for 
international affairs. The events not only exposed Western vulnerability to terrorism 
at home but moreover led to a number of interventions around the globe as well as a 
newfound focus on terrorism. The Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism had 
yet to complete its negotiations on a comprehensive agreement and although regional 
tensions (e.g. Israel/Palestine and India/Pakistan) continued to impact the global 
community, the agenda item ‘measures to eliminate international terrorism’ remained 
an annual fixture at the United Nations.109 After 9/11, the Security Council has taken 
on a more active role in counterterrorism, and academic interest in the work of the 
Council has experienced significant growth, at times at the expense of the General 
Assembly. Surely one can concede that the General Assembly has been entrusted with 
a broad range of mandates (see Article 10 of the UN Charter); however, “the General 
 
108 For further reading see for example Bowen et al.’s “Multilateral cooperation and the prevention of nuclear 
terrorism; pragmatism over idealism” or the OSCE’S “IMO Maritime Security Measures-Background” as well 
as MacKenzie’s “a History of the Civil Aviation Organisation”.  
109 In 2005, world leaders convened for a World Summit where the issue of international terrorism was a 
primary concern. Based on the 2004 commissioned report by the High-Level Panel on “Threats, Challenges 
and Changes” the idea of a counterterrorism strategy to be adopted by the General Assembly surfaced, which 
was adopted with resolution 60/288. Annex to the resolution was a plan of action that highlighted 
commitments governments ought to take in relation to addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of 
terrorism, to the prevention and combating of terrorism, capacity-building and human rights and the rule of 
law in counterterrorism. These developments cannot be considered in further detail here. See Comras’ “Flawed 
Diplomacy” pages 184-188 for a more thorough account.  
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Assembly’s powers are of recommendations only, and when contrasted to the binding 
power of the Security Council, they suggest an actor that is limited in its ability to 
generate or affect international law” (Boulden: 2014, 555). In contrast to the work of 
the Security Council, unanimity and consensus remain central in the Assembly. Only 
when sufficient support among member states is attracted can decisions be 
implemented. In some cases, decisions are watered down to the least-common-
denominator and one is left to wonder whether “the diplomatic energies expended” 
(Peterson: 2004, 174) were worth the outcome. Indeed, the activities of the Assembly 
have been more moderate with regards to terrorism and the body suffers from 
numerous procedural short-comings that certainly contribute to the rather low 
academic interest in the UN body on this subject. However, despite its inability to 
command governments to take or refrain from certain actions, the UNGA nevertheless 
functions as a moral compass and as a normative power. If nothing else, the General 
Assembly operates on a one-state, one-vote policy and consequently holds 
considerable legitimacy in a wide array of subjects. Due to the global membership of 
the Assembly, it also reflects a more diverse set of opinions and experiences than the 
Security Council, arguably making it the most legitimate UN body better suited to 
discussing matters of grave concerns, such as terrorism. It is this legitimacy that allows 
the General Assembly to set global standards in counterterrorism. Therefore, despite 
its shortcomings it is worth to reflect on the counterterrorism response of the General 
Assembly post-9/11.  
 
In response to the attacks on September 11th, the General Assembly greatly diversified 
its response to terrorism, with other committees (e.g. Fifth Committee) also 
addressing terrorism.110 As a matter of record, the body has adopted a multitude of 
resolutions focusing on specific terrorism-related matters, including human rights and 
terrorism, and terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.111 While these resolutions 
and other efforts adopted by the General Assembly after 9/11 are certainly worth 
considering, this thesis has chosen to exclude them from analysis for two reasons. For 
one, previous timeframes discussed have addressed the sectoral response, the 
attempts at a comprehensive convention, and the resolutions adopted under the 
‘measures to eliminate’ strand. Therefore, for the purpose of consistent comparison, 
focus should remain on these elements in this chapter as well. Second, the limited 
nature of this research project does not allow for an all-encompassing analysis of the 
Assembly’s work. The resolutions adopted by the Assembly are useful indicators in 
assessing in what way the United Nations has positioned itself on the issue of terrorism 
after September 11th and if any significant shifts can be identified. Equally important 
 
110  See the following link for a more detailed overview of the General Assembly’s work since 2001: 
https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/about-task-force 
111 Indeed, the General Assembly greatly expanded its work program to issue areas such as human rights, 
fundamental freedoms and terrorism. Although the Sixth Committee has remained a pertinent actor in the 
UNGA’s counterterrorism efforts, other committees (e.g. Third and Fifth Committee), have increasingly taken 
on a more active role. See Romaniuk’s “Multilateral Counter-Terrorism”, pages 80-83 and Rosenow’s “United 
we fight?” for a more insightful overview. A full list of the General Assembly’s increasingly diverse resolutions 
can be found here https://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/57 
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are the negotiations in the Sixth Committee (and the Ad Hoc Committee and the 
respective Working Group) on a Comprehensive Convention as they tellingly 
demonstrate if and how member states – and by extension the UN – have changed 
their position on terrorism and what progress has been made. Admittedly, in light of 
the far-reaching Security Council resolutions adopted after 9/11, which have 
incorporated some of the draft elements of the Comprehensive Convention, 
commentators have questioned the redundancy of the convention as a whole (e.g. 
Stiles: 2006). As noted, however, a review on the progress of a general convention 
against terrorism remains nevertheless important, as it is necessary to gain a better 
understanding of where the organisation stands on terrorism and how close countries 
are to an agreement. To the extent the subject allows, this section will underscore that 
the global body remains divided. The ongoing failure to define terrorism, to agree on 
the scope of the convention and the revival of efforts by the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference to “demand for inclusion of language that would distinguish between 
terrorist acts and the activities of national liberation movements and ‘peoples 
struggling against foreign occupation’” (Rosand: 2007, 407) continues to complicate 
the adoption of such an comprehensive instrument.  
At the 56th session of the UNGA, immediately following the September 11th attacks, 
then Secretary-General Kofi Annan acknowledged the work that has been done by the 
Assembly to date, specifically noting, “[w]e must now go further. All nations of the 
world must be united in their solidarity with the victims of terrorism, and in their 
determination to take actions” (UNGA Press Release: 2001, 9903). On behalf of the 
African Group, Dumisani Kumalo, the South African representative, highlighted that 
the challenge the United Nations “confronts is to intensify our collective efforts to live 
up to the preamble of the United Nations Charter” (Ibid: 2001, 9903). Countries thus 
condemned the attacks and adopted resolution 56/1 on Condemnation of Terrorist 
Attacks in the United States of America without a vote.  
 
Inevitably, the UNGA’s work on terrorism was granted new impetus in light of the 
events on 9/11. The resolutions adopted by the world body have been the subject of 
scholarly work early on (e.g. Peterson: 2004, Romaniuk: 2010 and Boulden: 2014), with 
many observers concluding that post-9/11 resolutions mirror pre-9/11 practise (e.g. 
Romaniuk: 2010, 78). The ensuing section will make evident that, while the resolutions 
adopted by the UNGA in the post-9/11 era represent a significant body of work, major 
changes remain absent in 2018. This serves as a reminder that although the 
organisation continues to seek an important role for the Assembly in matters relating 
to counterterrorism, the inherent disagreement prevents member states from moving 
beyond what has now become a well-established least common-denominator. In 
consideration of the lack of meaningful advances in respect to its resolutions under 
the ‘measures to eliminate’ agenda item, the General Assembly is stagnating.  
Despite the reluctance of member states to break new ground on this specific agenda 
item, there are a number of observations that are worth reflecting upon further. In this 
respect, both the preambulatory clauses and the operative portion of the resolutions 
offer useful insights. The preambles – that is, the introductory remarks of a resolution 
 
 
- 103 - 
– help discern the true intention of the paragraphs that follow and facilitate one’s 
understanding of how the issue of terrorism is viewed and understood. In the absence 
of precision, the preambles are intended to guide member states’ interpretation of the 
operative portions. First, the observation can be made that although the resolutions 
passed are not in response to any specific event, they include references to certain 
terrorist incidents. This is likely the result of a consensus that certain acts constitute a 
clear form of terrorism while others do not. This can certainly be considered as a 
reflection of the UNGA’s approach to “terrorism as a criminal activity requiring a long-
term, law-based approach” (Boulden: 2014, 567). Furthermore, the UNGA has tended 
to concede the role of more immediate intervenor to the Security Council (Peterson: 
2004, 175). Yet the past discussions in the respective committees (e.g. Sixth Committee, 
see previous chapters) also allow for the conclusion that this is also the result of the 
Assembly’s inability to agree on what constitutes terrorism. In this respect, it is worth 
highlighting member states’ willingness to condemn the attacks on September 11th as 
well as the Bali and Moscow bombings in 2002. In 2003, the General Assembly also 
widened its scope to include a reference to the bombings of the United Nations 
Headquarters in Iraq (see UNGA res. 58/81). Moreover, in 2008, although upholding 
its strong condemnation of the aforementioned incidents, the Assembly widened its 
scope yet again and showed itself deeply “disturbed by the persistence of terrorist acts, 
which have been carried out worldwide” (UNGA res. 62/71: 2007, para. 9), albeit 
without providing an understanding of what a terrorist act is. And in 2012 it reaffirmed 
its condemnation of attacks aimed against the United Nations around the globe 
(UNGA res. 66/105, para. 11). The General Assembly has to this day remained consistent 
in its practice of only rarely condemning specific acts of terrorism, certainly also as a 
result of its long-term strategic ambitions but equally importantly as a consequence of 
the politicised nature of the phenomenon in the General Assembly.  
Second, and as already indicated above, many of the provisions contained in the 
resolutions remained similar to pre-9/11 practice, including the strong condemnation 
of all acts, methods, and practises of terrorism no matter the consideration or cause, 
although terrorism is never defined. Third, and perhaps most important, although 
countries excluded any reference to the principle of self-determination and the rights 
of “peoples under colonial and racist regimes and other forms of alien domination and 
foreign occupation” (UNGA res. 46/51: 1991, para. 14) since 1994, the resolutions 
adopted under the ‘measures to eliminate’ strand indicate that member states 
continue to remain unwilling to condemn politically motivated violence in any and all 
circumstances. This is best evidenced by specific reference to the final outcome 
document of the conference of the NAM in the preambular paragraphs of numerous 
resolutions (see below) and in the discussions that have taken place in the Sixth 
Committee during the drafting and adoption of the respective resolutions.  
The resolutions adopted under the ‘measures to eliminate’ stream have remained 
government-centred and have created a normative structure that continues to 
emphasise the treatment of terrorism as a crime that necessitates suppression through 
seeking criminal repercussions (e.g. bringing terrorist to justice). Moreover, 
governments have highlighted the need for closer international cooperation between 
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countries and have encouraged specialised agencies and regional arrangements 
afflicted by terrorism to address the issue within their fora. In this context it is 
particularly useful to recall that over the past 18 years the General Assembly has 
repeatedly stressed “the need to strengthen further international cooperation among 
States and among international organisations and agencies, regional organisations and 
arrangements and the United Nations in order to prevent, combat and eliminate 
terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, wherever and by whomever committed” 
(for example UNGA res. 60/43, 12).112 In its later resolutions (starting in 2004), the 
UNGA moreover included a provision in its operative paragraphs calling “upon all 
States to cooperate to prevent and suppress terrorist acts” (UNGA res. 59/46: 2004, op. 
para. 13). 113  It is also remarkable how consistent the Assembly has been with the 
operative portions of its resolutions. More simply put, the UNGA solidified its 
condemnation of all “acts, methods and practises of terrorism in all its forms and 
manifestations as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomever committed” 
(UNGA res. 61/40: 2006, op. para. 1), and in all of its resolutions (as early as 1994) the 
Assembly rejected any notion that terrorism can be justified, no matter how noble the 
cause may perceived to be (e.g. UNGA res. 73/211: 2018, op. para. 4). Despite a general 
condemnation of terrorism, these references only remain partially helpful as it is still 
unclear what the Assembly considers to be a terrorist act. Yet, one ought to be aware 
that formal condemnation of terrorism – whatever the consideration – was a 
considerable step forward in comparison to the resolutions adopted in the 1970s. 
Indeed, earlier resolutions condemned acts of “international terrorism which 
endanger or take human lives” only to recognise that “in order to contribute to the 
elimination of the causes and the problem of international terrorism [member states] 
should pay special attention to all situations, including, inter alia, colonialism racism 
and situations involving alien occupation” (UNGA res. 34/145: 1979, para. 3 & 13).  
A more novel feature of post-9/11 UNGA resolutions is the more explicit emphasis 
placed on a criminal justice response. It was however not until the adoption of 
resolution 59/46 in 2004 that the global body explicitly urged governments to ensure 
that their nationals or individuals in their territories who have provided support to the 
commissioning of a terrorist act “are punished by penalties consistent with the grave 
nature of such acts” (UNGA res. 59/46: 2004, op. para. 7). Furthermore, member states 
have since been reminded of their obligation to “ensure that perpetrators of terrorist 
acts are brought to justice” (UNGA res. 62/71:2007, op. para. 9). This concept is 
however not entirely new. In the problem-specific UN agreements addressed 
elsewhere (see chapters three and four), the importance attributed to bringing 
terrorists to justice has come to build a core element of the UN’s response (see for 
example Art. 9 of the Terrorist Bombing Convention), yet it was not until 2004 that 
member states included such a provisions in this particular stream of resolutions.114 
The inclusion of such a reference can arguably thus be considered a reminder to those 
 
112 Such a provision was included in all General Assembly resolutions over the past 18 years, although not new 
considering that pre-9/11 resolutions likewise contained such a provision.  
113 Such a provision continued to remain a core element of the GA’s resolutions in some form or another to 
date (until 2018).  
114 This trend has continued to this day. See UNGA res. 73/211 operative paragraphs 11 and 12.  
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member states that have not done so to live up to their obligations placed on them by 
the respective conventions. The adherence imposed – despite not being of a binding 
nature – on countries to bring terrorists to justice is certainly aimed at eliminating safe 
havens for terrorists. This is a significant development considering that sectoral 
conventions only explicitly oblige states to prosecute terrorists for certain crimes (e.g. 
bombings or attacks against diplomatic agents), with the Terrorist Financing 
Convention perhaps representing somewhat of an exception. In doing so, the UNGA 
urges governments to ensure that terrorists are brought to justice and member states 
are – in theory – closing a normative loophole which intends to bring all terrorists to 
justice, no matter what form (e.g. hostage-taking or attack on diplomats) of crime was 
committed.  
A review of the resolutions over the past 18 years has also demonstrated that the 
Assembly has chosen to accentuate the need to respect international human rights as 
well as refugee and humanitarian law when countering terrorism. Despite initial 
efforts to tie terrorism to human rights as early as 1993, it was not until the 59th Session 
(2004-2005) that member states decided to affirm a state’s obligation to respect human 
rights in countering terrorism (UNGA res. 59/46: 2004, para. 10). 
As early as 1973, with the adoption of the Diplomats Convention and accompanying 
resolutions, the UNGA adopted crime-specific measures against terrorism. In its 
resolution 40/61 in 1985 the General Assembly called on member states to prevent 
attacks against civil aviation (see UNGA res. 40/61 operative paragraph 11). After 2001 
the General Assembly became more comfortable with raising concern over the rise of 
specific kinds of terrorism (e.g. kidnapping and foreign terrorist fighters). At its 69th 
Session in 2014 the General Assembly similarly expressed grave concern for the 
growing threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters. This inclusion was no coincidence 
considering that the issue received considerable global attention, particularly in light 
of the then-recent attacks involving returned foreign fighters (e.g. Jewish Museum in 
Brussels in 2014).115 The UNGA’s more long-term and general response to terrorism 
through its resolutions remains characteristic. That said, the body’s willingness to 
bring to attention certain forms of terrorist activities allows for the argument to be 
made that the General Assembly is establishing a normative structure intended to 
guide member states’ understanding of what constitutes an act of terrorism. This is an 
important acknowledgment considering that, while there are crime-specific 
agreements outlawing hostage-taking and terrorist bombing, other forms of terrorist 
violence such as knifing have not yet been the subject of a treaty. Arguably, the 
Assembly is progressively establishing a normative framework of non-acceptable 
forms of violence in conjunction with terrorism. Although UNGA resolutions are 
exclusively of a recommendation nature, the UNGA can regulate, through its moral 
power, the extent to which member states can support certain forms of political 
violence, thereby circumventing, yet not replacing, a lengthy and tedious treaty-
making progress.  
 
115 See also the 2015 published European Parliament Briefing “Foreign fighters- Member State responses and 
EU action” and Merz’s analysis “Switzerland and Jihadist Foreign Fighters for further reading.  
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Lasting ambiguities in the UN’s resolution-regime 
At the 46th session (1991-1992) of the UNGA, member states insisted on the inclusion 
of a reference to the principle of self-determination and the support for the 
independence of all peoples under colonial or racist regimes in the preambular, as it 
had done in most resolutions leading up to 1991. This was a considerable concession 
to supporters of the Third World bloc. By 1994 such a reference was however no longer 
made and member states took an unprecedented stern and formal position on 
terrorism, rejecting the use of the tactic as unjustifiable. It is perhaps worth reflecting 
on where the General Assembly, as the only global body, stands on this issue today.  
A closer review of the resolutions adopted from the 53rd session (1998-1999) onwards 
(until the 73rd session in 2018-2019) validates the notion that there remains a certain 
ambiguity and paradox in the relationship between national liberation (or self-
determination) movements and terrorism at the United Nations. With the conflicts in 
the Middle East, South Asia and other parts of the world still very much prevalent, it 
is necessary to reflect further on this abstruseness. The old maxim “one man’s terrorist, 
is another man’s freedom fighter” holds true today as it did in the 1970s when the 
United Nations General Assembly first took up the issue. By way of illustration, the 
remainder of this section intends to highlight that much of the contemporary 
discussion on terrorism, even until today, remains similar at its core.116 The resolutions 
adopted by the UNGA in this respect include preambular references that bring further 
confusion. The general statements made by national governments in the Sixth 
Committee, as well as the corresponding reports, provide useful contextual evidence 
that helps one’s understanding on why the General Assembly has responded through 
its resolutions the way that it has and why the contentious debate on what constitutes 
terrorism is far from over.  
In 2004, the General Assembly continued a trend that reaches as far back as the 53rd 
session (1998-1999) insofar that resolution 59/46 contained a reference to the final 
outcome of the Conference of Heads of State or government of Non-Aligned Countries. 
Specifically, the Assembly took “note of the Final Document of the Thirteenth 
Conference….which reiterated the collective position of the Movement of Non-Aligned 
countries on terrorism” (59/46: 2004, para. 18). In 2010, 2015, and 2018, to name three 
specific incidents, the General Assembly upheld this practise by reiterating the 
collective position of the movement.117 Although not part of the operative portion of 
the respective resolutions, such a reference is nevertheless puzzling. For instance, at 
the 13th Summit of the Movement in Kuala Lumpur for example, members conceded 
that criminal acts intended to provoke a state of terror are to be rejected in any 
circumstance as unjustifiable, no matter the consideration or any other underlying 
justification (Final Document Conf. NAM: 2003, 30). Yet, members further “rejected 
recent attempts to equate the legitimate struggle of peoples under colonial or alien 
domination and foreign occupation, for self-determination and national liberation 
 
116 This analysis has been limited to the time period after 2008 onwards. The reasons being, that much of the 
electronic resources available, including streaming footage, is not as readily available before 2008. And, equally 
important, the word restraints afforded to this section prevent a more comprehensive analysis.  
117 See resolutions 64/118, 70/120 and 73/211 for exact reading.  
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with terrorism in order to prolong occupation and oppression of the innocent people 
with impunity” (Ibid: 2003, 30). The summits recalled in UNGA resolutions in 2010 
(64/118), 2015 (70/120), and 2018 (73/211) contain similar positions. The NAM 
Conference in 2016, hosted by Venezuela, reiterated their familiar position outlined 
above, and furthermore agreed to “[o]ppose attempts to equate the legitimate struggle 
of peoples under colonial or alien domination and foreign occupation for self-
determination and national liberation with terrorism…” (Final Document Conf. NAM: 
2016, 83).118 The United Nations decided to remove any explicit references to national 
liberation movements and exceptions to terrorism even in response to colonial 
subjugation by 1994. Conversely, the allusion to such a conference in the preambular 
portion of UNGA resolutions even after 9/11 lends further credence to the fact that 
member states continue to foster fundamentally different understandings of what 
constitutes terrorism. The statements and consultations in the Sixth Committee, 
discussed in further detail below, certainly also confirm this conclusion.  
The Sixth Committee is the primary forum in which the issue of terrorism has been 
discussed since the early 1970s. The committee is an indication of where member 
states position themselves on the issue of terrorism, and the statements made provide 
evidence for the divisiveness among countries. For example, in 2013 the representative 
from Iran, on behalf of the NAM, reiterated its members’ unequivocal condemnation 
of all forms and manifestations of terrorism, “including those in which States are 
directly or indirectly involved” (Iran on behalf of the NAM: 2013, 1). However, the 
statement also emphasised that “[t]errorism should not be equated with the legitimate 
struggle of peoples under colonial or alien domination…[and the] brutalisation of 
peoples remaining under foreign occupation should continue to be denounced as the 
gravest form of terrorism, and the use of State power for the suppression and violence 
against peoples struggling against foreign occupation in exercising their inalienable 
right to self-determination should continue to be condemned” (Ibid: 2013, 3). At the 
69th session of the UNGA, the NAM made similar remarks and furthermore aligned its 
position in “accordance with General Assembly resolution 46/51 of 9 December 1991…” 
(Iran on behalf of NAM: 2014, 2). 119  Resolution 46/51 was the last of a series of 
resolutions that reaffirmed the right to self-determination and independence of all 
people under colonial rule or foreign occupation (UNGA res. 46/51: 1991, para. 13), a 
reference that was excluded from resolutions adopted from 1994 onwards. The 
statement should be seen as an overt attempt to strike at the use of ‘terrorism’ by the 
Israeli state against violence perpetrated by Palestinians, who are ‘struggling against 
 
118 Countries at the 15th summit of the Movement of Non-Aligned countries made similar remarks in 2009, 
emphasising that “brutalisation of people remaining under foreign occupation should not continue to be 
denounced as the gravest form of terrorism, and that the use of State power [e.g. Israel] for the suppression 
and violence against peoples struggling against foreign occupation in exercising their inalienable right to self-
determination should continue to be condemned” (Final Document Conf. NAM: 2009, 49). 
119 The NAM made similar remarks at the 70th session of the UNGA and continued to do so at the most recent 
session in 2018. Qatar moreover emphasised the need to look at the root causes of the problem and urged 
countries to put an end to foreign occupation and to recognise the right to self-determination (Qatar Sixth 
Committee, 2nd Meeting, 70th session: 2015, min. 22:21). Likewise, Libya, insisted on a distinction between a 
terrorist act and a legitimate struggle to self-determination (Libya Sixth Committee, 2nd Meeting, 70th session: 
2015, min. 41:16). 
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foreign occupation in exercising their inalienable right to self-determination.’ At the 
68th session, the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Group adopted a similar 
position and urged countries to “address the root causes of terrorism including 
unlawful use of force, aggression, foreign occupation…denial of the right of peoples 
living under foreign occupation to self-determination…” (Egypt on behalf of OIC: 2013, 
1). This approach is not new at the United Nations; ever since the organisation 
addressed the issue of terrorism, foreign occupation and the curtailing of rights to self-
determine have been identified as main causes of terrorism (see chapter four). The 
OIC further noted that it would like to “stress that this distinction [between terrorism 
and the exercise of legitimate right of peoples to resist foreign occupation] is duly 
observed in International Law, International Humanitarian Law, Article 51 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, and the General Assembly resolution 46/51 which also 
endorses this position” (Ibid: 2013, 2).120 
The Sixth Committee has also been privy to both India and Pakistan charging each 
other with terrorism. India, while condemning all forms of terrorism, especially 
accentuated terrorist activities “in which States are directly and indirectly involved, 
including the State-sponsored cross-border terrorism” (India: 2013, 2).121 In 2001, one 
academic put it as follows: “Pakistan also glorifies the terrorists [in Jammu and 
Kashmir] by calling them “the Kashmiris freedom fighters” and their terrorist 
operation as “liberation movement in Kashmir.” The objective is to legitimise their 
criminal activities under the shield of liberation movements, which are sanctified 
under customary international law, and to obtain support and sympathy of the world 
community” (Saini: 2001, 80). At the time of writing, the conflict remains prominent 
and is an increasingly dominant topic of discussion in the corridors of the United 
Nations122 and by default in the Sixth Committee. In fact, in September 2017 Pakistan 
labelled India the ‘mother of terrorism’ and accused it of sponsoring violence in 
Pakistan during a speech at the UN (Jha: 2017, 1). In response, India accused Pakistan 
of creating groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba, whose stated objective is to free 
Muslims from Indian rule in Kashmir (Tankel: 2010).  
The consultations on this agenda item at the 73rd session of the UNGA are the most 
recent reminder that terrorism remains a contentious and politically laden topic of 
discussion. Iran –while emphasising the global threat posed by terrorism – emphasised 
that a “longstanding issue to examine [in respect to terrorism] is the endemic and age-
old problem of foreign invasion and occupation and what it has brought in its wake. 
The seventy-year state of occupation of Palestine is the most pressing” (Iran: 2018, 2). 
In 2018 the OIC Group, represented by Saudi Arabia, also reiterated its position that 
 
120 The OIC Group continued to make such references at subsequent session. For example, Saudi Arabia, on 
behalf of the Group, reiterated that a comprehensive approach much tackle the root causes of which foreign 
occupation remains an important part (Saudi Arabia on behalf of the OIC: 2017, 1).  
121 India continued to highlight the state-supported terrorism, although it has been reluctant to formally name 
Pakistan.  
122 In August of 2019, the Security Council discussed the conflict over Kashmir, with particular emphasis on 
India’s recent move to revoke the special constitutional status of Kashmir, placing the region under the direct 
rule of India. It is thus against this backdrop that one must understand the discussions in the Sixth Committee 
and the resolutions adopted therein.  
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there needs to be a distinction between terrorism and the right of people to resist 
foreign occupation, a distinction which “is duly observed in International Law…and 
the General Assembly resolution 46/51 which also endorses this position” (Saudi 
Arabia on behalf of the OIC: 2018, 2). 123  This position is not shared by Western 
countries, who have been consistent in their condemnation of “terrorism in all its 
forms and manifestations and believes that those responsible for terrorist acts must be 
held accountable” (EU: 2018, 2).  
The discussions in the Sixth Committee affirm the continued disagreement among 
member states on the subject of terrorism. The developments in the committee are 
important as they facilitate our understanding of why UNGA resolutions are drafted 
in the manner that they are. Labelling an incident as terrorism not only has moral 
ramifications but in many countries also carries legal repercussions. If nothing else, 
the absence of a definition on terrorism can serve as a ploy for governments to 
prosecute political opponents and can likewise assist in legitimising political violence 
if it serves in the (foreign policy) interest of governments.124 A too-narrow definition 
will risk undermining the right of minorities while a too-broad conceptualisation will 
run the risk of letting terrorist organisations get away with violence. As Coffin noted 
in 2014, [t]hus far international law has been woefully inadequate in separating the 
legally acceptable forms of resistance – national liberation movements or NLM – from 
legally unacceptable forms of resistance terrorism” (Coffin: 2014, 32). Since the very 
inception of the debate, the distinction between these two concepts is finite and 
remains unresolved, a fact that is well-reflected in the discussions on terrorism at the 
United Nations. This holds true today as it did in 1973 and certainly also during the 
multilateral efforts against anarchism in the 19th century and in the 1930s within the 
League of Nations.  
Since 9/11 the General Assembly has continued to treat terrorism as a crime, urging 
governments to suppress the threat through criminal justice methods (e.g. policing) 
and not through armed force. The UN wants to fight terrorism with norms, not with 
arms. Over the course of the past 18 years the Assembly has indeed continued to set 
norms that do not involve the use of armed force in response to terrorism. The 
resolutions have also revealed that the General Assembly has developed new practises, 
including provisions that urge greater adherence to bringing terrorists to justice and 
levying appropriate penalties. Although the General Assembly has made attempts at 
 
123 This position is also taken by the members of the NAM in 2018. See papersmart from the 73rd session of the 
UNGA for a detailed account. Algeria likewise urged member states to “avoid any confusion between acts of 
terrorism and the legitimate struggle of peoples under colonial or foreign occupation for self-determination 
and national liberation” (Algeria (Ambassador Sabri Boukadoum: 2018, 3).  
124 See Oeter’s “Terrorism and “Wars of National Liberation” from a Law of War Perspective” and Cofin’s “Self-
Determination and Terrorism: Creating a New Paradigm of Differentiation” for a more thorough account. Also, 
the analysis of Sarvananthan in “’Terrorism’ or ‘Liberation’? Towards a distinction: A Case study of the Armed 
Struggle of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LLTE) and Saini’s “Self-Determination, Terrorism and 
Kashmir” for descriptive case studies. History has demonstrated that the principle of self-determination has 
played a considerable role in the decolonization and independence of many countries following the Second 
World War. Indeed, the principles found their place in UNGA res. 1514 & 1541, yet there remains no agreement 
on when such violence, if at all, is warranted and what entity decides when it is acceptable.  
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trying to bring clarity to where it stands on the use of politically motivated violence, 
the confusion remains. It is also possible to conclude that since 1999, the General 
Assembly, and in extension its member states, have not yet agreed to condemn 
political violence in all circumstances and there is thus no common understanding of 
what constitutes terrorism, which is not a new development at the United Nations in 
respect to terrorism. This has been best evidenced by the continued reference to the 
outcome document of conference of the NAM and the discussions and statements 
made in the Sixth Committee. It hence seems that the UNGA can only deal with 
terrorism by side-stepping the contentious details, resulting in vague commitments.  
 
Comprehensive Convention: Chasing a 50-year-long ghost  
The Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism was intended to complement the UN’s 
existing sectoral convention regime and although there was a general sense of urgency 
that a comprehensive response to terrorism would be useful, not all countries favoured 
this approach. As Diaz-Paniagua reflects in his assessment of the negotiating dynamics, 
it had already become clear by the end of the 1990s that countries were sceptical of 
where the process would lead. As a matter of record, developing countries favoured a 
comprehensive approach with the objective of distinguishing terrorism from the 
legitimate exercise of the right to self-determination (Diaz-Paniagua: 2008, 516). In 
contrast, for many countries from continental and Northern Europe the prospects of 
such a convention remained a distant thought. Norway and Sweden, for instance, 
expressed a desire to focus on a sectoral approach as they “feared that negotiating a 
comprehensive convention would be extremely difficult” (Ibid: 2008, 518). The 
European Union was only reluctant to agree to negotiations, even as late as 1999. It 
would only agree “under the condition that it would not contain any exceptions or 
justification based on the motives that promoted the recourse to violence” (Ibid: 2008, 
521). At the 35th meeting of the Sixth Committee in 1999, the American delegate made 
a similar argument, cautioning against the inevitable failure that the negotiations are 
likely to bring. Specifically, Rosenstock argued “that the Sixth Committee had focused 
on drafting international instruments to combat specific manifestations of terrorism 
it was therefore not necessary to produce a definition of that phenomenon which 
would, moreover, be extremely difficult to achieve in view of the differences in opinion 
in that regard” (USA in A.6/54/SR.35: 1999, 3). Despite considerable objections from a 
number of delegations, particularly from the developed world, the UNGA finally 
commenced negotiations on a comprehensive agreement in September 2000. The 
basis of the negotiations was the Indian draft introduced earlier and followed the 
pattern established by the Terrorist Bombing and Terrorist Financing conventions.  
 
If adopted, a Comprehensive Convention has the opportunity to close existing gaps as 
it would criminalise all forms of terrorism and would provide the international 
community with the ability to respond to evolving threats without adopting a sectoral 
convention as new threats emerge. Also, such a convention would dissipate the 
political power of the Assembly as well as generate a legitimate counter-weight to the 
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work of the Security Council. Indeed, it was due to the UNGA’s long-standing inability 
to adopt such a comprehensive convention that prompted the Security Council to 
side-step the traditional law-making process in the General Assembly and to take 
action in the form of resolution 1373 (Diaz-Paniagua: 2008, 537). The activism of the 
Security Council after 2001, starting with the adoption of resolution 1373 (see below), 
placed considerable pressure on the Assembly to take meaningful action. Conversely, 
the Comprehensive Convention would create a “counter-balance to the Council’s 
action” (Hmoud: 2006, 1035). The General Assembly saw it “risked becoming utterly 
irrelevant if it did not produce results quickly” (Stiles: 2006, 49).  
Following the attacks on September 11th, the so-called ‘friends of the Chairman’ 
prepared the text of articles 3-17 and 19-23 based on the already submitted draft. 
However, as Hafner recalls, the text could not be agreed as the definition of scope and 
the other aforementioned obstacles remained unsolved (Hafner: 2003, 156). Although 
there is a general consensus that a comprehensive agreement is necessary, countries 
have fallen short of submitting a draft text to the General Assembly for adoption. The 
drafting process has been a tedious, time-consuming, and certainly for many countries 
frustrating endeavour. It would thus be a redundant exercise to trace, in detail, the 
trajectory of the organisation’s drafting process. This is also not entirely necessary 
considering that the consultations have developed into “mere formalities and 
delegations kept repeating their positions” (Hmoud: 2006, 1041). 125  Indeed, as the 
review below will make evident, member states have stood firm in their positions over 
the past 18 years (even longer) and have only made minor concessions. The subsequent 
section intends to emphasise that notwithstanding considerable agreement on the 
bulk of the draft text, the main issues of concerns remain unresolved to this day.  
Some of the challenges faced by the organisation are technical or legal in nature and 
others are purely political. The main difficulties faced by the Ad Hoc Committee and 
the corresponding Working Group of the Sixth Committee, to varying degrees, are the 
definition of the crime, the scope of the convention (e.g. exclusion of self-
determination movements), and whether the convention should apply to state 
terrorism. 126  A further point of contention is the relationship between the 
comprehensive agreement and sectoral conventions; in essence, which convention 
would apply if the offence is covered by both the new convention and by a previously 
adopted one. While this is certainly a legal dilemma, it is political at its very core. 
Earlier conventions contained political offence exceptions (e.g. Tokyo Convention Art. 
 
125 Such an exercise is also not necessary considering that a detail account has been provided elsewhere. See 
Hmoud’s “Negotiating the Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism” and Hafner’s 
“Certain Issues of the Work of the Sixth Committee at the Fifty-Sixth General Assembly” for a more detailed 
reading.  
126 See above for literature on this specific problem. Due to space restrains it can only be considered in passing. 
Suffice it to say, a number of countries (mostly members of the OIC) insisted on including a country’s armed 
force within the scope of the Convention. This was target against countries like Israel and the United States 
whose military had been accused of terrorism. For example, Syria argued “Foreign occupation is indeed one of 
the most appalling forms of terrorism”, whereas Yemen urged countries to consider state terrorism “which is 
practise by Israel against the Palestinians” (Diaz-Paniagua: 2008, 582). See also the section above on the 
resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on similar argumentation in respect to the India-Pakistan 
conflict.  
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2), whereas the more recent Bombing Convention Article 11, for example, excluded 
such omissions. Similarly, the Hostages Convention Article 12 excluded self-
determination movements from the scope of the agreement, whereas the Financing 
Convention made no such reference and is understood to include such movements 
under its scope (see chapter five). Irrespective of the legal discussion on this sujet it is 
the political and interlinked nature of the debate that remains a central point of 
concern.127 Again, countries can be divided into two competing camps: Those that 
want to secure what had already been agreed in earlier conventions and those “who 
want to gain more than they have got[ten] from the sectoral conventions” (Hmoud: 
2006, 1034).  
Compounding the circumstances further was the nature of the work of the General 
Assembly. In particular, the unspoken custom of seeking a consensus significantly 
complicated matters. Granted, a consensus would reduce the risk of non-
implementation, considering the lack of enforcement and operative powers of the 
Assembly; however, the task of finding a consensus on the outstanding controversies 
continues to present a burden too far to overcome. Moreover, US representatives are 
concerned that breaking from the norm of consensus would create an unwelcome 
precedent for other countries. The rule of consensus, in other words, “is as much a 
truce between rivals as an agreement to cooperate” (Stiles: 2006, 50). It is thus against 
this backdrop that governments, as recent as the 73rd session of the UNGA, set out to 
negotiate the terms of a comprehensive package against terrorism. The patterns of 
work of the United Nations on the convention have been annual Ad Hoc Committee 
meetings held for an extended period of time (one or two weeks), and efforts have 
been complemented by a working group of the Sixth Committee. The Ad Hoc 
Committee however did not meet in 2012, 2014, 2015, 2016,128 and 2017 and there is 
currently no scheduled meeting. The intersessional work is to continue within the 
more informal setting of the Working Group of the Sixth Committee, likely until an 
agreement is attained. Despite a heightened sense of urgency to complete a 
convention-text immediately following 9/11, the reality of the matter remains that 
country positions became even more entrenched. Indeed, the questions of state 
terrorism and self-determination thus produce ongoing controversy (e.g. see UN Doc. 
A/56/PV.19: 2001, 6).  
On the definition of terrorism, the now all too familiar cleavages emerged again. While 
Islamic countries insisted on the need for a definition of the phenomenon western 
countries continued to recommend the use of an operational and technical 
enumeration of the offence. The most pertinent challenge faced by member states was 
however the matter of scope (Galicki: 2005, 747) and hence the matter of freedom 
fighters remain a contested issue. Irrespective of where the discussion on scope will 
lead to, Hafner underscores the impact the outcome could have. It is not a question of 
 
127 This specific issue cannot be considered in detail due to space restrains. Hafner’s “Certain Issues of the Work 
of the Sixth Committee at the Fifty-Sixth General Assembly”, pages 159-161 provides a more thorough reading.  
128 A description of the current mandate for the adoption of a comprehensive convention is available at: 
http://legal.un.org/committees/terrorism/ 
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when states have an obligation to prosecute acts under their territorial jurisdiction, 
but rather “how far states may serve as a safe havens or shelters for activities that were 
committed in other states and considered by the latter to be terrorist acts” (Hafner: 
2003, 158). Although a number of proposals were made, such as India’s proposal to 
include a preambular reference to the principle of self-determination (see for e.g. UN 
Doc. A/59/894: 2005, 6), a solution continues to remain absent. Indeed, while the 
proposal was not entirely rejected by OIC members, it was insisted that such a 
reference should be included in the operative portion of the text, as it had no legal 
effect in the preamble (Hmoud: 2006, 1041). Delegations from the West likewise 
opposed the text as it gave the impression that the right to struggle for self-
determination justifies acts of violence, even if included in the preambular. The United 
States in particular showed itself adverse to a similar approach taken in the Hostages 
Convention (see chapter three) considering that the “formulation of the Hostages 
Convention…was based on the first 1977 Protocol to the Geneva Convention, which it 
had rejected” (Dian-Paniagua: 2008, 586).  
In the years that followed, the Ad Hoc Committee established in 1996 and the Working 
Group of the Sixth Committee met without any real progress.129 During this time, the 
main issues of concern remained the well-known problems of those of self-
determination and the exception for armed resistance. As negotiations continued in 
2003 and 2004, countries’ positions remained unchanged and no real progress could 
be made.130 In 2005, however, the General Assembly found new momentum in light of 
the adoption of UNSC resolution 1566 (discussed further below) and the Report of the 
United Nations High-level panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. UNSC resolution 
1566 introduced a working ‘definition’ of terrorism by recalling the main 
characteristics of this criminal act, including “the intent to cause death or serious 
bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the 
general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population 
or compel a government or an international organisation to do or to abstain from 
doing any act…” (UNSC resolution 1566: 2004, op. para. 3). Although this was not an 
explicit definition, as was foreseen in the Comprehensive Convention, the Security 
Council’s adoption of such a working definition put the General Assembly under 
pressure. Switzerland, although welcoming the Council’s efforts, noted, “…when 
taking long-term legislative measures that affected the entire international 
community, all States must have an opportunity to participate in the drafting of such 
measures” (Quoted in Diaz-Paniagua: 2008, 633). Of greater concern to member states 
was however the report published by the Panel on Threats and Challenges. The report, 
inter alia, concluded that terrorism is never an acceptable tactic, no matter the cause, 
and that a lack of definition has considerably restricted the effectiveness of the 
organisation (Comras: 2011, 194). More importantly, the report found that “the legal 
and normative framework against State violations is far stronger than in the case of 
non-State actors and we do not find this objection to be compelling” (Report UN Doc. 
 
129 See the list of reports of the Ad Hoc Committee and special committees (Working Group) for detailed 
reading: http://legal.un.org/committees/terrorism/reports.shtml 
130 This is well indicated in the Ad Hoc Committee Reports UN Doc. A/58/37 and A/59/37  
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A/59/565: 2004, para. 160). The panel further curtailed the arguments put forward by 
the OIC so far by remarking, “…there is nothing [emphasis added] in the fact of 
occupation that justifies the targeting and killing of civilians” (Ibid: 2004, para. 160). 
The Non-Aligned Movement and the African Group were sceptical of the findings. 
While the former dismissed the findings “as flawed, incomplete, technically 
inaccurate,” the latter noted that the “legal definition of terrorism should be the 
subject of a treaty concluded by the General Assembly and it is not a matter to be 
determined and imposed by other organs of the UN” (Quoted in Diaz-Paniagua: 2008, 
638). Therefore, despite the formal commitments made to negotiate, the underlying 
positions remained the same. The consultations have however continued in the 
Working Group of the Sixth Committee,131 despite little progress being made.132 Ten 
years after 9/11, “several delegations reiterated that the convention should contain a 
definition of terrorism that would provide a clear distinction between acts of terrorism 
covered by the convention and the legitimate struggle of peoples in the exercise of 
their right to self-determination or under foreign occupation” (UN Doc. A/66/37: 2011, 
7).133 The most recently available report, from the 72nd session (2017) of the UNGA, 
moreover supports the conclusion that any real progress continues to elude the 
organisation. In fact, the “coordinator had observed that it would not be useful in the 
current negotiations to reopen for definition terms such as “armed forces”, as used in 
the draft comprehensive convention…” (UN Doc. A/C.6/72/SR.28: 2017, 4).  
The Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism is perhaps the most difficult 
counterterrorism endeavour the United Nations has attempted to undertake. The 
discussion above has made it painstakingly apparent that even 18 years after 9/11, 
member states remain unable to overcome the problem of definition and convention-
scope. The cleavages that have prevented agreement over the past 23 years (or 46 if 
one were to consider early efforts in 1973) have remained unaltered at their core. The 
arguments and statements put forward by member states have stayed remarkably 
similar, if not identical. The 74th session of the General Assembly opened on 17th 
September 2019 and terrorism was yet again on the agenda of the United Nations (see 
111. Measures to eliminate international terrorism). With the lasting difficulties in the 
Working Group it is however rather unlikely that an agreement will be reached. On 
the contrary, considering the current developments in the Indian-Pakistani skirmish 
(Biswas: 2019) as well as in the Israel-Palestine conflict (Freedland: 2019), it will 
certainly remain difficult to find solutions to the outstanding issues, not the least due 
to the fact that these issues are tied to the aforementioned conflicts. To conclude, it is 
probable that the United Nations will continue to chase the ghost of a comprehensive 
convention in the years to come, or negotiating parties will water down the 
convention-text in a manner that will render the convention meaningless.  
 
131 A full list of reports is available at: http://legal.un.org/committees/terrorism/reports.shtml# 
132 Over the course of the past 12 odd years there have been a number of amendments made. For example, in 
2007 the Bureau prepared a compromise to the preambular text, articles 1,2 and 4 to 27 of the draft 
comprehensive convention. See UN Doc. A/68/37. Nevertheless, these proposals have been unable to bridge 
the divide and have left the question of the right to self-determination and the exception of armed forces 
unresolved.  
133 Similar arguments were made in 2014. See UN Doc. A/C.6/69/SR.28: 2014 for a more detailed overview.  
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The Security Council post 9/11 
A vast majority of the United Nations’ most consequential counterterrorism output 
originates in the Security Council, not the least due to its broad authority under Article 
39 and its ability restore international peace and security through both non-violent 
means (Article 41) and the use of force (Article 42). For close to five decades, the 
Security Council remained a rather unambitious actor – albeit involuntary- in the 
United Nation’s attempt to counter terrorist activities. This, as discussed at great 
length throughout this thesis, was a result of geopolitics (e.g. the Cold War), leading 
to stalemates, and its members’ engagement, among other reasons, in proxy warfare 
across the Middle East. Luck concludes the challenges faced by the Council by 
highlighting that “[t]he divisive politics of the Middle East cast a shadow over the 
Council’s infrequent attempts to address terrorism. Throughout the Cold War years, 
the Council seemed more concerned about the alleged excesses of Israeli and 
American counter-terrorism measures than about the terrorist acts that preceded 
them” (Luck: 2006b, 95).  
The Council’s record on terrorism remained rather lacklustre in the 1980s. In reaction 
to the Achille Lauro incident the Council deplored the death of the passenger and 
condemned terrorism “in all its forms, wherever and by whomever committed” (UN 
Doc. S/17554: 1985). Yet a resolution on the subject was never adopted. By way of UNSC 
resolution 579, the Security Council however agreed on a general condemnation of 
hostage-taking and abduction (operative para. 1) and confirmed a state’s obligation to 
secure the safe release of the hostages (operative para. 3) and accede to existing 
international instruments (operative para. 4), and in the preambular expressed its 
concern over the recent and enduring hostage-takings across the globe. It is important 
to recall that although resolution 579 condemns hostage-taking in more general terms, 
it was adopted only one month after the Abu Nidal group abducted EgyptAir Flight 
648 en route from Athens to Cairo, thus arguably providing the impetus for the 
adoption of the resolution. Towards the end of the 1980s the Council again reacted to 
terrorism through a problem-specific lens. In light of the murder of an American 
citizen participating in peacekeeping efforts in Lebanon by Hezbollah, the Council 
adopted resolution 618 in 1988. The Council condemned the abduction of Lieutenant-
Colonel Higgins and demanded his immediate release (UNSC res. 618, operative para. 
1 & 2). Furthermore, in reaction to the destruction of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie 
in 1988 the Council adopted resolution 635 in which it not only condemned violent 
acts against civil aviation (operative para. 1) but more so urged states to take steps 
towards preventing the use of explosives as a weapon of terrorism (operative para. 2). 
It is important to highlight that the Council merely demonstrated its consciousness of 
terrorism for international security, yet it was not determined in asserting that 
terrorism is a threat to international peace and security. This is indeed significant 
considering that before the Security Council can adopt enforcement measures it must 
first establish the existence of a threat to peace and security (see UNC Ch.VII). In July 
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1989 the Council once more condemned the acts of hostage-takings and abductions 
and called on states to use their influence to secure the safe release of the hostages 
(UNSC res. 638, para. 2 and operative para. 3). Before the turn of the new century, 
members of the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1269, in which it 
confirmed its stern condemnation of international terrorism (operative para. 1)134 in 
broad terms, irrespective of motive (!). This was indeed remarkable as it was unusual 
for the Council to approach terrorism in such a general manner.  
Since the 1990s, the Council had specifically focused on terrorism on a case-by-case 
basis, yet the body was reluctant to explicitly label such incidents as a threat to 
international peace and security. Granted, the Council came close with resolution 635 
when it expressed its consciousness “of the implications of acts of terrorism for 
international security,” yet the Council did not consider the terrorist act per se as such 
a threat but rather the conduct of states in connection with the attack (e.g. failure to 
extradite suspects) (Santori: 2006, 90). In this context it is thus worth nothing that 
“the Council classified terrorist acts as a threat to the peace only when such acts were 
attributable to a ‘State’ either for omissions (failed prevention or repression), or for 
individuals or groups’ conducts that were directly attributable to that ‘State’ as they 
originated from its apparatus” (Ibid: 2006, 91). In the 1990s sanctions were the initial 
instruments used to respond to terrorism. The sanctions imposed against Libya, the 
Sudan, and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (and later on Bin Laden and his 
associates) served not only to reach the specific objective at hand (e.g. handing over 
terrorists for trial) but moreover sent a clear signal delegitimising a state’s support for 
terrorism. While the sanctions imposed on Libya and Sudan were somewhat 
successful, the sanctions against the Taliban regime and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan 
missed their mark. This outcome was largely owed to the fact that both the Taliban 
and al-Qaeda operated outside the norms of the international system and were able to 
reap considerable funds through illicit drug trade across the globe, an 
acknowledgement that would greatly influence member states’ post-9/11 thinking. 
Concludingly, one must appreciate that the Security Council was moving towards 
associating terrorism with a threat to international peace and security (see resolution 
1269). It was however not willing to constitute the terrorist act itself as a threat but 
rather the failed response by states, thus falling short of adopting enforcement 
measures (see UNC Art. 41 & 42). Hence, the Security Council has dealt with terrorism 
on a country basis, yet, “[i]n moving to deal with terrorism as a general phenomenon 
the Council begins [already in 1999] to parallel, if not overstep, the General Assembly’s 
role” (Boulden: 2008, 611).  
After almost two decades elapsed since 9/11, the persuasive engagement by the Council 
across the terrorism issue has allowed it to become the locus of action of the United 
 
134 In this context however it is important to take note that the familiar issues surrounding the definition of 
terrorism remained a concern. For example, at its 4053rd meeting, the Council heard from then two rotating 
members (Malaysia and Bahrain) in which they recalled the right to self-determination. Malaysia reminded 
governments that terrorism “must be differentiated from the legitimated struggle of peoples under colonial or 
alien domination and foreign occupation for self-determination and national liberation” (Malaysia in UN Doc. 
S/PV. 4053, 10). Bahrain made similar remarks (See pages 12 &. 13 UN Doc. S/PV.4053).  
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Nations’ counterterrorism endeavours. It is then rather evident that the Council has 
been the subject of extensive scholarly discussion. In consideration of this wealth of 
academic and practitioner-based interest it would be illusionary to attempt to provide 
an all-encompassing account of the Council’s response to terrorism post-9/11. 
Consequently, the ensuing section will set out to provide a more general overview of 
the body’s response to terrorism and will place specific focus on the major changes 
vis-à-vis pre-9/11. Some of the actions taken by the Council after 2001 build on 
previously adopted initiatives taken in both the General Assembly and in the Security 
Council, while others are considerable innovations and represent noteworthy 
novelties. Setting out from this observation, the remainder of this chapter will focus 
on the resolutions adopted by the Council under the rubric “threats to international 
peace and security caused by terrorist acts,” the sanctions-regime imposed on al-
Qaeda and later against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Da’esh), and 
the legitimisation of the use of force as a counterterrorism instrument. Specifically, 
attention will be drawn to the general and generic nature of UNSC resolutions post-
9/11, although not all provisions and concepts are entirely novel, as well as the 
continued practise of condemning specific terrorist incidents, or at least more 
frequently than the General Assembly has done. This is an important acknowledgment 
from the outset as it demonstrates the Security Council’s ability to respond to 
emerging threats. The ensuing paragraphs will moreover emphasise how the UN 
sanction regime against non-state actors (al-Qaeda and its associates) has evolved so 
as to place a more prominent focus on individuals since its inception with resolution 
1267 in 1999. This focus on non-state actors extends the reach of the sanction regimes 
to become truly global and brings with it a more complex enforcement and 
administrative structure. Finally, attention will also be placed on how the use of the 
right to self-defence pursuant to Article 51 of the UNC has become an accepted tool to 
fight terrorism, or at least far less contested. The chapter will close by discussing the 
ways in which the Council’s post-9/11 response is innovative and in what way these 
represent the well-established pattern and trends established in previous United 
Nations action.  
 
The Security Council’s layer of resolutions 
The Security Council’s immediate response to the attacks on September 11th came in 
the form of UNSC resolutions 1368 and 1373, both of which were adopted unanimously. 
It was the latter resolution that would chart the way forward for the organisation’s 
fight against terrorism. Indeed, there remains little disagreement that resolution 1373 
was the Council’s most innovative response to 9/11, imposing legally-binding 
obligations on all states as well as establishing an institutional sub-structure – the 
counter-terrorism committee (CTC) – to facilitate member state implementation. In 
an initial response however, the Council adopted resolution 1368 and called on all 
states to collaborate their efforts in bringing those responsible for the attacks to justice 
and to increase international cooperation (Rostow: 2002, 481). Yet, resolution 1368 
likewise broke new ground inasmuch by, for the first time, “[r]ecognising the inherent 
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right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter” (UNSC 
1368: 2001, para. 3) in response to a terrorist attack. The use of force as a legitimate 
instrument to counter terrorist activity will be discussed in greater detail below; 
however, suffice it to say here, it is generally accepted that it was resolution 1368, and 
its wording along the lines of Article 51 of the UNC, which “provided a blanket 
authorisation for such a response [use of force] against those who sheltered Osama 
bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda operatives” (Luck: 2006a, 342). More so, despite 1368 
having been adopted one day after 9/11, the instrument foreshadowed the Council’s 
more assertive approach to terrorism 2001 onwards.  
 
The maintenance of peace and security has been the essence for why the United 
Nations was established in 1945. What the UN however determines to be a threat to 
international peace and security has evolved over time and has developed in directions 
only few could have predicted (Mingst et al.: 2017, 115). With resolutions 1368 and 1373 
(and in many others thereon) the Council established that acts of international 
terrorism constituted a threat to international peace and security (Bianchi: 2007, 890). 
The Council grew increasingly comfortable with determining that the terrorist acts per 
se were a threat to global peace and security. Operative paragraph 1 of resolution 1368 
goes a step further in recognizing that the classification of a “threat to international 
peace and security” extends beyond the immediacy of 9/11, noting that the Council 
“regards such acts, like any act of international terrorism, as a threat to international 
peace and security” (UNSC res. 1368, 2001, operative para. 1). This was indeed novel as 
it was not the conduct of the state in response to the terrorist attack (e.g. refusing to 
extradite suspects) that constituted this threat but rather the terrorist act itself. This 
phrasing signalled that the Council was willing to respond to 9/11 using its powers 
established under Article 39 (and those after) and that it would enact measures that 
were aimed beyond the microcosm of 9/11, addressing the threat posed by terrorism in 
more general terms.135  
Shortly after the adoption of 1368, the Council once again voted unanimously to adopt 
resolution 1373 on September 28th in what would become the organisation’s 
cornerstone instrument against terrorism. From its experiences with terrorism in the 
1990s, the Council understood the importance of having all UN member states become 
part of a global effort to thwart terrorism (Messmer & Yordan: 2010, 175). The 
provisions entailed in resolution 1373 have been discussed at great length elsewhere,136 
and so these are only discussed to the extent that they are relevant to the findings of 
this study. Resolution 1373 is the most comprehensive, far-reaching and certainly most 
intrusive resolution adopted by the Security Council in the aftermath of 9/11. Indeed, 
the Security Council circumvented the traditional treaty-making process and imposed 
legally-binding obligations on all states (Rostow: 2002, 482). In turn, it “goes beyond 
the existing counter-terrorism treaties, which bind only those who have voluntarily 
 
135 This approach was not limited to resolutions 1368 and 1373 but was mimicked in resolutions 1438, 1440 and 
1450, each responding to a specific act of terrorism yet classified the threat in more general terms.  
136 See Sossai’s “UN SC Res. 1373 (2001) and International Law-making: A Transformation in the Nature of the 
Legal Obligations for the Fight against Terrorism? and Okeke’s “The United Nations Security Council 
resolution 1373: An appraisal of lawfare in the fight against terrorism”  
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become parties to them by creating uniform global obligations” (Rosand: 2007, 409). 
Resolution 1373, unlike the sanctions-regime adopted in 1999 and amended in 2002 
(and 2011 and 2015), does not target individual terrorists but rather remains state-
catered (Rosand: 2003, 334). Acting under Chapter VII of the charter, member states 
were tasked with the obligation to “(a) prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist 
acts; [and with] (b) criminalising the wilful provision or collection, by any means….of 
funds…with the intention that the funds should be used, or in knowledge that they are 
to be used, in order to carry our terrorist acts” (UNSC res. 1373: 2001, operative para. 1 
(a) & (b)). Additionally, governments were to freeze the assets of individuals who 
commit or attempt to commit terrorist acts (operative para. 1 (c)), as well as refrain 
from supporting any entities involved in terrorist acts (operative para. 2 (a)) and to 
deny safe havens to terrorists (Ibid. 2 (c)). It is important to understand that the 
resolution did not include a definition of terrorist acts, granting member states the 
prerogative to define in their respective national legislation.  
 
Drawing on the importance of bringing terrorists to justice, a principle enshrined into 
numerous sectoral conventions adopted by the General Assembly, governments were 
moreover to “[e]nsure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, 
preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought 
to justice and ensure that, in addition to any other measures against them, such 
terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and 
regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such terrorist 
acts” (Ibid: 2001, operative para. 2 (e)). Significantly, it was decided that governments 
undertake efforts to establish effective border controls (operative para. 2 (g)), share 
information (operative para. 3 (a)) and to become parties to the then 12 existing 
international conventions (the Nuclear Terrorism Convention was not adopted until 
2005) and protocols (operative para. 3 (d)). Equally important, the Council decided to 
establish a committee – later referred to as the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) 
– to monitor the implementation of 1373, a practise that the Council usually only 
undertook in respect to the imposition of sanctions (Rostow: 2002, 482). Absent of any 
further instructions, it was left to the CTC and its 15 members to carve out its modus 
operandi and scope of work (Ibid: 2001, operative para. 7). In this respect, the Council 
has chosen not to confine itself to responding to 9/11 but has decided to place 
obligations on countries that reach beyond an immediate response. In fact, the general 
character of resolution 1373 “has caused many to characterise it as a form of ‘legislation’ 
on the part of the SC” (Bianchi: 2007, 883). By ceasing to draft a definition of ‘terrorism’ 
the Council shied away from addressing this bone of contention and has essentially 
left it to member states to do so in their domestic legislation. Member states “were left 
free to decide for themselves which groups should be called terrorists, and which were 
to be hailed as “freedom fighters.” Saudi Arabi used this distinction, for example, to 
justify its continuing funding of Hamas, while Iran and Syria used it to provide funds 
and support to Hezbollah” (Comras: 2010, 83). 
  
The lack of a globally accepted definition is not only a normative and moral dilemma 
but moreover bears great risks to human rights. The Council’s failure to provide a 
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definition was certainly no coincidence. With the experiences made in the General 
Assembly on this subject, it was perhaps this ambiguity that allowed the Council to 
adopt swift and far-reaching action against terrorism in the immediate aftermath of 
September 11th. However, this strategic ambiguity also begs the question of what help 
resolution 1373 has been in quelling terrorist violence. Arguably, it gave states a good 
basis for repressive action against political opponents and terrorists alike.  
 
One must however be cautious of overstating the unprecedented nature of resolution 
1373 (and subsequent resolutions as well). As Romaniuk notes in his 2016 assessment, 
“the operational paragraphs of 1373 give strong emphasis to measures against terrorist 
financing, reflecting the [then] recently concluded Terrorist Financing Convention” 
(Romaniuk: 2016, 284). In particular, Article 2(1) asserts that any person who “directly 
or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that 
they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in 
order to carry out: (b) Any other act intended to cause death or seriously bodily injury 
to a civilian… when the purpose of such an act…is to intimidate a population, or to 
compel a government or an international organisation to do or to abstain from doing 
any act” (Terrorist Financing Convention: 1999, Art. 2(1)(b)). Mirroring much of the 
language, resolution 1373 sets out to “[c]riminalise the wilful provision or collection, 
by any means, directly or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories 
with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to 
be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts” (UNSC res. 1373, operative para. 1(b)). On 
a more general note, one can conclude that both the convention and the resolution 
criminalise the support for terrorism, intend for the prosecution of terrorists and 
address the matter of international cooperation (e.g. in sharing evidence in the course 
of criminal investigations) (Collier: 2003, 724). Making the provisions of the 
convention binding in 1373 obliged member states to include measures in their 
domestic legislation that had not yet entered into force, evidently circumventing 
traditional treaty-making processes. As described at great length in previous chapters, 
counterterrorism treaty-making has been a cumbersome process, and ratification has 
certainly also taken its time. Therefore, circumventing this process allows for the 
adoption of far-reaching measures without lengthy debate and member states are 
required to implement these provisions without relying on a delay in the course of 
drawing the process in the course of ratification.  
The Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) established by the Council in resolution 
1373 has evolved into a core element in the United Nations’ counterterrorism 
architecture. Over the years, it has been amended and its mandate broadened. In many 
ways, the CTC placed pressure on “States and organisations to pay more attention to 
combating terrorism, whether through the adoption of new or the improvement of 
existing legislation, the ratification of treaties, or the development and 
implementation of action plans” (Rosand: 2006, 82). Moreover, the committee has 
functioned as a capacity-building instrument, bringing countries together to exchange 
knowledge and best-practise, as well as facilitating member state implementation of 
the resolution’s provisions (Ibid: 2006, 82). Composed of all 15 Council members, the 
CTC takes decision by consensus, in the absence of which the matter is referred to the 
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Council (Murthy: 2007, 4). When the CTC was first established,137 it initiated a multi-
layered approach, in which the first stage was focused on the review of existing 
legislation, whereas the second and third stages focused on institutional mechanisms 
and the implementation of the resolution with the objective of bringing terrorists to 
justice (Oudraat: 2004, 162 and Rosand: 2003, 336).  
Immediately following the September 11th attacks, the CTC enjoyed wide support (Luck: 
2006a, 343). This fact is largely owed to the dramatic nature of 9/11 as well as the 
acknowledgment that the first chairman (Sir Jeremy Greendstock of the United 
Kingdom) of the CTC was a permanent member of the Council (Dhanapala: 2005, 19). 
In combination, these factors have allowed the CTC to rapidly evolve into a go-to 
platform that would, inter alia, bring countries together and facilitate between 
potential donor countries and those seeking assistance in capacity-building. This 
administrative role taken on by the CTC after 2001, and in extension by the Council, is 
important as it demonstrated the usefulness of non-military instruments in countering 
terrorism (Rosand: 2007, 410). As Luck likewise reflects in this context, “the reporting 
and monitoring process helped spur a marked acceleration in the number of states 
signing and/or ratifying the then dozen global counter-terrorism conventions” (Luck: 
2006a, 343). 138  It is also worth pointing out that the CTC has adopted a non-
confrontational management approach. To this end, the CTC has sought to convince 
states of the “usefulness of its counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation approach. 
It frequently highlighted its intention to engage states in constructive dialogue and 
socialize them into new norms and rules [and when a conflict or debate emerged] it 
was crucial not to overrule objections but rather bring up convincing arguments and 
reach a consensus” (Heupel: 2008, 17-18). 139  Although resolution 1373 gives way to 
uniform and mandatory requirements, the committee is not a sanctions committee 
and does not have a mandate to prosecute or condemn countries (Rosand: 2003, 335).  
In 2004, member states undertook an important step towards further 
institutionalising and extending the Council’s administrative response to terrorism. 
With the adoption of resolution 1535, member states created the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) with the objective of supplementing the 
work done by the CTC and to facilitate the monitoring and implementation of 
resolution 1373 (UNSC res. 1535: 2004, operative para. 2). One of the most operative 
activities of the CTED has been the practice of country-visits, 140  where specific 
emphasis was on the legislative, judicial or administrative need of the respective 
country (Luck 2006b, 106). In the time between 2005 and 2015, the CTED conducted 
 
137 See Rosand’s “Security Council Resolution 1373, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Fight against 
Terrorism” for a more thorough treatment of the CTC, its work method and the challenges it faced in its early 
years.  
138 Initially the CTC received an impressive amount of support. Yet, as time lapsed the Committee faced a 
number of difficulties. See Marschik’s Chapter 5 “The Security Council’s Role: Problems and Prospects in the 
Fight Against Terrorism” for an overview of some of the challenges faced by the CTC.  
139 See Heupel’s “Combining Hierarchical and Soft Modes of Governance” for further reading on enforcement-
based implementations strategies of the CTC and the 1540 Committee.  
140 The first round of country visits were undertaken Albania, Kenya, Morocco and Thailand. See Chapter 7 
“Terrorism and weapons of mass destruction” in Luck’s “UN Security Council: Practise and Promise” for a more 
detailed reading.  
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66 country visits, providing the Council with a unique ability to enhance member 
states’ counterterrorism capabilities, as well as strengthening technical and 
bureaucratic structures necessary for implementation (Mingst: 2017, 177).141 On a more 
institutional level, it is observed as early as 2007 that the CTED was intended to “bring 
forward ‘a more systematic’, consistent and comprehensive’ implementation of 
resolution 1373, develop further relevant best practises and strengthen the role of the 
CTC as facilitator of technical assistance” (Bianchi: 2007, 901).  
By 2004, there was also mounting concern over terrorists’ intention of acquiring 
biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons to conduct terrorist attacks. As Salama & 
Hansell conclude in 2005, “[t]here is evidence that al-Qaeda remains committed to 
acquiring CBRN agents and has actively pursued the materials required to weaponize 
such agents” (Salama & Hansell: 2005, 618). It was however not the first time that the 
United Nations addressed this particular threat, which is best illustrated by the 
General Assembly’s efforts to adopt a nuclear terrorist convention as early as 1996. This 
fear, however, re-surfaced when investigations revealed that a global network, headed 
by Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan, provided nuclear material and technology 
to rogue states, like North Korea and Libya, potentially providing such material to non-
state actors (Comras: 2010, 160). Concurrently, the Security Council adopted resolution 
1540 and again invoked its enforceable powers under Chapter VII. Similar to resolution 
1373, countries were required to adopt legislative and regulatory measures to prevent 
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and the means of delivery, from falling into the 
hands of terrorists. The resolution obliged states to adopt effective laws to prevent 
non-state actors from, inter alia, acquiring, producing, transporting chemical or 
biological weapons, or to provide any assistance to such efforts (UNSC 1540: 2002, 
operative para. 2). Analogous to the Council’s previous resolutions, 1540 again 
established a new subsidiary committee mandated with tracking member state 
progress and acting as a clearing-house for the transfer of knowledge (Boulden: 2008, 
617).142 On a more practical level, the 1540 committee was also tasked with identifying 
assistance needs and sharing information and know-how with other international 
agencies (e.g. IAEA) (Luck: 2006a, 344).  
The Council thus gradually established regulatory requirements and a corresponding 
institutional structure that laid out how countries were expected to prevent terrorists 
from acquiring WMDs. On a final note, it is also worth noting that the continuous 
‘legislative role’ adopted by the Council in the post-9/11 era has been the subject of 
considerable reservations. After the adoption of resolution 1540, for example, the 
representative from Nepal raised concern over the Council’s attempt to “establish 
 
141 Space restraints do not allow for a more detailed assessment of the work, and the successes and failures, of 
the CTC and the CTED. On a brief note, some of the challenges faced include the lack of adequate financing, 
absence of an agreed definition with which the CTC can work, the integration of human rights concerns and 
maintaining support for the committee’s work. The website of the Security Council is a worthwhile source of 
information in this regard. More so, Murthy’s 2007 published “The U.N. Counter-Terrorism Committee: An 
Institutional Analysis” is likewise a helpful guide on this topic. Rosand’s 2003 published work on the resolution 
and the CTC further outlines the challenges faced (see pages 338-341).  
142 The mandate of the 1540 committee has been amended and extended on numerous occasions, including 
UNSC resolutions 1673 (2006), 1810 (2008), 1977 (2011) and 2325 (2016).  
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something tantamount to a treaty by its fiat. This is likely to undermine the 
intergovernmental treaty-making process and implementation mechanisms” (Nepal 
in Comras: 2010, 162). The representative further cautioned that the Council should 
“resist the temptation of acting as a world legislature, a world administration and a 
world court rolled into one” (Ibid: 2010, 163).143 
A further instrument adopted by the Security Council in 2004 was resolution 1566. 
Attracting unanimous support, the resolution was sponsored by the Russian 
Federation, as well as China, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States and thus signalled support across geographic regions. The broad show of 
support by arguably the most powerful countries demonstrated that terrorism 
continues to pose a concern to countries the world over. It was also no coincidence 
that the resolution was adopted shortly after Islamic terrorists occupied the Beslan 
School in the autonomous Russian republic of the Northern Caucasus, killing over 300 
men, women, and children (Banovac & Dillon et al.: 2007). This is further evidence to 
suggest the reactive rather than pre-emptive nature of the Council’s response to 
terrorism. Unlike 1540 – likewise adopted in 2004 – 1566 adopted a more general 
response and represented the strongest condemnation made by the Council on the use 
of violence against civilians (Rosand: 2007, 414). The instrument intended to provide 
a working definition of terrorism and tasked a working group “to consider and submit 
recommendations to the Council on practical measures to be imposed upon 
individuals, groups or entities involved in or associated with terrorist activities, other 
than those designated by the Al-Qaeda and Taliban sanctions Committee, including 
more effective procedures considered to be appropriate for bringing them to justice 
through prosecution or extradition…” (UN Doc. S/2010/683: 2010, 2). The Working 
Group was also tasked with considering the possibility of establishing an international 
fund for the compensation of victims of terrorism. Differences between members of 
the 1566 Working Group have however prevented any tangible outcome. The most 
recent report published in 2010 serves as telling evidence that the Working Group has 
been unable to make concrete recommendations on how to expand the sanctions list 
beyond al-Qaeda (UN Doc. S/2010/683: 2010, 3). This shortcoming prevents the 
Council from adopting measures against individuals or groups involved in terrorist 
activities that are not already part of the al-Qaeda and Taliban sanctions.144 
 
143 This sentiment was shared by a number of other countries (e.g. Egypt and South Africa). See Comras’ 
“Flawed Diplomacy” pages. 162-164 for a more detailed reading.  
144 In response to the attacks on London’s public transportation, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 
1624, although the Council did not act under Chapter VII. The most novel addition to the Council’s regulatory 
framework was that states were to “(a) prohibit by law incitement to commit a terrorist act or acts…[and to] 
(c) [d]eny safe havens to any persons with respect to whom there is credible and relevant information giving 
serious reason for considering that they have been guilty of such conduct” (UNSC res. 1624: 2005, operative 
para. 1(a) & (b)). Space restraints prevent any further discussion at this point.  
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Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) 
It is estimated that al-Qaeda, ISIL, and “associated groups have attracted over 30,000 
FTFs from over 100 Member States” (UNSC CTC Foreign terrorist fighters: 2019). It is 
also believed that around 20,000 FTFs are still present in Iraq and Syria and as such 
many countries are concerned with the “steady trickle of returning foreign terrorist 
fighters” (CTED Factsheet: 2018, 1) returning to their countries of origin.  
 
In response to the threat posed by FTFs, the Council took an unprecedented step and 
unanimously adopted resolution 2178 in 2014, attempting to prevent travel to conflict 
zones. In the Council’s more recent efforts (2017), it was not the departing of FTFs that 
occupied countries the most but rather the returning ones. In 2017, there were “at least 
5,600 citizens or residents from 33 countries who have returned home. Added to 
unknown numbers from other countries” (Barrett: 2017, 5). Consequently, the Security 
Council adopted resolution 2396, creating greater focus on measures that address the 
returning of foreign terrorist fighters, again requiring states to strengthen border 
security and the criminal justice system. Both resolutions require states to “prevent 
the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls 
on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for 
preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers…” (UNSC 2178: 
2014, operative para. 2).  
 
More intrusively, the Council urged member states to require airlines operating in 
their respective territories to provide passenger information so that the departure (or 
entry) of an individual that fits the offence laid out in the resolution can be detected 
ahead of time (Ibid: 2014, operative para. 9). This requirement was made mandatory 
with the adoption of resolution 2396 as states were, as of 2017, obligated (and no longer 
called upon) to require airlines to provide advance passenger information (UNSC 2396: 
2017, operative para. 11). Indeed, countries were urged to strengthen not only their 
border control and information-sharing mechanisms, but the focus was likewise 
drawn on the criminal prosecution of fighters returning home. Significantly, the 
resolution called for the accountability of those who committed acts of terrorism 
(operative para. 19) and highlighted a member state’s obligation to prosecute and 
penalise individuals who have travelled abroad for terrorist purposes (operative para. 
17). Resolution 2396 (as did resolution 2178) confirmed that FTFs can be placed on the 
Sanctions List discussed at length below. Specifically, a foreign terrorist fighter can be 
placed on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaeda Sanctions List if there is sufficient evidence 
to confirm the individual’s involvement in the financing, planning, facilitation, and 
preparation of terrorist acts in connection with al-Qaeda, ISIL or any affiliate cell 
(UNSC 2396, operative para. 42). The use of sanctions against terrorists, albeit initially 
focused on states, has been a primary counterterrorism instrument drawn on by the 
Security Council. The decision to place FTFs on the Sanctions List would significantly 
broaden the Council’s non-state sanctioning practise.  
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Terrorist Financing  
In one of its more recent attempts to further develop a legally-binding regulatory 
counterterrorism framework, the Council adopted resolution 2462 on terrorist 
financing in March 2019. Again acting under Chapter VII, member states have 
endeavoured to specifically turn their focus to the financing of terrorism, placing 
legally binding obligations on all member states. At an Arria formula meeting 145 at the 
beginning of 2019, member states made note of the considerable progress that has 
been made over the past years. In particular, countries highlighted recent efforts to 
criminalise the funding of FTFs (2195- see above) or the efforts taken to curtail ISIL 
funding from the trade with cultural artefacts in resolution 2347. However, [w]hile 
some progress has been achieved…terrorist groups and individuals continuously adapt 
their methods and look for new sources of funding. With the rise of homegrown 
terrorism, we have also seen terrorist attacks committed with very limited financial 
resources” (Concept Note Arria formula Meeting: 2017, 1). In his statement to the 
Council, Financial Action Task Force (FATF) president, Marschall Billingslea, noted 
that resolution 2462 thus “includes an important focus on the adequate 
criminalisation and effective prosecution of terrorist financing” (Billingslea in 
statement to Council: 2019). Rather matter-of-factly, the president also noted that “less 
than 20 percent of countries have criminalised terrorist financing and two thirds do 
not effectively prosecute it” (Billingslea in Charity & Security Network: 2019). 
Conversely, member states were prompted to unanimously adopt resolution 2462.146 
The Council “[e]mphasize[d] its decision in resolution 1373 that all Member States 
shall criminalise the wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly or indirectly, 
of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the funds 
should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry out 
terrorist acts; and its decision in resolution 2178 that all Member States shall establish 
serious criminal offences regarding the travel, recruitment, and financing of foreign 
terrorist fighters; [and] [h]ighlight[ed] that the obligation regarding the prohibition in 
paragraph 1 (d) of resolution 1373 applies to making funds, financial assets or economic 
resources or financial or other related services available, directly or indirectly, for the 
benefit of terrorist organisations or individual terrorists for any purpose, including but 
not limited to recruitment, training, or travel, even in the absence of a link to a specific 
terrorist act [emphasis added]” UNSC res. 2462: 2019, operative para. 2 & 3). It turn, 
one can conclude, that the Security Council not only adopted to changing realities 
 
145 An opportunity for member states and other stakeholders to exchange views in a more informal manner.  
146 While space restrains do not allow for the consideration of the more general views of terrorism of the 
respective countries, it is nevertheless interesting to note that the Non-Aligned Movement has used the UNSC 
sessions to reiterate: “[e]xperience shows us that terrorist groups are fuelled by, among other things, 
hopelessness, injustice, frustration, the lack of opportunity and the denial of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in order to promote their criminal agenda based on hatred, intolerance, sectarianism and extremism. 
Poverty, social and economic inequalities; political, ethnic and religious intolerance, as well as the imposition 
of unilateral coercive measures, colonial and foreign domination and foreign occupation, as well as violations 
of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, among others factors, are also part of the fabric of so-
called determining drivers of terrorism” (UN Doc. S/PV.8496, 47).  
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(e.g. innovation in terrorist financing methods) but moreover underscored its criminal 
justice commitment by obliging member states to ensure that their national legislation 
establishes ‘terrorist financing’ as a serious crime and provides competent authorities 
with the basis to prosecute and penalise in a manner that reflects the gravity of the 
crime (Ibid: 2019, operative para. 5). In response to the changing and innovative 
methods of terrorists in the course of their funding activities, the Security Council 
moreover called on countries to “intensify and accelerate the timely exchange of 
relevant operational information and financial intelligence regarding actions or 
movements, and patters of movements of terrorists or terrorist networks, including 
Foreign Terrorist Fighters” (Ibid: 2019, operative para. 19). Significantly, member states 
are to do so by considering the “risks associated with virtual assets…new financial 
instruments, including but not limited to crowd-funding platforms” (Ibid: 2019, 
operative para. 19 (d)).  
 
UN Security Council resolutions: A new way forward or previously established 
practice? 
Since 2001, the Security Council responded to terrorism in a stern and determined 
manner. Despite drawing on pre-2001 initiatives (Rosenow: 2011, 21) these measures 
represent a deviation insofar as they address the phenomenon of terrorism in both a 
legally-binding and generic manner. The general nature of UNSC resolutions was 
however not entirely new. Already with resolution 635 (1989) and 1269 (1999) the 
Council was comfortable with condemning all acts of terrorism, irrespective of the 
impetus for the act (e.g. UNSC resolution 1269 (1999) para. 2 and operative para. 1). 
Certainly, one of the most prominent traits of the Council’s resolution-regime has 
been the generic character and the legally binding, and thus mandatory, nature of 
Council resolutions. Such assertiveness is usually reserved for international treaties, 
which are only binding on those states that sign and ratify the respective agreement. 
What has also become strikingly evident is that the Security Council has gone to great 
lengths to provide a relatively thorough description of how member states are 
expected to respond to terrorism. Although member states have continued to 
condemn specific attacks, the Council has been much more occupied with detailing 
with how states are expected to fight terrorism. Its response has thus been more 
assertive and comprehensive than in previous periods discussed, and has, although 
borrowing from other instruments, broken new ground. 
While commentators characterise the pre-9/11 period as event-driven (Kramer & Yetiv: 
2007, 420), the evidence presented above nevertheless also allows for the conclusion 
that the Security Council has continued to rely on the impetus provided by terrorist 
attacks, or the emergence of new threats (e.g. ISIL) to take action. This is certainly best 
illustrated by the adoption of resolutions 1368 and 1373 in the immediate aftermath of 
September 11th. But this trend has also continued with the adoption of resolution 1540 
in response to the revelations in connection with the A.Q. Khan network in 2004; 
resolution 1566 in response to the Beslan hostage-taking; as well as resolution 1624 
following the attacks in London in 2005. More recently, resolutions 2178 (2014) and 
2396 (2017) were adopted as a result of the emerging threat posed by foreign terrorist 
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fighters departing to conflicts and subsequently returning home. Finally, resolution 
2465 on the financing of terrorism is a further example of how the Council is reactive 
in its response to terrorism rather than pre-emptive. It is perhaps worth noting that 
while there are certainly limits to reactive law-making, the conclusion can be made 
that it also demonstrates the Council’s ability to react with relative swiftness to 
developing circumstances, although this certainly also depends on the political 
support by the permanent members of the Council.147  
It is also fair to say that the layer of UNSC resolutions have built on pre-9/11 practice 
insofar that states have been obliged to criminalise certain offences, including the 
general offence of terrorism (1373), the proliferation of nuclear weapons of non-state 
actors (1540), engaging in acts of terrorism abroad (2178), or supporting terrorism 
through funding (2462). Although the Council has called on states to bring to justice 
perpetrators who have engaged in terrorist acts before 2001 (e.g. resolution 1269 in 
1999), the body has become more assertive and comprehensive in its demands. Most 
obviously, it has made such demands legally binding under Chapter VII in respect to 
any person engaging in the “planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or 
in supporting terrorist acts” (UNSC 1373: 2001, operative para. 2(e)).  
Finally, the Security Council has established an unprecedented institutional 
architecture to administer the resolutions and to help member states fulfil their 
obligations. Putting in place institutional structures to facilitate implementation of the 
various obligations was however not entirely new. Already with the adoption of 
resolution 1267 in 1999 did the Security Council understand the need to properly 
administer its decisions. The technical and comprehensive nature of the Council’s sub-
structures is however unparalleled. The extent to which this is a novelty, and how the 
sub-structures compare to one another (e.g. CTC vs. 1267-Sanctions Committee) will 
be discussed in the concluding remarks to this chapter.  
The adoption of a number of resolutions in response to specific acts of terrorism, 
including 1438 (Bali in 2002), 1440 (Moscow in 2002), 1450 (Kenya in 2002), 1465 
(Bogota in 2002), 1515 (Istanbul in 2003), and 1611 (London in 2005) gives way to the 
conclusion that the Security Council has become more ready to condemn specific acts 
of terrorism. Before 9/11 the Council was more selective in what terrorist attacks it 
would condemn and address (Kramer & Yetiv: 2007, 420). Specifically, the Council 
referred to terrorism conducted by agents of the Libyan state (resolution 731), the 
assassination attempt against the Egyptian president in Ethiopia in 1996 (resolution 
1044) and the attacks in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 (resolution 1189). These 
resolutions are however not legally binding and remain political statements (Rosand: 
2004, 745).148  
 
147 This should not be a foregone conclusion and only applies to the cases discussed throughout this section. 
Subsequently work must assess the Council’s ability to act independently.  
148 The Council has upheld the practise of condemning specific acts of terrorism well after 2005. For example, 
in resolution 2249 adopted in 2015, the Council condemned “the horrifying terrorist attacks perpetrated by 
ISIL…which took place on 26 June 2015 in Sousse, on 10 October 2015 in Ankara, on 31 October 2015 over Sinaï, 
on 12 November 2015 in Beirut and on 13 November 2015 in Paris” (UNSC res. 2249: 2015, operative para. 1).  
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Expanding the United Nations’ sanctions-regime 
The forthcoming discussion gives way to the conclusion that the Security Council used 
powers granted under Article 39 – that is, determining a threat to international peace 
and security. Tellingly, the previous chapter has also determined that the UNSC has 
responded to such threats by imposing sanctions against Libya, the Sudan, and the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and later against bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Indeed, 
resolution 1333 (2000) obliged member states to freeze the financial assets of bin Laden 
and those associated with him as well as entities designated by the 1267 Sanctions 
Committee (UNSC res. 1333: 2000, operative para. 8(c)). Member states were also 
tasked with preventing any funds or financial resources from being made available to 
bin Laden and his associates and the Sanctions Committee was moreover mandated 
with maintaining an updated list, based on information provided by states and 
regional organisations, of the individuals and entities designated as being associated 
with Usama bin Laden, including those in the al-Qaeda organisation (UNSC res. 1333: 
2000, operative para. 8(c)). 
In 2002 the Security Council found itself frustrated by the continued threat to 
international peace and security posed by al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associates. 
Consequently, the Council adopted resolution 1390 in 2002, reinforcing its financial 
sanctions, expanding the arms embargo on the Taliban, and imposing travel 
restrictions. By enacting resolution 1390, states were required to freeze the funds and 
other financial resources of individuals placed on a regularly updated sanctions list 
(maintained by the 1267 Committee) (operative para. 2) and prevent such persons from 
entering or transiting through their respective territory (operative para. 3). Resolution 
1390 was however unique as member states “did not have [a] connection to a certain 
territory. It did not relate to a certain state or regime and had no factual or temporal 
limitation” (Birkhäuser: 2005, 5-6). Hence, “the scope of the sanctions were made 
global in their effect since they involved financial, arms, and travel embargoes on the 
Taliban, Al Qaeda and all those in association with that organisation wherever they 
may be located” [emphasis added] (Foot: 2007, 493). These provisions were indeed a 
novelty considering that the previous resolutions, particularly 1267 and 1333, were 
adopted with a specific territory in mind and they only urged states to take steps to 
“restrict the entry into or transit through their territory of all senior officials of the 
rank of Deputy Minister or higher in the Taliban” (UNSC res. 1333: 2000, operative para. 
14).149 In resolution 1390 adopted after 9/11 (2002) the Security Council thus extended 
the reach of its sanctions globally and to any member or associate of al-Qaeda 
wherever they may be (Cameron: 2005, 183). A further novelty of resolution 1390 was 
operative paragraph 3, which stipulated a review of the sanctions in 12 months, at the 
end of which the “Council would either allow these measures to continue or decide to 
improve them” (UNSC res. 1390: 2002, operative para. 3). In contrast, the pre-9/11 
sanctions adopted in the course of resolution 1333 had a sunset clause of one year 
 
149 In reaction to growing concerns over devastating human impact (e.g. financial hardship) that the sanction 
may incur, the Council allowed for exemptions, including the “payment of foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, 
medicines and medical treatment, taxes” (UNSC res. 1452: 2002, operative para. 1(a)), as well as other necessary 
payments (e.g. such as those required under existing contracts). 
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(Gutherie: 2005, 494). Resolution 1390 however remained rather vague as regards the 
listing practice of the committee. In theory, names submitted to the 1267 sanctions 
committee lacked personal information and justification for the inclusion. In practice, 
this resulted in the implementation of measures against individuals that may not 
necessarily have had a connection to al-Qaeda or the Taliban. For instance, in late 2001 
the United States included the names of three Somali-born Swedish nationals on the 
sanctions list for their apparent link to an international financing network linked to 
al-Qaeda (Rosand: 2004, 749). When investigations however revealed that the 
activities of the three individuals did not warrant any criminal charges, the Swedish 
government undertook efforts at the UN to have the Somali-born citizens delisted. 
Although the efforts were successful, albeit cumbersome, this incident revealed a 
larger problem with the sanction committee’s work method. Specifically, concerns 
over the extent to which the committee was complying with human rights and due 
process principles became increasingly relevant.150 As a result, the committee adopted 
the 1267 Committee Guidelines in 2002 (most recently updated in September 2018), 
which provided that submissions ought to include a basis for the designation, as well 
as an identification of a link between the individuals listed (see 1267 Committee 
Guidelines). The Council further addressed concerns in resolution 1526 (2004) 
“strongly encourag[ing] all States to inform, to the extent possible, individuals and 
entities included in the Committee’s list of the measures imposed on them” (UNSC res. 
1526: 2004, operative para. 18). In order to provide assistance to the Sanctions 
Committee, the Council furthermore decided to established the Analytical Support 
and Sanctions Monitoring Team, 151  tasked with assessing and monitoring the 
implementation of the measures set out in the sanctions-regime (Annex to res. 1526), 
analyse reports submitted by member states (as required by res. 1455, operative para. 
6), to coordinate efforts with the CTC and other responsibilities as provided by the 
sanctions committee (Annex to res. 1526). The Analytical Support and Sanctions 
Monitoring Team replaced the existing Monitoring Group established by resolution 
1363 prior to 9/11.152  
Early practices established by member states in the Sanctions Committee indicated 
that “governments initially viewed the Consolidated List as an opportunity to squelch 
their own local insurgencies, or to otherwise taint opposition groups, providing name 
that had nothing to do with the Taliban or al Qaeda” (Comras: 2010, 95) and hence it 
became necessary to provide criteria for classifying an association with al-Qaeda or 
the Taliban. Amidst such concerns, member states decided to adopt resolution 1612 in 
2005. In doing so, the Council determined that an individual or group is associated 
with al-Qaeda (or bin Laden) and the Taliban if such entities participate in the 
financing, planning or preparation of “acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under 
 
150 See also Boer’s “The Al Qaeda Sanctions Committee and Due Process: The Security Council’s Obligation 
Under International Law”, Hudson’s “Not a Great Asset: The UN Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism 
Regime: Violating Human Rights” and Genser & Barth’s “When Due Process Concerns Become Dangerous: 
The Security Council’s 1267 Regime and the Need for Reform” for further reading. 
151 A five-person Monitoring Team was however already established in resolution 1363 in 2001 (Foot: 2007, 493). 
152 See Rosand’s “The Security Council’s Efforts to Monitor the Implementation of Al Qaeda/Taliban Sanctions” 
for a more comprehensive treatment of the short-comings and challenges faced by the Monitoring Group.  
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the name of, on behalf of, or in support of; supplying, selling or transferring arms and 
related materiel to; recruiting for; or otherwise supporting acts or activities of” (UNSC 
res. 1612: 2005, operative para. 2). Resolution 1612 furthermore extended the scope of 
the Monitoring Team’s mandate and reinforced its role in constantly updating the 
listing and de-listing process (UNSC res. 1612: 2005, Annex para. c.). Only one year 
later the Council continued its efforts to address the human rights concerns of its 
sanctioning endeavours (Rosenow: 2011, 24). Despite the request made in previous 
resolutions (e.g. 1612) on states to inform individuals and others affected by sanctions, 
it was resolution 1735, adopted in 2006, that provided countries with more assertive 
instructions on the process. In particular, member states were obliged to provide 
sufficient information to demonstrate that the listing fulfils the association criteria laid 
out above and should provide “(iii) supporting information or documents that can be 
provided [and] States should include details of any connection between the proposed 
designee and any currently listed individual or entity” (UNSC res. 1735: 2006, operative 
para. 5). This requirement was further strengthened with resolution 1882 in 2009, 
demanding states to provide a summary of the reasons for the listing on the 
committee’s website (operative para. 13) and to conduct a review of the Consolidated 
List every three years (Rosenow: 2011, 24).  
In 2009, certainly also in response to the judgement by the European Court of Justice 
in respect to the lack of judicial due process of the sanction-regime,153 the Security 
Council established the position of the Ombudsperson to assist in the consideration 
of any delisting requests. Since, the mandate of the office of the Ombudsperson has 
been renewed and updated. 154 Indeed, individuals and other entities listed on the 
consolidated list, which as of August 2019 contained 262 individuals and 84 entities, 
can make a delisting to the ombudsperson (UNSC Ombudsperson: 2019).155 However, 
the most notable amendment to the powers of the Ombudsperson came in 2011, on 
the basis of resolution 1989. If the request for delisting is not explicitly denied within 
60 days it will be removed thereafter (Rosenow: 2011, 25). The original sanction-regime 
first established in 1999 and later amended in the aftermath of 9/11 was gradually being 
revised so as to accommodate human rights concerns. The perhaps most ground-
breaking reform of the 1267-sanction regime since 2002 was the split of the Taliban 
and al-Qaeda and Associates List (Sanctions List) in 2011. In resolution 1988 the 
Council recognised the continuing conflict in Afghanistan and reiterated its support 
of a peaceful political solution. In an unprecedented step, the Council removed 
individuals and groups (and entities) associated with the Taliban (UNSC res. 1988: 2011, 
op. para. 2). That said, the Council established a separate committee (the 1988 
Committee) to maintain a list of Taliban entities that pose a threat to the peace and 
security in Afghanistan (UNSC Summary of listing Criteria: 2019, website). In parallel, 
 
153 In its Kadi decision, the European Court of Justice decided that the regulation that gave effect to the UN 
Sanctions was invalid and that any obligation placed on member states of the European Union has to be in 
conformity with constitutional principles, including principles such as due process and the rule of law. Amidst 
the short-comings of the 1267 sanctions these were not sufficiently respected.  
154 The Council adopted resolutions 1989 in 2011, 2083 in 2012, 2161 in 2014, 2253 in 2015 and most recently 
resolution 2253 in 2017.  
155 See resolution 2253 for a detailed reading on the mandate of the ombudsperson.  
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the previously consolidated Sanctions List would be limited to the al-Qaeda and its 
associates (UNSC res. 1989: 2001, operative para. 2).  
The rise of ISIL did not happen overnight. Rather, the group’s origins are rooted in 
political Islam and broader global trends156 “that stress the tensions between religiosity 
and modernity, compounded by an increase in Islamic militancy” (Oosterveld et al.: 
2017, 5).157 It was however not until 2014 that ISIL truly made it onto the radar of the 
international community. Led by al-Baghdadi, the group seized the city of Mosul in 
Iraq and thus expanded its territorial reach beyond its base in Syria (Gurule: 2015, 1). 
Consequently, in February 2015 the Security Council took steps to curtail ISIL’s ability 
to finance its terrorist activities by adopting resolution 2199. Although the resolution 
does take a general approach to the issue of financing158 its specific focus rests on ISIL’s 
ability to acquire funds through oil trade as well as through the destruction and 
plundering of cultural heritage sites and kidnapping for ransom. More concretely, and 
acting under Chapter VII, the Council reaffirmed states’ obligation to “freeze without 
delay the funds and other financial assets or economic resources of ISIL, ANF, and 
other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaeda, 
including funds derived from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly, by 
them or by persons acting on their behalf or at their direction” (UNSC res. 2199: 2015, 
operative para. 3). The resolution also reaffirms that member states are obligated to 
bring to justice not only those directly involved in terrorist attacks, but also those that 
support such activities, further remarking “that such support may be provided through 
trade in oil and refined oil products, modular refineries and related material with ISIL” 
(Ibid: 2015, operative para. 11).  
Resolution 2253 likewise adopted in 2015 (December) again takes seriously the threat 
posed by ISIL to international peace and security. Granted, resolution 2199 already set 
out to curtail the organisation’s ability to finance their terrorist endeavours; however, 
resolution 2253 is nevertheless noteworthy for a number of reasons. First, and again 
acting under Chapter VII, the Council formally changed the name of the “Al-Qaeda 
Sanctions List to the “ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaeda Sanctions List”, formally 
acknowledging the need to not only impose financial sanctions but to also enact more 
stringent efforts, such as a travel ban (operative para. 2 (b)) and an arms embargo 
(operative para. 2(c)). Importantly, resolution 2253 expands159 listing criteria to include 
individuals or entities associated with ISIL (operative para. 3).160 The Security Council 
 
156 The origins have to also be understood in the context of the Iraq invasion in 2003 as well as in the sectarian 
conflicts between Sunni and Shite fractions across the Middle East 
157 See the publication “The Rise and Fall of ISIS: From Evitability to Inevitability” by The Hague Centre for 
Strategic Studies, particularly pages 5-8.  
158 Indeed, the resolution reaffirms a country’s obligation to “ensure that their nationals and those in their 
territory not make assets or economic resources, directly or indirectly, available to ISIL” (UNSC res. 2199: 2015, 
operative para. 2) 
159 Resolution 1989 adopted in 2011 also included a more detailed listing criteria for the Al-Qaeda sanctions list, 
it was thus extended to include non al-Qaeda (or associates).  
160 The resolution furthermore contains other provisions, inter alia, including on the topic of implementation 
and non-compliance (operative para. 11-36), on the Committee (operative para. 37-42), and the Monitoring 
Team (e.g. mandate extensions) (operative para. 89-96), the importance of listing names and entities 
(operative para. 43), delisting procedures (operative para. 54-74) and reporting (operative para. 97) 
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reaffirmed it resolve to combat terrorism through sanctions by adopting resolution 
2368 in 2017 and thus demonstrated its ability to respond to emerging threats.161  
The 1267 sanctions-regime initially adopted in 1999 has evolved into one of the most 
central and assertive components of the international community’s efforts to counter 
terrorist activities. Over the course of the past 18 years, the Security Council has 
progressively amended its sanctions-regime, reflecting the challenges and criticism 
raised by both member states (e.g. Swedish government) and non-governmental 
entities (e.g. Human Rights Watch report: 2012), and has built a supporting 
institutional structure (e.g. 1267-Committee and Monitoring Team) that remains 
unprecedented in the United Nations’ trajectory, in both scope and complexity. It is 
perhaps for this reason, that the sanctions framework imposed against al-Qaeda, ISIL 
and formally also against the Taliban, has become one of the most comprehensive and 
continuously evolving instrument in the organisation’s fight against terrorism. Yet, 
sanctions have not been the only assertive tool against terrorism following 2001. 
Indeed, with the adoption of resolution 1368, highlighting the right to individual or 
collective self-defence, the Council acknowledged the use of force as a legitimate 
response to terrorism.  
 
The use of force as a legitimate reaction to terrorism(?)  
The Security Council responses to terrorism after 9/11 came in a number of different 
forms; it has condemned specific acts of terrorism and has adopted a layer of 
resolutions that bind states to take action in a wide range of issue areas (e.g. foreign 
terrorist fighters). Since 1999 the Security Council has moreover established a 
sanctions-regime against al-Qaeda, ISIL and its affiliates and in consequence shifted 
its focus to non-state terrorist actors. One of the most noticeable responses taken by 
the Council has however been the acknowledgement of the right to individual or 
collective self-defence, in principle legitimising the use of force in the course of 
countering terrorism. The basis of this acknowledgement have been resolutions 1368 
(2001), 1373 (2001) and arguably more recently 2249 (2015).162 The UN Charter is explicit 
in its prohibition of the use of force, except when such force is authorised by the 
Council or undertaken in the pursuit of self-defence. Specifically, Article 2(4) of the 
Charter reminds member states of their obligation to “refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any States” (UNC: 1945, Article 2(3)). Nevertheless, the UNC 
recognises two exceptions in regard to “forcible enforcement measures within the 
framework of the organisation’s collective security system, and the right to self-
defence against armed attacks” (Tams: 2009, 360), enshrined in Articles 42 and 51, 
 
161 The Council moreover noted its concern over the increasing lack of implementation. 
162 Although the use force in self-defence has been recognised in the course of counterterrorism (see resolution 
1368), it is not clear to what extent this norm applies to other scenarios not involving groups like al-Qaeda and 
ISIS (Da’esh). In this respect it is worth noting the condemnation of Israel’s use of force against Hezbollah and 
Hamas targeting the country from its bases in Lebanon and Gaza. See Mingst et al. Chapter 4 on maintaining 
international peace and security in “The United Nations in the 21st Century”.  
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respectively. The right of individual or collective self-defence has attracted extensive 
debate, especially among international jurists and the legal community as a whole. Of 
particular contention has been the parameters that provide justification for the use of 
force (e.g. definition of armed attack, the issue of pre-emptive strikes and state 
attribution). In fact, one of the most contentious debates surrounds the definition and 
scope of “armed attack”, which entitles a country to respond with force in self-defence 
(Dalton: 2006, 525) and who can be the perpetrator of such an attack (state vs. non-
state actor). While interesting, these legal justifications and ramifications will not be 
of relevance to us here. 163 As Byers objects, the law on self-defence is an “area of 
international law that is particularly contentious and difficult to analyse” (Byers: 2003, 
405).  
 
Use of force prior to 9/11 
The use of force to respond to terrorism has been a sujet whose origins predate the 
9/11 attacks. In 1976 when members of the PFLP and the German Revolutionary Cells 
hijacked an Air France flight, diverting the aircraft to Entebbe, the use of force by one 
state in foreign territory in the name of counterterrorism became a reality. Less than 
10 days into the hostage-taking, Israeli commandos “landed without authorisation in 
Entebbe, overwhelmed the Ugandan forces and terrorists, and freed the hostages” 
(Blumenau: 2014a, 68). The commandos not only killed terrorists but moreover killed 
20 Ugandan soldiers in the course of the operation. Despite the successful outcome of 
the operation, the Organisation of the African Union (OAU) asked the president of 
the Council to call a session of the Security Council. On July 9th the Council convened 
a session of the whole hearing the complaint of the OAU on the act of aggression 
perpetrated by Israel. Indeed, while Western countries showed their support for 
Israel’s successful operation a number of Arab and African nations highlighted the 
breach of national sovereignty. Libya, for example, strongly condemned the operation 
and noted;  
 
“[t]he Israeli representative tries to avoid addressing the main issue, which is 
that his Government planned and executed an act of aggression against a 
sovereign, independent country, a Member of the United Nations. Should the 
Council tolerate such aggression, it would give the green light, it would give 
permission to every country in the world to take the law into its own hands and 
invade other countries under any pretext it chooses. We believe the Council 
should apply the provisions of the Charter, which everybody is interested in 
applying. The Council should condemn in the sharpest terms this 
contemptuous, wanton Israeli aggression” (UN Doc. S/PV.1939: 1976, 25).  
When the discussions on the operation came to an end, as Blumenau reflects, “the SC 
did not pass a resolution on Entebbe. Both the anti-Israeli draft by the African 
 
163 See O’Connell’s “Lawful Self-Defence to Terrorism”, Starski’s “Right to Self-Defence, Attribution and the 
Non-State Actor” and Värk’s “Terrorism and the use of force: From defensive reaction to pre-emptive action?” 
for a more detailed treatment of the legality debate.  
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countries as well as a more balanced one submitted by Great Britain failed to achieve 
a majority” (Blumenau: 2014a, 72). Although the debate yielded no concrete outcome, 
it became clear that the use of force against terrorists would not be considered a 
legitimate tool, although Israel does represent a special case considering the hostility 
it faced in respect to its policy towards Palestine at the time. Furthermore, in 1985, 
“Israel’s raid on the PLO Headquarters outside Tunis was ‘condemn[ed] vigorously’ by 
the Security Council, which declared it an ‘act of armed aggression…in flagrant 
violation of the Charter of the United Nations’ and urged other states ‘to take measures 
to dissuade Israel from resorting to such acts against sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of all States’” (Tams: 2009, 367). 
The American missile attack on selected sites in Afghanistan and the Sudan in 1998 in 
response to the bombings of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania is a further 
illustrative case in point. The Clinton administration informed the Security Council 
that the attack had taken place in conformity with its right to self-defence, as 
prescribed under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The attack had targeted 
training facilities in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum believed to 
be producing chemical weapons, both of which could be linked to al-Qaeda (Lobel: 
1999, 537). Although most allies supported the attacks, a number of countries voiced 
their condemnation and took issue with the unilateral use of force. Governments of 
Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Russia condemned the use of force by the United States 
(Murphy: 1999, 164). And “[t]he Secretariat of the League of Arab States condemned 
the attack on Sudan as a violation of international law, but was silent as to the attack 
on Afghanistan…Other states, however, expressed support, or at least understanding, 
for the attacks, including Australia, France, Germany, Japan, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom. In conducting the missile strikes, U.S. defence officials stated that the 
United States did not request overflight permission from Egypt, Eritrea, or Pakistan. 
In a letter to the Security Council, Pakistan asserted that the United States' action 
"entailed a violation of the airspace of Pakistan" and that there should have been prior 
consultations by the United States with Pakistan (Murphy: 1999, 165). Efforts by the 
Group of African States, the Arab League, and the Group of Islamic States to request a 
special meeting of the Council on the attacks failed, and although resolution 1193 
enacted on the subject of Afghanistan made note of the issue of terrorism in the 
country, it did not mention the US missile strike (Ibid: 1999, 165). Attempts at 
establishing a fact-finding mission investigating the apparent wrongful targeting of 
the factory in Sudan were successfully blocked by the United States and the matter 
was dropped altogether soon thereafter (Lobel: 1999, 538 & 556). This is an important 
development because it highlights that although a number of member states and 
political groups did not support forceful means against terrorists, the veto prerogative 
of a permanent member of the Council prevented any action that might have led to 
the condemnation of the attack on the factory in Sudan.  
Since the inception of the United Nations in 1945, member states have used force in 
connection with terrorism on numerous occasions. In 1986 President Ronald Reagan 
ordered military strikes against Libya in response to the bombing of a West Berlin 
disco frequented by US servicemen, and against Afghanistan and the Sudan in 1998 in 
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reaction to the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Even before, in 
1976, Israel used force and violated Ugandan sovereignty in the course of a rescue 
attempt at the Entebbe airport. On most occasions, such strikes led to condemnation 
and “diverging and often critical opinions about the legality of military strikes in 
response to terrorist acts” (Oudraat: 2004, 160). In fact, the 1986 bombing of Tripoli in 
response to the Berlin nightclub explosion, justified by the right to self-defence, “was 
widely rejected, with many States expressing doubt as to whether the attack on Libya 
was necessary and proportionate” (Byers: 2003, 407). There was thus no support for 
the use of force against terrorists amongst members of the international community.  
 
Terrorism and the use of force after 9/11  
The remainder of this chapter will suggest that the attacks on September 11th 2001 
provided sufficient impetus for the Council to become a legitimiser of the use of force 
in responding to terrorism. Although it is certainly not evident that there is a broad 
consensus that military means in the pursuit of counterterrorism is always warranted 
and accepted across countries, Security Council resolutions 1368, 1373 and the more 
recently enacted 2249 demonstrate that the international community’s reluctance to 
endorse the use of force as a counterterrorism instrument has diminished after 9/11. In 
this respect, Condoleezza Rice’s164 remark “an earthquake of the magnitude of 9/11 can 
shift the tectonic plates of international politics” (Rice address at John Hopkins: 2002) 
holds considerable weight.  
 
The dramatic images of the attacks in September of 2001 lent support to the Bush 
Administration’s more force-oriented counterterrorism endeavours. “The Bush 
administration noted support from NATO, the EU, the U.N., the G8, the Organisation 
of the Islamic Conference, and numerous other groups” (Collier: 2005, 716). NATO 
took an unprecedented step in invoking Article 5, identifying the attacks against the 
United States an attack against all. Collier further observes that although this is more 
of a political development, certainly in an attempt to demonstrate solidarity with the 
Americans, the organisation “definitively acknowledged its willingness to act if 
necessary” (Collier: 2003, 724). Likewise, the Organisation of American States invoked 
Article 3(1) of the Rio Treaty, equally considering 9/11 an attack against all (Dalton: 
2006, 526). It was indeed owed to the unprecedented solidarity, that the United 
Nations found itself able to adopt resolutions 1368 and 1373 in the short span of time 
following the attacks. The first course of action, as already alluded to above, was the 
unanimous adoption of resolution 1368 and the international community showed itself 
determined to combat threats posed by international terrorism. The resolution called 
on states to cooperate in bringing the perpetrators to justice (operative para. 3) and to 
redouble their efforts to prevent such attacks from occurring in the future (operative 
para. 4). It was, however, the resolution’s reference to the inherent right of individual 
and collective self-defence in accordance with the UN Charter that proved to be the 
most ground-breaking change in the organisation’s handling of terrorism. Specifically, 
 
164 The former National Security Adviser to the Bush administration.  
 
 
- 136 - 
the Council recognised “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in 
accordance with the Charter” (UNSC res. 1368: 2001, para. 3). It was the first time that 
the Council acknowledged self-defence (e.g. use of force) as a legitimate tool against 
terrorism (Kramer & Yetic: 2007, 413) and it demonstrates the Council’s willingness to 
treat terrorism as a heinous crime of international proportion that requires a more 
forceful response. It is also important to note that, while 1368 expressed “readiness to 
take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and to 
combat all forms of terrorism” (operative para. 5) it did not authorise the use of force 
(Byers: 2003, 342). Resolution 1373 adopted shortly after likewise acknowledged the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence, arguably providing member 
states with a broad authorisation to use force.165 
One month after the attacks, on October 7th, the American representative to the 
United Nations, John D. Negroponte, informed the United Nations that in accordance 
with Article 51, the United States and a coalition of other states “initiated actions in 
the exercise of its inherent right of individual and collective self-defence following the 
armed attacks that were carried out against the United States on 11 September 2001” 
(UN Doc. S/2001/946: 2001, 1), further accusing the Taliban of providing al-Qaeda an 
operational basis and identifying specific targets (e.g. training camps.). Indeed, the 
Taliban, as the de facto government in Afghanistan, refused to hand over bin Laden 
and “were alleged to have directly facilitated and endorsed his acts” (Byers: 2003, 408). 
Equally important, Negroponte emphasised that American inquiry into the attacks 
were still in their early stages and that the United States “may find that our self-defence 
requires further actions with respect to other organisations and other States” (UN Doc. 
S/2001/946: 2001, 1). Operation Enduring Freedom was made necessary by the Taliban 
government’s willingness to allow its territory to be used by al-Qaeda. It was also of 
no less importance that the Americans emphasised the indirect involvement of the 
Taliban, as state attribution would justify the case for an invasion. Indeed, “it was the 
first time that such a claim was met with wide support from the international 
community, with the European Union declaring ‘its wholehearted support for the 
action that is being take in in self-defence in conformity with the UN Charter’” (Cenic: 
2007, 2008). As a matter of record, once Operation Enduring Freedom was underway, 
expressions of support were noted from all over the world, and support was provided 
from a number of countries (e.g. airspace from Pakistan) (Schmitt: 2002, 10). This was 
indeed novel considering that previous forms of unilateral (or multilateral) uses of 
force were largely condemned as violations of international law (see reaction to strikes 
on Afghanistan and Sudan addressed above).  
Since 2001, resolutions 1368 and 1373 have served as a justification for the use of force 
against terrorism (Voeten: 2005, 530). Yet, it is important to note that the Security 
Council, while legitimising the use of force in counterterrorism (e.g. Afghanistan in 
 
165 There has been a wide variety of cases in which the right of self-defence was drawn on to justify the use of 
force. Some examples beyond the obvious example against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in October 2001 include: 
Israel bombing of Palestinian camps in north of Damascus in 2003, the incursion of Turkish troops into 
northern Iraq to fight the Kurdish PKK, Russian use of force against Chechen rebels in 2004 and 2007 and the 
military incursion against revolutionary armed forces by Colombian forces. These incidents incurred varying 
reactions.  
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the early 2000s) did not authorise the use of multilateral force. To appreciate this 
distinction further, it is helpful to draw on Tams’ remarks, when he ascertains that in 
“SC Resolutions 1368 and 1373, the Council expressly noted that the attacks of 9/11 had 
triggered a right of self-defence…but this amounted to a multilateral endorsement of 
a claim to use force unilaterally, rather than a multilateral enforcement action in the 
sense of Article 42” (Tams: 2009, 377). And while countries have certainly not all 
favoured military means, or at the very least have recognised that military measures in 
and of themselves are not sufficient in dealing with the threat, “the fight against 
terrorism is increasingly regarded as a legitimate cause which warrant a ‘military 
approach’” (Tams: 2009, 374). 166  A word of caution is however necessary. A more 
comprehensive review of the use of force since 9/11 167  and the responses by the 
international community does not suggest that there is always broad support for the 
use of force in response to terrorism. For instance, although the United States drew on 
the right to self-defence in the case of Afghanistan, it showed itself critical of Russia’s 
similar claims when it launched strikes against Chechen rebels in Georgia (Terry: 2016, 
51). Indeed, when Russia bombed rebel bases in Georgia claiming ‘self-defence,’ the 
United States disapproved of the strikes as a breach of Georgian sovereignty (White 
House Press Release: 2002). Likewise, Israel’s military action against Syria in 2003 and 
against Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006 was met with rather strong condemnation (Ibid: 
2016, 51 & 52). The international community was particularly divided on whether to 
lend support to or condemn the attacks on Hezbollah in Lebanon. The Non-Aligned 
Movement “expressed strong condemnation of the relentless Israeli aggression launch 
against Lebanon and the serious violations…of the Lebanese territorial integrity and 
sovereignty” (14TH Summit Outcome Doc. NAM: para. 142). These cases make evident 
that political realities – that is the Middle Eastern conflict and broader geopolitical 
considerations (e.g. relationship between Russia and the United States) – play a pivotal 
role in ascertaining whether the use of force is a legitimate tool in countering terrorism 
and that it is by no means evident that the use of force has garnered consensus among 
all countries. 
 
Resolution 2249: fighting ISIL in Iraq and Syria  
The rise of ISIL and its brutal campaign in Syria, later expanding into Iraq, has 
occupied the international community a great deal. By 2014 ISIL had established its 
base in the captured Syrian town of Raqqah, prompting it to change its name from the 
Islamic State of Iraq to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (Scharf: 2016, 6). Shortly 
after, the city of Mosul in Iraq also fell to ISIL, significantly expanding the group’s 
territorial repository. Notwithstanding Russia’s veto of any initiative in the Security 
 
166 See for example Norway’s comments in 2002, stating that “[w]e must employ all means at our disposal: 
political and legal, military and financial” (UN Doc. S/PV.4413: 2001, 10). Other countries have however also 
cautioned that international efforts “must not, I repeat, be confined to military options only” (UN Doc. 
S/PV.4618: 2002, 13). See also the Council’s statement in 2011, stressing “that no cause or grievance can justify 
the murder of innocent people and that terrorism will not be defeated by military force, law enforcement 
measures and intelligence operations alone” (UN Doc. S/PV.6526: 2011, 2).  
167  See Terry’s “Germany Joins the Campaign Against ISIS in Syria”, pages 46-55 for a more review of 
international reaction to the respective changes. 
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Council authorising the use of force in Syrian territory, certainly as a result of its close 
affiliation to the Assad regime, the US commenced conducting military strikes against 
ISIL targets on Syrian territory as early as 2014 (Scharf: 2016, 9). 
 
When ISIL however bombed a Russian aircraft over the Sinai desert, leading to the 
death of 224 passengers, and conducted a series of attacks in Paris in November, both 
in 2015, Security Council action became necessary. Accordingly, in November 2015, the 
Security Council reaffirmed that terrorism represents one of the most significant 
threats to international peace and security and that “any acts of terrorism are criminal 
and unjustifiable regardless of their motivations, whenever and by whomsoever 
committed” (UNSC res. 2249, para. 4). Resolution 2249 also singled out ISIL as 
constituting a “global and unprecedented threat to international peace and security” 
(preambular para. 5), a label not yet afforded to any other terrorist organisation. More 
specifically, the Council condemned the attacks perpetrated by ISIL in Sousse (2015), 
Ankara (2015), Sinai (2015), Beirut (2015), and in Paris (2015) (operative para. 1). The 
more prevalent provision for the purpose of this thesis was, however, the Council’s call 
“upon Member States that have the capacity to do so to take all necessary measures 
[emphasis added], in compliance with international law, in particular with the United 
Nations Charter….on the territory under the control of ISIL also known as Da’esh, in 
Syria and Iraq” (UNSC res. 2249: 2015, op. para. 5). The adoption of the resolution is 
interesting for a number of reasons. First, unlike resolutions 1368 and 1373, although 
enacted in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, resolution 2249 specifically targets ISIL 
(only to a lesser extent al-Qaeda and al-Nusra Front). Second, member states are called 
upon to take ‘all necessary measures’ on the territory controlled by ISIL in both Syria 
and Iraq, which was likely a compromise to secure Russian (and Syrian) support as this 
would prevent any infringement on Syrian territorial integrity. “Unlike Iraq, Syria has 
not consented to use of force against ISIS by foreign countries (other than Russia) in 
Syrian territory” (Scharf: 2016, 8). This was indeed novel considering that in 2001 it was 
rather evident that the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was at the very least harbouring 
al-Qaeda, providing it with an operational basis. A propos Syria, Terry also reflects, 
“[n]obody is claiming that Syria is tolerating or actively supporting ISIS. In fact, it is 
uncontroversial that the Syrian Government is itself, with Russian support, attempting 
to fight the ISIS terrorists” (Terry: 2016, 32).  
The most important question that still needs to be answered is whether resolution 
2249 gives way to the use of force against terrorists. Given the vagueness of the 
wording of the resolution it is not easy to make a clear determination.168 It is evident, 
however, that member states have not tasked the UN with an enforcement mandate, 
whereby member states would contribute troops to a multilateral mission on the basis 
of Article 42 of the UNC. Unlike resolutions 1368 and 1373, resolution 2249 also does 
not explicitly mention the right to self-defence (Hilpold: 2016, 544), nor does it endorse 
any other legal theory to justify military action. Despite these textual ambiguities, the 
 
168 This indeed a protracted and contested debate that would reach beyond the scope of this thesis. For more 
a more comprehensive treatment see Hilpold’s “The fight against terrorism and SC Resolution 2249: towards 
a more Hobbesian or a more Kantian International Society”, Milanovic’s “How the Ambiguity of Resolution 
2249 Does Its Work”.  
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resolution “does show Council support for States, in accordance with their own 
domestic legislation, taking further military steps to eradicate Islamic States” 
(Elgebeily: 2016). For instance, labelling ISIL a threat to peace and security implicitly 
invokes Article 39 of the UN Charter, even when no clear reference is made to Chapter 
VII (Akande & Milanovic: 2015, para. 3). The resolution is thus constructed in a way 
“that it can be used to provide political support for military action, without actually 
endorsing any particular legal theory on which such action can be based or providing 
legal authority from the Council itself” (Ibid: 2016, para. 9). In fact, the resolution has 
provided the political basis for military action against ISIL in the territory they control 
in Iraq and Syria.  
The French representative following the adoption of the resolution, for instance, 
asserted, “[o]n the basis of this historical resolution of the Security Council, France will 
pursue and strengthen its efforts to mobilize the entire international community to 
defeat our common enemy. France will play its full part in this effort. Militarily, the 
President of the Republic announced an intensification of air strikes against strategic 
Daesh targets in Syria” (UN Doc. S/PV.7565: 2015, 2). It is also interesting to note that 
when the British prime minister addressed the House of Commons seeking approval 
for the deployment of armed forces against ISIL in Syrian territory, he drew on the 
resolution for support. He specifically noted, that 
“the document I have published today shows in some detail the clear legal basis 
for military action against ISIL in Syria. It is founded on the right of self-defence 
as recognised in Article 51 of the UN Charter. The right of self-defence may be 
exercised individually where it is necessary to the UK’s own defence…and of 
course collectively in the defence of our friends and allies. Mr Speaker, the main 
basis of the global coalition’s actions against ISIL in Syria is the collective self-
defence of Iraq. Iraq has a legitimate government, one that we support and help. 
There is a solid basis of evidence on which to conclude, firstly, that there is a 
direct link between the presence and activities of ISIL in Syria, and their ongoing 
attack in Iraq…and, secondly, that the Assad regime is unwilling and/or unable 
to take action necessary to prevent ISIL’s continuing attack on Iraq – or indeed 
attacks on us. It is also clear that ISIL’s campaign against the UK and our allies 
has reached the level of an ‘armed attack’ such that force may lawfully be used in 
self-defence to prevent further atrocities being committed by ISIL. 
And this is further underscored by the unanimous adoption of UN Security 
Council resolution 2249. We should be clear about what this resolution means 
and what it says. The whole world came together – including all 5 members of 
the Security Council – to agree this resolution unanimously…” (Prime Minister 
Statement to the House of Commons: 2015).  
Despite general acknowledgements that the resolution would provide a helpful basis 
in fighting ISIL (Nigeria in UN Doc. SC/12132), a number of countries again highlighted 
the importance of addressing the root causes of terrorism, in many cases making no 
mention of Article 51 or the use of force. Liu Jieyi, the Chinese representative, 
emphasised the need to bring terrorists to justice and in the same vein noted that 
counterterrorism measures “must address both the symptoms and the root causes of 
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the problem, and refrain from adopting double standards” (China in SC/12132: 2015, 3), 
not directly endorsing the use of force on the basis of Article 51. Russia further noted, 
“[i]n our view, the French resolution is a political appeal, rather than a change to the 
legal principles underlying the fight against terrorism. We consider it a step in creating 
a broad anti-terrorism front by marshalling comprehensive cooperation…to end all 
manifestations of terrorism and eradicate its root causes” (Russia in Ibid: 2015, 5).  
By enacting resolution 2249 member states were urged to take ‘all necessary measures,’ 
including the use of force, to prevent and suppress terrorist acts, and to eradicate safe 
havens established in Iraq and Syria. Similar to resolutions 1368 and 1373, the 2015 
resolution does not authorise the use of multilateral force on the basis of Article 42 
but it does provide political legitimacy to member states to use such force (Cirkovic: 
2017, 9). Although the shortened description above certainly does not replace more in-
depth academic scrutiny, one can also conclude that the use of force is “now 
permissible against non-state actors where the territorial state [Syria] is unable to 
suppress the threat that they pose” (Scharf: 2016, 53). Resolution 2249 marked the first 
time since 2001 that the Security Council not only determined a terrorist group to be 
a grave threat to international peace and security but that the use of force may be a 
legitimate tool to counter the threat.169 The impact of the resolution is best reflected 
in the military action taken after the adoption of the resolution as well as in the 
statements made by (permanent) members of the Council (e.g. France and the United 
Kingdom). 170  It is also worth concluding that resolution 2249 is different to the 
previously adopted resolutions in 2001 as its provisions are geographically limited, 
namely to ISIL-controlled territory in Syria and Iraq, and it does not provide the 
necessary legal theory (e.g. self-defence) upon which member states can base their 
military action.  
 
Chapter conclusion 
The resolutions of the General Assembly adopted under the ‘measures to eliminate’ 
stream have continued to treat terrorism as a crime requiring a criminal-justice 
response (e.g. bringing perpetrators to justice) and it has thus been reluctant to 
endorse a military approach to counterterrorism. Although the Assembly has 
continuously reiterated its condemnation of terrorism no matter how noble the cause, 
a closer review of the resolutions gives way to the conclusion that there remains a 
certain degree of ambiguity in the General Assembly’s condemnation of political 
violence. This is best illustrated by its continued reference to a final outcome 
document of the Non-Aligned Movement and the unaltered discussions in the Sixth 
Committee. The General Assembly has sustained its efforts at adopting a 
 
169 In 2018 the UNSC adopted resolution 2449 in which it expressed “its grave concern that areas remain under 
their control and about the negative impact of their presence…calling for the full implementation of Security 
Council” resolution 2249 (UNSC res. 2449: 2018, para. 6).  
170  The German government has taken a similar position (self-defence). As recently as October 2019, the 
German government has continued to “invoke collective self-defence on behalf and on the request of Iraq 
against attacks from ISIL “in connection with” Security Council resolution 2240 (2015)” (Nussberger: 2019).  
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comprehensive convention against terrorism. This convention would close existing 
loopholes and would go a long way in providing the international community with 
some sort of common understanding of what terrorism is, or at least it is intended to 
do so in theory. The evidence reviewed above, however, at a minimum allows for the 
conclusion that the international community remains entrenched in its positions, 
some of which have not changed since it first took up the task in 1973.  
 
There should be little doubt that the Security Council has evolved into an important 
global counterterrorism actor, certainly also as a result of the challenges faced by the 
General Assembly. It has also been demonstrated that the Council has adopted a 
legally-binding resolution-framework and has established a number of sub-structures 
to oversee implementation and assist in capacity-building. In doing so, it has made 
measures previously only contained in international treaties – depending upon 
ratification– mandatory and subject to Council scrutiny. The discussion has also 
demonstrated that the Council has been willing and able, or at least to the extent 
possible given its mandate and political division, to respond to emerging threats and 
changes to these threats. As time elapsed and new forms of the threat emerged (e.g. 
foreign fighters), the Council understood that changes to its counterterrorism 
response were necessary, adding one layer after another to its counterterrorism 
architecture.  
With the historical adoption of resolution 1373 the Council adopted its first quasi-
legislative resolution, obliging every country to adopt (or amend) national legislation 
so as to criminalise terrorism and to bring to justice those engaging in such activities. 
The sanctions-regime in contrast has the function of addressing a problem-specific 
activity and will cease to exist when (if ever) the threat of al-Qaeda and ISIL is no 
longer present. Although resolution 1566 provided a working definition, a formal and 
accepted definition of terrorism remains elusive. Yet, the absence of a definition has 
not prevented the Council from taking assertive action. Conversely, despite challenges 
(e.g. human rights concerns or reporting fatigue) the institutional architecture put in 
place is unprecedented in scope and reach. Indeed, while the 1267 sanctions-regime 
predates 9/11, the comprehensive institutionalisation of the CTC, the 1540 Committee 
and the ISIL and al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee has predominantly taken place after 
9/11. The committees established to administer the implementation of the respective 
resolutions and sanctions have demonstrated the Council’s intention to enhance the 
body’s ability to monitor member state compliance, although forceful non-compliance 
has remained absent.  
A noticeable difference between the aforementioned sub-committees is that while the 
CTC attempts to set global standards in the fight against terrorism, the 1540 
Committee only attempts to do so for a specific terrorism-related issue: The 
proliferation of nuclear terrorism. To that extent, the 1267 Sanctions Committee is also 
dissimilar as its main focus is on the imposition of constraint on specific individuals, 
and has thus been granted unprecedented (continuous) power to determine who is to 
face sanctions. Gutherie in this respect observes, “[t]he authority given to the 1267 
Committee to make determinations regarding an individual’s connect to Al-Qaeda is 
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similar to that of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
and Rwanda (ITRY) [considering that both bodies were] created under the Chapter VII 
authority of the Security Council and vested with power to make judgments 
concerning an individual’s involvement in activities condemned by the international 
community” (Gutherie: 2005, 496). One ought to however concede that the 1267-
Committee is temporally limited insofar that when the threat posed by ISIL or al-
Qaeda ceases to exist, so will it. In contrast, the CTC established by 1373 is indefinite 
and deals with the terrorism threat in more general terms, not limited to any specific 
group.  
With the adoption of sanctions in resolution 1390 in 2002, the Council once more 
determined that terrorism is a threat to global peace and security. Prior to the events 
of 2001, it was the inadequate response by a state (e.g. failing to extradite) that 
represented a threat to international peace, not the act in and of itself. It was not until 
after 9/11 that the body found that the terrorist act per se, irrespective of a group’s link 
to a state or whether they acted under the authority of a respective state, constituted 
a threat to peace and security. The body’s determination to make this identification in 
connection with resolution 1390 indicates that member states have understood that 
non-state actors have become the “core cause of situations of emergency for 
international peace and security” (Santori: 2006, 96). Yet, even before 9/11, in adopting 
resolution 1333, the practise of targeting individuals (bin Laden) in specific territories 
(Taliban-controlled areas in Afghanistan) found its origins. However, it was resolution 
1390 that specifically and overwhelmingly set out to target bin Laden, al-Qaeda 
members, and associated entities globally (Stromseth: 2003, 41). And although the 
Taliban continued to remain subject to the sanctions-regime, they were no longer 
treated as a government but as a terrorist organisation (Comras: 2010, 87). This 
however partially changed again in 2011 when the sanctions-regime was split amidst 
peace efforts with the Taliban in Afghanistan. On a more general note, it has also 
become evident that the Council underwent a learning process, becoming less ad hoc 
in the imposition of counterterrorism sanctions. In doing so, it has established an 
administered institutional approach, with ongoing listings and delistings. As related 
above, the current sanctions on al-Qaeda and ISIL (Da’esh) will only end when the 
groups no longer pose a threat. In contrast, the sanctions imposed on Libya and the 
Sudan had been in response to specific acts of terrorism and were terminated in 2003 
and 2001, respectively, once the countries complied with the specific demands made 
by the Council.  
The Security Council has also not shown reticence to treat terrorism as a crime of 
international proportion requiring military responses. In this respect, the body has 
recognised the right to self-defence (e.g. 1368 and 1373) and more recently called on 
member states to take “all necessary measures” – including the use of violence – to 
prevent and suppress ISIL in Syria and Iraq (resolution 2249). This was new as previous 
Security Council resolutions gave a more general mandate (in response to 9/11), 
whereas resolution 2249 specifically targets ISIL (although mention is made of ANF 
and al-Qaeda) and the scope of application is geographically restricted to occupied 
territory in Syria and Iraq. Worth noting is also that the Council legitimised such force 
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on Syrian territory despite the country neither supporting ISIL nor asking the broader 
international community for help. Prior to 9/11 the Council was paralysed by the East-
West conflict and unilateral use of force, “whether based on self-defence or some legal 
construction,” was never accepted (Tams: 2009, 373). To be sure, the Council has still 
not authorised the use of multilateral force pursuant to Article 42; it has only endorsed 
unilateral use of force and has thus transferred responsibility to the respective member 
state (or coalition of states). Although there is by no means a consensus on military 
enforcement against terrorists, Tams however usefully observes that “many different 
states have asserted a right to use force against terrorists, and their conduct has been 
viewed rather favourably by the international community” (Tams: 2009, 378).171  
To be sure, of any international organisation the Security Council has taken the most 
assertive response to terrorism since 2001. With the Council’s use of its Chapter VII 
powers, making the provisions legally-binding, the General Assembly was replaced as 
the organisation’s primary counterterrorism body (Murthy: 2007, 4). The Council, 
although lacking in operational capabilities has “played a key role in the establishment 
of international norms and law…it has also facilitated enhancement of the capacities 
of weaker states to counter the threat of terrorism [with tools such as the CTC and the 
CTED] (Mingst et al.: 2017, 178). It can however also been drawn, that the Security 
Council and the General Assembly share one specific commonality, namely their 
inability to adopt a definition of terrorism. Perhaps the Council has moved a step 
further with the adoption of resolution 1566, which provides a working definition. 
Nevertheless, the absence of such a definition leaves considerable room for abuse, 
giving significant leeway to governments in defining terrorism in ways that best suit 
their own political (domestic) interests. 
  
 
171 One has to however consider the context in which military measures occur. Political rivalries and lasting 
conflicts in the Middle East and other parts of the globe certainly play a role in whether the use of force against 
terrorists is condemned or condoned.  
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CHAPTER SIX- CONCLUSIONS: BETWEEN INNOVATION 
AND CONTINUITY  
 
 
“Individual states may defend themselves, by striking back at terrorist groups and at 
the countries that harbour or support them. But only concerted vigilance and 
cooperation among all states, with constant, systematic exchange of information, 
offers any real hope of denying the terrorists their opportunities.”  
- UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan (2002) 
 
This thesis has set out to gain a better understanding of the ways in which the United 
Nations’ response to terrorism has changed since 1972. A review of this nature has 
become necessary because, as alluded to in introductory chapters and demonstrated 
throughout, terrorism has taken on a strong international character. With the United 
Nations being the only truly global organisation in both scope and reach, the 
organisation’s response to terrorism is critical to the overall international efforts to 
quell terrorist activity. There has been a wealth of academic interest in the United 
Nations and terrorism, although this is concentrated to the period after 9/11; and there 
is a lack of scholarship which has taken an in-depth historical and comparative 
approach to this subject area. This research fills this void, and in doing so it is now 
possible to better understand not only how the United Nations has dealt with 
terrorism but, equally importantly, how the organisation’s response has changed over 
time. With the previous discussion in mind, one is able to draw conclusions on what 
that means for the UN’s counterterrorism endeavours and the international 
community as a whole. Many new developments have transpired at the organisation 
in terms of terrorism over the past four decades but there have also been numerous 
continuities. Indeed, the General Assembly has continued to struggle to find common 
ground on what constitutes terrorism and has relied on the adoption of crime-specific 
counterterrorism-related conventions to respond to terrorism. The Security Council 
has taken a more repressive and assertive response, placing sanctions on countries and 
individuals associated with terrorism, and, as one might argue, legitimised the use of 
force as a counterterrorism tool. The attacks on September 11th 2001 had an obvious 
and radical impact on how the organisation responded to terrorism but so too did the 
rise of new threats such as ISIL. There is nevertheless also sufficient evidence to 
suggest that the UN’s response has at times remained strikingly similar in a number 
of ways. The findings moreover expose a number of lines for future inquiries that 
would yield significant analytical benefits.  
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The General Assembly 
When the United Nations set out to tackle terrorism in a general manner in 1972, it 
quickly became apparent that such plans would yield little success. Chapter three has 
chronicled the early struggles to place terrorism on the agenda of the United Nations 
in 1972. It was an increasing number of (dramatic) acts of terrorism, evidenced for 
example by the Lod Airport attack and the Munich Massacre of Israeli athletes in 1972, 
that compelled then-Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim to urge the General Assembly 
to deal with terrorism. Consequently, the Sixth (legal) Committee was tasked with 
forging a collective response to terrorism. This endeavour proved greatly controversial 
and divisive from the very beginning. Nevertheless, the General Assembly formally 
took up the issue of terrorism in resolution 3034 in 1972. With 76 countries voting in 
favour, 35 against, and 17 abstaining, it was foreshadowed that a consensus on the 
matter would evade the organisation for years to come. The competing country blocs 
– where Third World countries and their allies pulled to the one side and countries 
from the West to the other – emerged and with them different views on what terrorism 
is and what to do against it. In fact, discussions in the UNGA were redirected by Third 
World countries (with the help of the Soviet Bloc) towards affirming the right of 
national liberation movements to draw on violence when confronting repressive 
regimes. In essence, individuals resisting colonial rule and foreign occupation (e.g. 
Palestinians) should not be classified as terrorists even in cases where they use 
violence as a tactic for their struggle. At the same time, the elimination of the roots of 
the problem, such as colonialism and repressive regimes, were considered the best way 
to put an end to terrorism.  
 
The United Nations’ position on terrorism has changed significantly since it first 
turned to the issue in the early 1970s, only gradually condemning terrorism under all 
and any circumstances. From the very outset, it was plainly obvious that considerable 
differences between countries exist. Indeed, the very title of the agenda item drew 
significant criticism and was later amended from “measures to prevent terrorism and 
others forms of violence which endanger or take innocent human lives or jeopardize 
fundamental freedoms” to include “and study of the underlying causes of those forms 
of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair 
and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an 
attempt to effect radical changes” (UNGA res. 3034: 1972). Initially, the General 
Assembly was reluctant to condemn terrorism and instead underlined the right to self-
determination. Yet, with the Cold War entering a new phase in 1985, dynamics at the 
UN were gradually shifting. Add to this the fact that countries that formerly supported 
terrorist organisations were more frequently becoming targets of terrorism and hence 
started to see terrorism as a threat to their own power. With the end of the Cold War, 
came an opportunity to cross old division lines on terrorism and attempt new 
initiatives. This shift in UNGA practice could be seen in 1985, in response to the Achille 
Lauro incident, when the UNGA adopted resolution 40/61 and for the first time 
“[u]nequivocally condemn[ed], as criminal, all acts, methods and practises of terrorism 
wherever and by whomever committed, including those which jeopardize friendly 
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relations among States and their security” (UNGA 40/61: 1985, operative para. 1). In 
1991, the General Assembly went a step further and for the first time shortened the 
title of the agenda to ‘measures to eliminate international terrorism.’ This new title 
reflected a wider consensus that the root causes of terrorism did not justify acts of 
terrorism (see UNGA resolution 46/51). However, until 1994 all resolutions continued 
to include a reference to the right to self-determination against colonial and racist 
regimes (Halberstam: 2003, 575). The most radical change to the organisation’s 
position on terrorism came with the adoption of resolution 49/60 and the attached 
Declaration in 1994. Possibly the most significant provisions of the Declaration was its 
complete condemnation “of all acts, methods and practises of terrorism as criminal 
and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomever committed” (UNGA 49/60: 1994, op. 
para. 1) and the General Assembly’s emphasis that criminal “acts intended or 
calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public…are in any circumstance 
unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of political, philosophical, ideological, racial, 
ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them” (UNGA res. 
49/60: 1994, op. para. 3). With it, the General Assembly established a novel standard 
in respect to terrorism and was becoming more comprehensive in its condemnation 
of terrorism. This change was only possible because of “…a series of terrorist attacks 
carried out by radical Islamic groups against Middle East and other Muslim and non-
Muslim third world countries [that] had begun to change many NAM countries’ 
perception of the risks posed by international terrorism” (Comras: 2010, 175). The 
Declaration signifies a break with a long-term position held by the General Assembly 
(e.g. the acceptance of political violence in some cases) and “represents as close to a 
comprehensive ban on terrorism as the UN has come” (Boulden: 2014, 568). At the 
same time the General Assembly stopped making direct references to the inalienable 
right to self-determination. The General Assembly, including after 9/11, has continued 
to strengthen and expand on the provisions contained in the 1994 Declaration (e.g. see 
the amendment made in 1996) and has solidified its formal condemnation of terrorism 
no matter how noble the cause. The Assembly thus transitioned from a body that made 
provisions for terrorism when committed in the course of national liberation to one 
that condemned terrorism under all and any circumstances irrespective of the origins 
or motives of the perpetrator. The support for the shift of position by member states 
could however only be won, by remaining vague on the very definition of what 
constitutes an act of terrorism.  
After 9/11, the General Assembly’s position on terrorism is marked by a significant 
degree of continuity. As this thesis has shown, the organisation, or at the very least the 
majority in the General Assembly, is still, today, not clear on where it stands on the 
use of political violence. Since the 53rd session (1998-1999) the General Assembly 
engaged in a practise of ambiguity when it comes to the body’s position on terrorism. 
As chapter five has discussed at some length, the General Assembly has enacted 
numerous resolutions from 1998 until 2019 which made reference to a final document 
adopted by the Conference of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned 
Countries. From a brief review of some of the final documents, it becomes clear that 
members of the NAM “[o]ppose attempts to equate the legitimate struggle of peoples 
under colonial or alien domination and foreign occupation for self-determination and 
 
 
- 147 - 
national liberation with terrorism…” (Final Document Conf. NAM: 2016, 83). The 
reference is not included in the operative portions of the resolutions; yet, when 
governments interpret the respective resolution, also in respect to the spirit in which 
it was adopted, it is likely that these references will inform member states’ 
understanding of the terrorism issue. This matters because UNGA resolutions may 
consequently validate the use of political violence in some circumstances (e.g. foreign 
occupation), albeit only indirectly. So far, one continuity in the UN’s stance on 
terrorism over the past 50 years has been that a common understanding of what 
constitutes terrorism continues to elude the United Nations. And, given the 
unresolved conflicts which influence this stance, namely the conflict in the Middle 
East and the stand-off between India and Pakistan, this strategy is going to continue.  
The United Nations’ record on terrorism is, however, not all bleak. Over the course of 
the past four decades the General Assembly adopted an impressive series of 
international treaties with counterterrorism application, indicating the seriousness 
that counties have attached to the threat of terrorism since the early 1970s. They were 
also willing to adopt concrete measures: The Diplomats Convention was a substantial 
step forward and is a prime example that when an issue of common interest – the 
orderly conduct of diplomatic relations – is at stake, governments are able to take swift 
action. The Hostages Convention adopted six years later (1979) serves as further 
evidence that although disagreement over the exact nature of terrorism – and how it 
differs from national liberation movements – still persists, compromise is possible. As 
already alluded to, plans for a comprehensive convention quickly revealed that a very 
general approach had no chances for a successful outcome and instead, a crime-
specific approach would yield the highest probability of success. While there is 
generally a consensus that the conventions were indeed a great accomplishment - even 
if only on a purely symbolic level as expressions of the UN’s intention to combat 
terrorism - one also has to be aware of their short-comings. For instance, when the 
Diplomats Convention was adopted it was done in conjunction with resolution 3166. 
Resolution 3166 stipulated “that the provisions of the annexed Convention [Diplomats 
Convention] could not in any way prejudice the exercise of the legitimate right to self-
determination” (UNGA res. 3166, para. 4). Paragraph 6 further noted that the 
resolution and the convention should always be published together. Consequently, if 
a state considered the condition of the resolution to be met, it could refuse to extradite 
the accused (Green: 1974, 727). The 1979 Hostages Convention was not adopted with 
such a resolution; it however also contains an important qualification: in the preamble 
of the convention (para. 3) member states reaffirmed the principle of self-
determination suggesting that the use of political violence can be justified. Arguably, 
this again may be mistaken for a validation of the use of political violence if the 
circumstances so warrant. The Hostages Convention moreover introduced a caveat 
that allows governments to refuse extradition if a party has ‘substantial grounds’ to 
believe that an extradition request is made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing 
someone based on race, religion, and most notably, a political opinion (Hostages 
Convention: 1979, Art. 9). This was a significant development because, although the 
motivation of the perpetrator was removed from the equation, governments would 
have a loophole under which they could refuse extradition. And despite still having to 
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submit the case to their competent authorities for prosecution (Article 8) there is a 
gap as proper prosecution of a culprit might be prevented due to sympathetic 
sentiments with the cause, in turn not removing safe havens. Notwithstanding these 
short-comings, both conventions signalled that the international community was 
growing increasingly serious about tackling terrorism. Although resolution 51/210 in 
1996 provided a new mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism to address the 
task of a comprehensive convention, familiar difficulties quickly re-emerged and no 
results materialised. It was thus no accident that member states decided to follow a 
piecemeal strategy again in the 1990s. Willing to tighten the international 
community’s framework against terrorism, member states adopted the Terrorist 
Bombing Convention and the Terrorist Financing Convention in 1997 and 1999, 
respectively. In many ways, these conventions are a continuation of previous patterns 
as they again focus on specific aspects of terrorism and also enshrine again an 
obligation to extradite or try a suspect. In contrast to previous conventions, however, 
the Terrorist Bombing Convention explicitly recognises that the offence of terrorist 
bombing is not a political offence nor one that is politically motivated and thus a 
request for extradition cannot be rejected due to the political nature of the crime 
(Bombing Convention: 1997, Art. 11).  
While this convention still abided by old patterns, the Terrorist Financing Convention 
was a considerable novelty, as the UN addressed the phenomenon in more general -
and also pre-emptive – terms for the first time by criminalising the funding of 
terrorism. The General Assembly was thus, by 1999, willing to move towards targeting 
the means that make terrorism possible and hence trying to stop terrorism before it 
could even emerge. The more recent conventions (Terrorist Bombing and Terrorist 
Financing), while not entirely new in principle, have become more explicit in 
excluding political offence exceptions as a reason to not extradite. It is thus also a step 
forward to explicitly exclude the political offence exception, as both the Bombing 
Convention (Art. 11) and the Terrorist Financing Convention (Art. 14) have done; 
however, member states have simultaneously left a gap by allowing governments to 
refuse extradition if the request is made in an attempt to punish someone based on his 
race, religion, or political views. Now it might be argued that such provisions were 
perhaps included in an attempt to safeguard human rights. Indeed, Article 15 of the 
Terrorist Financing Convention ensures a government’s right to refuse extradition if 
there are grounds to believe that the request is made on the basis of race, religion, or 
on the political views of the individual. This is problematic as an offender might 
commit a crime in one country and escape to a country favourable to his or her cause 
and extradition may consequently be rejected under the guise of the protective 
elements laid out in Article 15 of the Terrorist Financing Convention. Granted, legally, 
parties are still obliged to submit the case to its authorities for the purpose of 
prosecution, as Article 10 of the Terrorist Financing Convention stipulates for example, 
but the provision only means that prosecution will be sought, but not that punishment 
will be guaranteed. Thus, in cases where a government might be favourable to a 
specific cause, the UN-convention system falls short and does not provide a 
mechanism to enforce the provisions of the convention. In essence, the 
implementation of the aut dedere aut judicare principle, to a considerable extent, 
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depends on the willingness of member states. Indeed, governments must rely on one 
another for the convention-regime to take full effect. Given all the ambiguities that 
continue to persist, as demonstrated throughout, it remains questionable whether the 
convention-regime is implemented in the manner its drafters had intended. This is 
however not just a problem for international terrorism legislation but remains a 
difficulty faced in the implementation of international law more generally.  
The General Assembly has seen both changes and continuities in its efforts to curb 
terrorist violence. The problems that have prevented swift action in the early 1970s 
have remained consistent and are unlikely to yield any concrete solutions in the near 
future (e.g. defining terrorism). However, the piecemeal approach taken by the 
organisation has urged governments to take stern and public stances on some aspects 
related to terrorist violence (e.g. Hostage-taking) while allowing governments to take 
more demanding and public positions elsewhere (e.g. the Sixth Committee). 
Therefore, counterterrorism cooperation is possible at the UN (e.g. on the Hostages or 
Bombing conventions), but it is best done when it is away from the political limelight.  
 
The Security Council 
The United Nations Security Council is arguably the most powerful of the UN organs. 
This is partly due to its role as ‘concert’ assembling the most powerful states. Moreover, 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations grants the Council powers to 
determine what constitutes a threat to international peace and security (Article 39) 
and to take measures short of the use of force (Article 41), such as sanctions, as well as 
measures involving the use of force (Article 42). Provisions adopted under Chapter VII 
have a direct implication for member states as these are binding on all countries. As 
the permanent members of the Council yield most influence, they can also obstruct 
the Council through the use of their veto powers, as has happened on numerous 
occasions throughout the Cold War and beyond. During the forty-yearlong Cold War, 
it was difficult for the Security Council to take assertive action against terrorism. When 
the Council turned to the aftermath of the Lod Airport assault in 1972, for instance, it 
was only able to agree on a meagre statement (Romaniuk: 2016, 279). And as already 
discussed, in response to the Munich Olympic hostage-taking in the same year, a draft 
resolution condemning the attacks and calling for action against terrorism 
(introduced by the United States) did not attract much support and a compromise 
draft introduced by European powers provoked the veto of China and the Soviet Union. 
Likewise, a draft by the Non-Aligned Movement, which made no mention of terrorism 
nor the incident in Munich, was vetoed by the United States. As chapters four and five 
have outlined in more detail, the Security Council was also not spared from political 
quarrels. Therefore, the issue of terrorism fell victim to geopolitical considerations in 
the Council: for instance, the Soviet Union and China supported Palestine in its quest 
for independence and the Soviet Union was keen on building a strong relationship and 
influence with the Third World. As a result of a number of high-profile terrorist attacks 
(e.g. Achille Lauro) and the coming to the end of Cold War politics, however, the 
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Council was gradually turning to terrorism in a more constructive and assertive 
manner.  
In the 1970s and in the 1980s, a number of countries, mostly from the Middle East and 
North Africa, were involved in supporting terrorist organisations (Heupel: 2007, 480). 
As a result, the SC, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, imposed sanctions on 
Libya in 1992, against the Sudan in 1996, and against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan 
in 1999. Breaking with earlier policies, the SC now applied sanctions as an intrusive 
and repressive tool to dissuade states from engaging in terrorism, or in its support. 
The results were mixed. In the case of Libya, the sanctions were successful and only 
lifted when the suspected terrorists were delivered to The Hague to face trial. 
Contrariwise, documentation suggest that the sanctions placed on the Taliban regime 
in Afghanistan had little effect. Indeed, it became clear that the 1267 sanction-regime 
did little in dissuading the Taliban from providing support to bin Laden and his al-
Qaeda organisation. Consequently, the Council moved to adopt resolution 1333, the 
passing of which represented a major development in the UN’s efforts to curb quasi 
state-supported terrorist activity. This was an important milestone as the UNSC was 
realising that its previous measures would not be successful and it was thus adapting 
its approach, targeting individual people and their assets. Indeed, the sanctions-
regime proceeded to target assets of bin Laden and his associates. The most pertinent 
development, however, was the extension of the sanctions to include members of al- 
Qaeda. This was the first time that the SC was directly targeting individuals rather 
than governments, and their commercial interests (Comras: 2010, 70). As noted, this 
was a deviation from the Council’s established practise previously insofar that 
resolution 1267 only made passing reference to bin Laden and his associates. It is 
however important to recall that a noticeable similarity was that both resolutions 1267 
and 1333 were adopted with a geographic context (Afghanistan) in mind and did not 
have a global reach (Luck: 2006, 99). While Libyan sanctions were largely in response 
to a specific terrorist incident172 (e.g. Pan Am 103) and applied to the whole of Libya, 
the 1267 Taliban sanction-regime was limited to the territory controlled by the Taliban 
and not in response to one particular act of terrorism. In fact, as chapter four and five 
have submitted, the 1267 sanction-regime remains in place today and has significantly 
been expanded. On that score, it is thus worth concluding that the response taken by 
the Council in the 1990s was not only unparalleled in its assertiveness but moreover 
laid the foundation for the Security Council’s response following the attacks on 
September 11th 2001 and against ISIL in 2015.  
Chapter five focused on the Security Council’s response to terrorism following the 
attacks on September 11th and has traced the body’s major developments on this subject 
until 2019. After almost two decades since 9/11, the Security Council has arguably 
emerged as the most assertive counterterrorism actor in the UN system. It has filled 
that role by continuing practices from before 9/11 but also by developing new 
approaches. Since 2001, the Council has adopted an impressive series of resolutions 
 
172 Although one has to acknowledge that Libyan support for terrorism greatly occupied the United States. Yet, 
Security Council action remained absent until 1992, after investigations into Pan Am flight 103 and UTA flight 
772 implicated the Libyan government.  
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that have come to build a regulatory counterterrorism framework. Above all, the 
Council has grown increasingly comfortable in labelling terrorism per se as a threat to 
international peace (see Art. 39 of UNC). Previously, the SC held that only the conduct 
of a state (e.g. Libya’s refusal to extradite terrorist suspects) constituted a threat to 
peace. Now the actions of individuals as well could trigger the Security Council to 
make full use of its powers granted by the UNC, including both forceful and non-
forceful means. The resolutions adopted by the Council represent a considerable 
deviation from pre-9/11 practise as resolutions 1368 and 1373 moved to not only address 
terrorism in a general manner but moreover imposed far-reaching and legally-binding 
obligations on all member states. Granted, earlier resolutions (e.g. resolution 635 (1989) 
and resolution 1269 (1999)) condemned terrorism in general but did not place binding 
obligations on member states to respond to terrorism. The SC did not develop its 
approach out of the blue. In fact, earlier work done by the UN served as a basis for the 
new resolutions regime as the obligations imposed on member states with resolution 
1373 in many ways reflect the provisions of the 1999 Terrorist Financing Convention. 
Yet while the convention was negotiated involving all UN members through the GA, 
resolution 1373 places binding obligations on all countries, many of which had no say 
in the details of the resolution. This is indeed noteworthy as the Council clearly side-
stepped the General Assembly and made provisions only applicable to parties of the 
Terrorist Financing Convention legally binding on all, irrespective of whether they 
ratified the convention.  
Continuing a pattern from the past, the Security Council counterterrorism resolutions 
adopted in post-9/11 also continue to be designed in response to new threats. In that 
sense, the Security Council continues its old practice to take a reactive, rather than 
proactive, response to terrorism.173 While this practise is certainly not new, it is not 
necessarily a point of criticism of the SC approach. In fact, it demonstrates that the 
Council is able to take swift, assertive, and forceful action if the political interests of 
the (permanent) members of the Council are aligned.  
As noted above, in little under two decades, the Security Council significantly 
expanded the United Nations’ sanctions-regime. The most significant change to the 
UN sanctions-regime however came in the form of resolution 1390 in 2002. The United 
Nations, for the first-time imposed sanctions without any specific geographic context 
in mind, in turn extending the sanctions globally (Birkhäuser: 2005, 5-6). In the 
meantime, the evolving peace process in Afghanistan made it politically opportune for 
the Council to split the sanctions-regime, removing members of the Taliban and its 
associates from the Consolidated List, as they were now allies in developing a post-war 
Afghanistan. What was formally the Taliban and Al Qaeda Sanctions List was now 
reconstructed to only include members and associates of al-Qaida (see UNSC res. 
1989). The Security Council thus moved from a state-focused sanctions approach (e.g. 
 
173 Resolutions 1368 and 1373 were adopted in the aftermath of 9/11 and it was the revelations of the A.Q. Khan 
network in 2004 that compelled member states to adopt resolution 1540. These practises continued well into 
the 2000s when the Council adopted resolution 1566 as a result of the Beslan hostage-taking, resolution 1624 
in response to the attacks in London in 2005 and resolutions 2178 and 2396 amidst the threat posed by foreign 
terrorist fighters in 2014 and 2017, respectively. 
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Libya) to a more nuanced one, focusing on the actual actors of terrorism (e.g. al-
Qaeda).  
The rise of ISIL introduced an unprecedented threat to the world, one that would place 
countries under significant pressure to take action. Yet ISIL was a new sort of actor 
too. While terrorists in design, it also exerted control of specific territories and had 
state-like features (e.g. tax collection and a health system). ISIL’s brutal and very 
public campaign in Iraq and Syria was gradually spilling over to Europe, compelling 
governments to extend the UN sanctions-regime to include ISIL. Thus, with resolution 
2253, adopted in 2015, the al-Qaeda sanctions list, became the “ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-
Qaeda Sanctions List.” This development shows, though, that the 1267 sanctions-
regime first put in place in 1999 in response to the Taliban regime and its support for 
al-Qaeda remains a central component in the Security Council’s counterterrorism 
repository. It is maintained in essence and adapted to the changing circumstances. 
The past decades have also demonstrated that the Council is willing to correct the 
regime in response to criticism. And while the Consolidated Sanctions List and the 
listing and delisting process continue to be criticised on human rights and due process 
grounds, chapter five has shown that the Security Council is willing to take criticism 
on board when revisiting the scheme. As Comras concluded in 2010, governments 
initially viewed the Consolidated List as an opportunity to squelch their own local 
insurgencies, or to otherwise taint opposition groups, providing name that had 
nothing to do with the Taliban or al Qaeda” (Comras: 2010, 95). Consequently, Security 
Council amended some of the regime’s short-comings. In 2005, for instance, the 
Council adopted resolution 1612 and established a set of criteria which outline what is 
considered an affiliation or membership with al-Qaeda (operative para. 2); and in 2006 
the Council obliged member states to provide more information on the reason for 
listing a designee (UNSC res. 1735: 2006, operative para. 5). It has hence become 
apparent that the Security Council’s response to terrorism is not static but that the 
body is able to build on existing instruments as new circumstances emerge and to 
respond to criticism. The Council’s response is thus shaped by ongoing developments.  
Looking at it from a long-term perspective, the response taken by the Council has 
developed in a number of ways. Since 2001, the UNSC has established a legally-binding 
and quasi legislative framework through which member states are expected to respond 
to terrorism, although it falls short of properly defining what constitutes terrorism. 
Also, the findings suggest that the UNSC has used its considerable powers, 
traditionally not designed to deal with terrorism, to respond to the threat. The perhaps 
most notable point of contention in this context is the Council’s acknowledgment of 
the right to use force as a legitimate counterterrorism instrument by member states. 
This debate on this development is nowhere near over and there remains considerable 
debate on its permissibility, especially in the legal community. With that in mind, 
however, this thesis argues that prior to 9/11 the use of force as a counterterrorism 
instrument was widely rejected, see for instance when the US attacked Libya in 1986. 
Back then, the notion that governments were acting in self-defence to terrorism, and 
would therefore be allowed to use force was rejected (Byers: 2003, 407). This changed 
with the attacks on 9/11. Indeed, it was not until after 2001 that the right to self-defence 
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in countering terrorism gained traction. Especially resolutions 1368 and 1373 have 
served as the basis for the use of force against terrorism and were important 
instruments in legitimizing the use of unilateral force to respond to terrorism. This, 
however, does not imply that there is a general consensus on the use of force against 
terrorists in any and all circumstances (see US reaction to Russian strikes on Georgia) 
but a military approach on terrorism is gaining traction. Evidence for this claim can 
be found in the Security Council’s forceful action against ISIL. When ISIL bombed a 
Russian plane over the Sinai desert and engaged in a series of brutal terrorist attacks 
in France in 2015, the Council was ready to declare the organisation a threat of 
unprecedented nature. The resulting resolution 2249 called upon member states to 
take all necessary measures against ISIL in the territories controlled by the 
organisation in Syria and Iraq. In spite of not explicitly mentioning the right to self-
defence, the adoption of the resolution demonstrates the Council’s support for 
countries to engage in military action against the terrorist group. At the very least it 
lends political support for countries to take unilateral (or collective) action (see 
statement by British Prime Minister in chapter five). Of particular relevance is however 
to note that the Council transferred the responsibility away from the UN and towards 
member states, although the Council retains control on defining what terrorist 
organisation is a legitimate target (e.g. ISIL). The record reflects that the Council was 
not willing to mandate a multilateral enforcement operation in the sense of Article 42 
but phrased the mandate as broad as possible (‘take all necessary measures’), albeit 
within the defined territory in Syria and in Iraq. Yet there is as of yet no clear trend in 
UNSC practice on this matter of the ‘military approach’. For instance, while resolutions 
1368 and 1373 make explicit reference to the right to self-defence, resolution 2249 does 
not.174 The adoption of resolution 2249 further suggests that the Council was only 
willing to recognise the right to self-defence against non-state terrorist actors when 
another state is unable or unwilling to counter a certain terrorist threat in its territory 
(e.g. Syria). This was indeed a break with previous practise, as the right to self-defence, 
on the basis of resolutions 1368 and 1373, was predominantly invoked against the 
Taliban – a quasi-state. The implications of resolution 2249 remain to be determined, 
but one might suggest that the resolution sets – a somewhat dangerous precedent - 
insofar as that it allows any state to use force against non-state actors present in 
another state if that latter state is unable or ‘unwilling’ to suppress the threat. More 
generally, the UNSC might shift towards a military approach in responding to 
terrorism, one that could potentially serve as a carte blanche for some states to 
intervene in other countries. Consequently, fears that counterterrorism might be used 
as a justification for foreign intervention may become reality.  
The Security Council, as demonstrated, has evolved into a considerable and assertive 
counterterrorism actor. The Council has on numerous occasions shown its ability to 
adjust its practises to changing environments. It is, however, important to remember 
that the composition of the Security Council raises questions of legitimacy. It is only 
composed of 15 members, 5 of which are the permanent members (mirroring the 
 
174 Although some scholars argue it does indirectly support such an approach as suggested by Akande & 
Milanovic in “The Constructive Ambiguity of the Security Council’s ISIS Resolution”.  
 
 
- 154 - 
power situation of 1945) and the remaining 10 are elected on a two-year basis without 
a right to veto. These 5 +10 countries can make far-reaching decisions with immediate 
repercussions on states and individuals. Equally importantly, while the Council has 
adopted far-reaching and legally-binding counterterrorism instruments, and 
established a permanent institutional structure (Counter-Terrorism Committee) to 
administer monitoring, it has continued to leave significant leeway in interpretation 
and implementation. Although UNSC resolution 1566 provided a working definition 
of terrorism, a formal definition remains absent, giving countries a broad mandate to 
pursue terrorists with their own experiences and understandings in mind. In light of a 
shift towards a more military approach, one that gives significant leeway to states to 
interpret the nature of a terrorist threat, this is indeed a development that warrants 
careful and critical examination.  
There is, hence, no simple answer to the research questions that underpin this PhD 
project, as developments have been both vast and complex. The United Nations’ 
response to terrorism since 1972 has been marked by changes and continuities. The 
General Assembly gradually came to terms with condemning terrorism no matter how 
noble the cause, yet, as noted earlier, some ambiguities remain. This makes it difficult 
to characterise the UNGA’s position on terrorism, even today. The sectoral approach 
taken by the Assembly remained a consistency throughout the UN’s history in dealing 
with the issue of terrorism, whereas the Terrorist Financing Convention represents a 
noteworthy novelty considering its general treatment of the issue. The Security 
Council moved from a state-focused approach to a more nuanced focus on non-state 
actors of terrorism and has hence demonstrated its ability to respond to emerging 
developments. Following the attacks on September 11th, the Security Council moreover 
lent political support for countries to engage militarily against terrorists. The Council 
reaffirmed this approach more recently by adopting resolution 2249, although limiting 
the scope to ISIL in territories in Iraq and parts of Syria.  
The evidence presented in this thesis allows for a number of wider considerations. To 
begin with, while the world is certainly better off with the United Nations than without 
it, counterterrorism at the United Nations remains a cumbersome and at times a 
frustrating policy field. The perhaps biggest short-coming of the UN in dealing with 
terrorism is the General Assembly’s inability to adopt a comprehensive convention 
against terrorism. It is, however, of particular importance to note here, that the failure 
to agree on a general way forward against terrorism has evaded the organisation since 
1973 and is thus not a recent recurrence. Although 9/11 certainly provided new impetus 
for the negotiations, the political quarrels and the contrasting opinions of what 
constitutes terrorism have remained similar at their core over the past 50 years and 
have prevented the adoption of such an instrument, although countries can agree on 
the necessity of such a convention. Notwithstanding the absence of success in these 
negotiations, remarkably, member states have not dismissed the idea of such a 
convention. Nor should they. The adoption of such an instrument would demonstrate 
that the international community stands united in its response to terrorism; and it 
would provide much needed clarity to the UN’s counterterrorism architecture as a 
common definition is still missing, leaving countries with significant leeway in 
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implementing UN measures. The adoption of such a convention would also augment 
the UN’s credibility in its efforts to quell terrorist violence. Despite the absence of a 
comprehensive convention, a counterterrorism-regime has nevertheless been 
developed by sectoral conventions. The UN conventions facilitate the process of 
criminalising terrorism step-by- step and by providing the basis for apprehending and 
extraditing or prosecuting suspects even if the crime was not committed on that state’s 
territory. Despite the sectoral response taken by the UN, the rise of suicide terrorism 
puts into question whether the prosecution and extradition approach taken over the 
past four decades remains effective. Focus, as Blumenau has already noted in 2014, 
should thus increasingly be placed on prevention rather than punishment. So the UN 
should shift its focus to prevent terrorism from even materialising. The Terrorist 
Financing Convention does exactly that but it is an exception that proves the rule. All 
other conventions only criminalise a certain set of crimes and the drafting of 
conventions has mostly been in reaction to the rise of new threats. The process has 
thus been reactive and post-factum. This certainly does not diminish their value; 
nevertheless, a comprehensive convention would add a pre-emptive element to the 
organisation’s response to terrorism. It appears progressively clear that governments 
cannot afford to continue down the path of a problem-specific response without 
defining terrorism by means of a comprehensive convention, nor can they solely rely 
on the Security Council to take meaningful action. Governments would always remain 
one step behind as terrorist develop new methods, forcing countries to respond after 
threats emerge. At the same time, though, member states should not water down the 
provisions of a potential comprehensive convention to the extent that it becomes 
utterly meaningless, in an attempt to accommodate as broad a consensus as possible. 
The findings of this thesis however suggest that if countries can reach compromise on 
a comprehensive convention, the instrument will likely be nothing more than a 
symbolic endeavour.  
The definition of terrorism has plagued academics, practitioners, law-makers, and the 
layman alike. It is not merely an academic exercise but, as pointed out frequently, has 
real-life implications. Both the General Assembly and the Security Council have come 
close to a definition. Indeed, the UNGA included one in the 1999 Terrorist Financing 
Convention when it defined the act of terrorist financing as the unlawful or wilful 
provisions of funds “in order to carry out (b) [a]ny other act intended to cause death 
or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part 
in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its 
nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an 
international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act” (Terrorist Financing 
Convention: 1999, Article 2(b)). The Security Council assumed a similar working 
definition in 2004 when it adopted resolution 1566 (see chapter five). Nevertheless, 
both attempts did not produce a formal definition that is applied throughout the UN 
and consequently a global definition of terrorism is still overdue. As long as member 
states fail to agree on a global definition of terrorism, there is a risk that 
counterterrorism measures might be abused by states.  
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Over the course of the past half-decade, the United Nations has faced a plethora of 
obstacles when responding to terrorism and drew a lot of criticism of its approach. Yet, 
an examination of the UN’s response to terrorism also gives rise to a sense of optimism. 
The international realities (e.g. Cold War and decolonisation) that have made fighting 
terrorism a contentious endeavour have not prevented the UN from keeping it on its 
agenda nevertheless. The organisation has taken significant steps in countering 
terrorist activities, including the adoption of a crime-specific convention-regime, 
sanctions against members and affiliates of al-Qaida and ISIL, as well as a legally-
binding and quasi-legislative resolution framework. Moreover, as Blumenau (2014) has 
also shown, the General Assembly has served as a useful forum through which member 
states can voice their positions on terrorism very publicly to please domestic audiences 
while making concessions behind closed doors (Blumenau 2014b, 104). One also must 
not forget that the UN is comprised of 193 member states that not only have different 
political and legal systems but that moreover harbour very different historical 
experiences with terrorism; with some countries even coming into existence through 
some acts that could be considered terroristic. In sum, the United Nations, within the 
limitations it has to operate in, contributes to the global efforts to quell terrorist 
violence. Realistically, commentators must assess their expectations against the 
limitations placed on the organisation by its members. Indeed, the UN is only as strong 
as its members allow it to be. Hence, bearing this acknowledgment in mind, member 
states must make an honest assessment of the extent to which they have provided the 
UN with the necessary conditions (not just in respect to mandate) to respond to 
terrorism in a cohesive and clear manner. And member states can only claim to be 
doing so when they finally manage to adopt a comprehensive convention against 
terrorism and agree a consensus definition.  
This leads us to a bigger question: Is the UN actually the most pertinent organisation 
to deal with terrorism? Over the past fifty years, the international nature of terrorism 
has intensified and has conversely made multilateral responses through international 
fora even more important. The findings previously discussed have highlighted a 
number of avenues for further research and the limitations addressed at the beginning 
of this thesis leave open a number of worthy research endeavours. First and foremost, 
this thesis has been limited in scope and therefore a number of responses taken by the 
United Nations have not received the attention that they merit. To name one example, 
in 2006 the General Assembly adopted the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. 
This initiative has not been discussed as it is not a concrete measure but rather an 
overarching strategic endeavour and it thus remains to be shown how this has had an 
impact on the response of the organisation. Furthermore, since 2001 (some even before) 
most international organisations have realized that terrorism touches upon their own 
fields of work and that they can no longer afford to ignore the threat. Despite the 
growing importance of multilateral counterterrorism, academics have not dedicated 
sufficient efforts to examining the response taken by international organisations to 
terrorism, especially from a historical perspective. This is surprising as a thorough and 
systematic assessment would yield many insights into how future counterterrorism 
efforts should look like and what is a likely response that would achieve support from 
countries. Indeed, one of the main conclusions that should be taken from this thesis 
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is that terrorism has different meanings that are informed by country-specific 
experiences, which in turn make multilateral counterterrorism cooperation very 
difficult. International organisations will certainly remain essential in any response to 
terrorism, yet academics (and governments) must also consider successes and failures 
of less comprehensive organisations, organisations that are technical and regional in 
nature. In simpler terms, academics ought to explore if other forums are more suited 
to dealing with terrorism than the United Nations. In particular: In what ways have 
other international organisations (regional, technical) responded to terrorism? What 
efforts have been successful and which ones have been controversial? And does the 
nature of the organisation (global vs. regional vs. technical) have an impact on the 
response and the extent to which it has been successful? Focus should rest on the 
extent to which, if at all, regional and technical bodies are more suited to designing 
counterterrorism efforts and if implementation is more successful given that members 
of regional organisations are more alike and technical bodies can ideally circumvent 
political and ideologically motivated obstacles. This research project has above all also 
demonstrated that a historical analysis is vital in gaining a complete picture. 
Conversely, future research should examine and assess the response taken by 
international organisations over time.  
On a second note, future research needs to pay special attention to implementation 
processes and should address the degree to which countries have implemented the 
obligations coming from international organisations. In this respect, it is also 
necessary to see how organisations deal with non-compliance and countries’ failure to 
live up to their obligations. Moreover, as has been shown, in the post-9/11 era, the 
Security Council has taken a more assertive and mandatory approach when 
responding to terrorism. Yet there is no legal definition of terrorism leaving member 
states considerable leeway in implementation of SC measures. Future research ought 
to examine the extent to which this poses a problem to the coherent implementation 
of Council resolutions and the extent to which member states have a common 
understanding of the threat that they are trying to curtail. As such, a country analysis 
has become necessary.  
Finally, two further research areas have emerged and would yield great insights. This 
thesis, as have previous works, has established that tackling terrorism within the 
General Assembly is burdensome and takes time. It has also been demonstrated that 
the Security Council has evolved into a critical counterterrorism actor that is able to 
take swift and decisive action (e.g. resolution 1373). This is certainly, inter alia, also the 
result of the Council’s powers and procedures granted to it by the UN Charter. In 2006 
Stiles focused on the place of procedure in international organisations, in essence, 
trying to understand to what extent rules have an impact on policy outcomes. In fact, 
it was found that the United States turned to the Security Council after 9/11 because it 
was this body that would allow for quick and decisive action (Stiles: 2006, 39). And 
while a number of insights have been created, future research should try to understand 
the impact of rules and procedure more recently, particularly in the UN’s response to 
ISIL and the extent to which other forums might be – from a procedural point of view 
– better suited to address terrorism. Finally, any international organisation is 
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composed of states. And states are guided by their own interests. National interests 
have been a major aspect of academic studies of international organisations for some 
time but it is still important for academics to understand the role of national interest 
in negotiating counterterrorism outcomes at the UN (and other organisations). 
Therefore, future inquiries ought to consider archival research to better understand 
how national interests and country-specific positions have shaped the United Nations 
efforts to curb terrorist violence.  
If history is any indication, terrorism is here to stay and it is likely to retain its 
international character. Kofi Annan’s remarks to the General Assembly in 2002 on the 
importance of international counterterrorism cooperation (see quote beginning of 
chapter six) hold as true today as they did then; states can certainly take unilateral 
action against terrorists but it is the collective action taken by states that will deny 
terrorists the ability to strike. The issues that the UN faces must be taken seriously and 
it is doubtful that the organisation and its members will be able to solve century-old 
feuds quickly, but the UN was after all created to maintain international peace and 
security and to foster global cooperation. It has been the hope of this thesis to 
underscore that the global struggle against terrorism has been bumpy to say the least 
but that the alternative – that is, having no global response to terrorism at all – is not 
a scenario that anyone should desire. The United Nations remains the best chance we 
have to deal with terrorism globally.  
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